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During the last two decades more than 120 countries of the world have 
faced some or the other form of banking crises. Many a times these 
crises were such of large scales that it virtually threatened the international 
payment system. The governments and monetary authorities, to avert these 
crises and to stop the contagion, had to intervene but only at the enormous 
public costs to the national GDP ranging up to 40-45 %. 
Several studies have been conducted by various world bodies like IMF. 
World Bank, Bank for hiternational Settlements (BIS) and national institutions 
apart from various reports and studies by the ailing governments. Many 
theories have been postulated about the causes and their solutions. However, 
the situation remained where it had been. The frequency of these crises has 
been an increasing trend in spite of several measures taken at the national and 
international levels. 
Major theories put forth about the causes of these crises discovered 
inefficiency, underdeveloped economy and un-regulated capital market as the 
main causes of the crises. These findings, however, faltered when some o1' the 
most efficient, developed and highly regulated capital market countries like 
US. Japan, Switzerland and Malaysia faced severe banking crises during the 
recent past. Sometimes countries faced with the crisis were so diversified in 
their economic strength that it was almost impossible to find a common cause 
leave alone their solutions. 
Muslim economists (mostly called Islamic economists) saw these 
problems from another angle. Though initially basing their arguments on 
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religious, moral and ethical considerations, over a period of time, to prove their 
thesis, they came out strongly with more contemporary experiences. They also 
tried to seek support in scattered western writings. However, a major support to 
Islamic economists came in the form of recent financial theories which 
suggested that the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure. 
Besides, an earlier incident that gave unprecedented boost to their concept, was 
the fall of Philips curve that had hypothesized a stable trade off between 
inflation and unemployment. As Professor Norman of the London School of 
Economics observed, "The most crucial change that has occurred in my own 
lifetime about our way of thinking about the working of the macro-economic 
system was the shift from a belief that the Phillips curve remained downward 
sloping, even in the longer term, to the belief that it would become vertical".' 
Islamic economists, in their diagnosis, attributed major reason of these 
crises to collateral based fixed pay mechanism (i.e. interest). They tried to 
prove that it is the 'interest'^ which is at the root of all economic crises. For 
them, it is the interest that leads to uneven business cycle resulting in boom and 
recession. It is the interest that, using the tolls of debt and speculation, de-links 
the financial economy from the real one. It also leads to widening the gap 
between the rich and the poor bringing social unrest and hatred in the society. 
Islamic economists' attack on interest revolved around several aspects: 
• Theoretical justification of interest as a price for capital. 
• Moral justification of interest; as all the major religions, philosophers 
and philanthropists had proscribed or deplored the practices of interest 
(usury). 
• Empirical justification; has interest been able to perform its assigned 
task efficiently, justifiably and led to growth and stability? 
Sosnow, Norman , 'Whi ther Central Banking? ' , Eleventh Chintaman De.shmukh Lecture. Reserve 
Bunk of India, December 7. 2000. 
' A predetermined f ixed payment to one of the constituents of the production irrespecti\ c of the actual 
ou tcome of the business. 
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Islamic economists point out that all the theories of interest, time 
preference; liquidity; and abstinence; have failed to justify the existence of 
interest as price for capital when other factors of production are not assured of 
their fixed positive return. Another reason deploring the practices of interest is 
moral which says that it is unjustified when risks of the business are not 
distributed equally on all the factors of production. Other factors are, in fact, 
exposed to more risk when one of them is insured. This unnecessarily puts a 
restriction on entrepreneurial capabilities and innovations, apart from raising 
the cost of production. Few of the very desirable investments are abandoned 
only because of not being able to cover the cost of interest. On the other hand, 
some of the undesirable economic activities, including speculations and 
gambling are freely undertaken because they carry a high-expected return. 
The Islamic economists are more scathing against the empirical 
justification of interest. How a system can be efficient when the criteria for 
selecting a project is not based on its merit but on the financial worthiness of 
the proposer. For Islamic economists, the most efficient way of financial 
intermediation is that which ensures most efficient distribution of financial 
resources, according to the merit of the project itself and not the one who 
proposes it. As far as the stability is concerned Islamic economists argue that 
interest, debt and speculation together have evolved one of the most vulnerable 
financial systems where public money to the order of thousands ol" billion 
dollars is diverted to maintain the stability. For growth. Islamic economists 
scoff that an inefficient, unjustified, and unstable system can only create a myth 
of economic growth. 
The present work, 'Recent Developments in Banking Organizations with 
Special Reference to Islamic Banking and Finance' tries to examine and 
analyze the above-mentioned issues. The basic problem, which has been 
identified, is to find out the causes of the growing and recurring financial crises 
and also to analyze the steps taken to avert these crises. One important aspect 
in this regard is the emergence of Islamic financial institutions during the last 
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couple of decades. In this study greater emphasis has been given to this aspccts 
ol'developments not only because this is a new concept but also because of the 
tremendous attention it has received not only among Muslims but also among 
the secular, western and other non-Muslim experts. The work proceeds with the 
following chapterization; 
Chapter One: Modern Banking: A Historical Perspective. 
Chapter Two: Recent Banking Crises, Reforms, and Restructuring 
Efforts. 
Chapter Three: Bank Reorganization: An Islamic Way. 
Chapter Four: Models of Islamic Banking. 
Chapter Five: Islamic and Conventional Banking: A Comparative 
Analysis. 
**** Chapter Six: Problems of Islamic Banking. 
Chapter Seven: The Future of Islamic Banking. 
Chapter One: Modern Banking: A Historical Perspective: 
This chapter briefly describes the history of modern banking. How the 
modern banking has developed from the practices of moneychangers, 
goldsmiths, and Lombardy Street to the present day. Discussion starts (i'om the 
word 'Bank' itself and proceeds to a brief historical overview ol' the modern 
banking. It has been explored how the modern banking came to evolve in the 
present form from the Italian moneychangers, 'argentarry' and the Britisli 
goldsmiths. 
Subsequently a country-wise discussion of the development of modern 
banking is taken. The beginning is made from the Italy since it is regarded as 
the mother of modern banking where during 1270-1584 banking was entirely in 
the private hand, however, after 1584 effort was made to create public sector 
bank, which was not encouraging in the beginning. Another country, which has 
played no less important role in the development of modern banking is Great 
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Britain. Modern banking in Great Britain began during Elizabethan age when 
growth of the foreign trade led to influx of gold in the country. These golds 
were kept at the goldsmiths who started the first practices qf deposit banking 
and loaning. Germany follows a different kind of banking which in present day 
is often known as the investment banking. Banking developments in Germany 
are described briefly. In the same order banking developments in France and 
United States are taken. Among the commonwealth countries banking history 
of hidia is taken for some description. 
After the country-wise development of modern banking, an important 
constituent of the modern banking, i.e. Central Bank that had started taking 
shape during the early years of the twentieth century, is described. By the first 
half of the twentieth century almost every country had developed a kind of 
bank with special powers of note issue and as a supervisor of the countries 
monetary policy. After a brief discussion of the evolution of central banks, 
some of the later developments in modern banking like regional development, 
industrial development and International Monetary Fund and the World Bank's 
brief account is given. Present day modern banking is carried out mostly 
through Internet known as virtual banking is also included in the chapter. Some 
important features of the unit and branch banking are also mentioned in the 
work to highlight the disfinguishing feature of the US and the British banking 
systems. 
Chapter Two: Recent Banking Crises, Reforms, and 
Restructuring Efforts: 
The chapter revolves around the basic question of the study. It analyses 
the recent banking crises in several countries and the steps undertaken to 
resolve these crises. Chapter starts with genesis of the crises then moves on to 
measure the costs of the crises in selected countries. This subsection briefly 
touches upon the recent trends in the financial markets highlighting major 
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issues related with globalization, innovation, and speculation accompanying 
large-scale deregulation in financial markets across several countries of 
Europe, Asia, and America. An effort has been made to analyze the causes of 
these crises from various viewpoints. Blun'ing distinction between domestic 
and foreign market alongwith voluminous trade in foreign currencies, 
derivatives, swaps etc. are examined to find out the real causes behind these 
crises. Certain tables have been given for proper empirical understanding of the 
issue. International efforts in this direction to resolve the crises in the form of 
Basle Committee and its recent guidelines in the form of Basle Core Principles 
for Effective Banking Supervision are mentioned in some detail. 
Bank reforms and restructuring undertaken in several countries like 
Japan, Sweden, United States, Korea, Thailand, Philippines, China, and India 
have been discussed in some detail. It was found that in all the countries special 
emphasis was given to higher capital adequacy, prudential regulation and assets 
classification. It was also found that higher capital is now considered as public 
good. A major constituent of the present commercial banking i.e. deposits 
insurance is also critically analyzed. It is also found that deposit insurance, 
(explicit or implicit) more often, has resulted in moral hazard and increased 
public cost to maintain the stability of these financial institutions. Some of the 
recent studies are also cited in the favor. At the end a table comparing the 
structure of bank income in some western countries along with developing 
countries is given to highlight that as a country advances towards 
industrialization its non-interest income in comparison to interest income, 
increases. 
Chapter Three: Bank Reorganization: An Islamic Way: 
This is another very important chapter as far the basic question of the 
thesis is concerned. It introduces the Islamic banking into the thesis. Several 
important aspects related with introduction of Islamic banking are discussed in 
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detail before describing the evolution and development of Islamic banking. The 
chapter has been subdivided into theoretical preparation and practical efforts. 
In the beginning, prohibition of interest is discussed in detail and the reasons 
that make Islamic economists feel uncomfortable while dealing with interest. 
Islam and financial intermediation is discussed to find out whether Islamic 
economists consider it necessary or not. Economic reasons for financial 
intermediation, not sustained by fixed pay up, are also discussed. In between, 
some of the distinguishing features of Islamic economics are compared with 
the conventional economics. 
Theoretical preparations of Islamic banking are further subdivided into 
early writings on Islamic banking which discusses all major writings on the 
issue. This is accompanied with,a table mentioning some of the early efforts. 
Another subhead of the section is a brief introduction of some of the important 
seminars, conferences, committee reports and institutional efforts. 
The practical efforts in the field of Islamic banking are looked under two 
broad subheads (1) those Islamic banks established before 1980 and (2) those 
that were established after 1980s. Some of the earliest and prominent efforts 
have been specially highlighted. An important aspect, which has been brought 
to the fore, is India's contribution in this arena. An attempt has been made in 
this study to examine this aspect. It, however, appears to have hitherto been 
ignored by researchers in India. 
Some countries have initiated to Islamize their whole economy. This 
issue is briefly discussed in the chapter apart from introducing some of the 
topmost Islamic financial institutions of the world. Islamic banking in South 
Asia along with India is especially examined. Islamic banking practices by 
Western financial institutions are mentioned at the end of the chapter. 
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Chapter Four: Models of Islamic Bank: 
This chapter is specifically devoted to the models of Islamic banking. 
Since the Islamic banking models are based on Islamic financing techniques. A 
detail description of Islamic financing techniques is given prior to the 
discussion on Islamic banking models. These financing techniques arc grouped 
under: Contracts of Partnership; Contracts of Exchange; and Contracts of 
Charity. These contracts are further subdivided for some detail elaboration. 
It is contended that the basic idea of Islamic banking is to devise an 
efficient and equitable system of profit and loss sharing (PLS). Efficiency 
property derives from its insistence on the linkage between the financial and 
the real sectors of the economy, while equity property is based on maximizing 
the rates of return on deposits. Islamic banking, in the sense of its linkage 
between the financial and the real economy, is contrary to the fixed payoff 
system of the conventional economy. Therefore, all the banking models 
devised under Islamic framework are based on PLS principles. 
Since the idea of Islamic banking is derived from the Islamic legal 
concept of Shirkah (partnership) and Mudarabah (profit-sharing), all the major 
models of Islamic banks revolve around these partnership contracts. Islamic 
bank mobilizes savings from the public on the basis of MucJarahuh and 
advances it to the entrepreneurs on the same principle. The first and foremost 
model discussed in the chapter is Mudarabah model propounded by M.N. 
Siddiqi. Some other models given by Mohammad Baqir al-Sadr. Mohammad 
Muslehuddin, Abdul Gafoor's Commercial Banking model and Shaikh 
Mahmood's Time Multiple Counter Loan (TMCL) have been discussed in 
some detail. At the end, some of the more recent and refined models of Islamic 
banking are briefly described. These models deal with some of the more 
intricate issues like credit creation, seigniorage and monetary policy etc. At the 
end some modifications in Siddiqi model are mentioned in the words of Siddiqi 
himself 
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Chapter Five: Islamic and Conventional Banking: A 
Comparative Analysis: 
The financial sector is a major player in modern economies, as a 
producer of financial services and as an employer. Banking system fulfils 
essential functions in intermediating between savers and investors. To ensure 
the proper allocation of financial resources, it is must that the banking system is 
sound and efficient enough to effectively play this role. Profit-sharing 11 nance 
synchronizes payment obligations of firms with its revenue accruals, thus 
removing a great source of instability in the system. Interest based finance 
subjects the firm to a rigid schedule in which the amounts due for payment as 
well as the due dates of payment do not lake into account the currcnt status of 
the project. Conventional banking lend money to earn interest while Islamic 
banks provide finance to share profit. This fundamental difference leads to 
many other important differences between functioning of the both. 
Islamic banks have their own conceptual mainspring, defining 
objectives, procedures and practices that make distinction with conventional 
systems of banking. The thrust of the chapter revolves around comparing the 
Islamic banking vis-a-vis conventional banking from the point of view of 
efficiency, stability, growth and justice. 
At the end, an empirical comparative study of Islamic and conventional 
banking is presented where it can be noted that Islamic banks have perlbrmed 
better than their counterpart conventional banks (Table No. 5.3). The rate of 
growth of total equity for Islamic banks, during 1990-97, was substantially 
higher as compared to the conventional banks. As far as the total investments is 
concerned Islamic banks leave their counterparts far behind. And almost 
similar is the scenario for growth in total assets for Islamic as well as 
conventional banking, where again Islamic banks have maintained their lead by 
a fair margin. 
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Chapter Six: Problems of Islamic Banking: 
In this chapter, the main focus is on the problems and obstacles that 
Islamic banks are facing in various ways; ideological, theoretical as well as the 
practical. These difficulties mainly stem from the circumstances created by 
their existence in places and regions where they operate in an economic, legal, 
administrative, cultural and social atmosphere, which is not best, suited to 
them. Islamic banks have been facing a number of problems which can be 
evaluated on various grounds. Some of the problems faced by Islamic banks 
stem from the nature of their businesses. Another kind of problems can be 
evaluated from the point of view of the treatment Islamic banks receive iVom 
various governments, Muslims as well as non-Muslims. A set of problems is 
specifically associated with the institutions concerned. Several problems faced 
by the Islamic banks have been overcome by their past experience while new 
problems are still hindering the performance of Islamic banks at various stages. 
Some of them are related to their internal structure, which has grown 
unplanned and instantaneous to the demands of the community. Some of the 
inherent theoretical contradictions still haunt the business of Islamic banks. 
Early models of Islamic banks, which were supposed for financial 
intermediations only, have taken precedence by the Islamic banks engaging 
themselves in the actual businesses. Since Islamic banks have largely 
concentrated on actual business, they have not yet been successful in devising 
an interest-free mechanism to place their funds on a short-term basis. Because 
of the same they are facing problems in financing consumer loans and 
government deficits. Second, the risks involved in profit sharing seems to be so 
high that almost all the Islamic banks have resorted to those techniques of 
financing which bring them a fixed assured return. As a result, there is a lot of 
genuine criticism that these banks have not abolished interest but they have, in 
fact, only changed the nomenclature of their transactions. Third, the Islamic 
banks do not have the legal support of the Central Banks, which seldom have 
the necessary expertise and trained manpower to appraise, monitor, evaluate 
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and audit the projects that are financed by the Islamic banks. Various issues are 
yet to be resolved before Islamic banks could really expand their spheres 
outside their small religious clientele. Few suggestions are given at the end of 
the chapter. 
Chapter Seven: The Future of Islamic Banking 
This is the last and concluding chapter of the thesis which deals with the 
future of banking organizations in general and Islamic banking in particLilai-. It 
is observed that the present financial system, which is based on fixed pay. is 
inherently weak in comparison to a system based on equity and partnership. 
Therefore, the desirable banking form is that where financial intermediation is 
carried out on equity principles and not on debt which has rendered the present 
financial system obsolete and vulnerable. It is also observed that Islamic 
banking is not an insignificant or a temporary phenomenon and that it is here to 
stay. 
In the beginning 'the overview' section briefly reviews the Islamic 
banking development and the factors responsible for it. This is followed by a 
brief review of the present financial crises under the subhead 'the fault line'. 
Some of the western scholars are quoted. The third and fourth subheads of the 
chapter express that Islamic banking has the potentials to remain viable on its 
own and there is a large demand for Islamic banking products. And finally, the 
future of Islamic banking is looked in the light of statements of Islamic as well 
as conventional economists. 
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The prohibition of riba (interest) is mentioned in four different 
revelations in the Qur'an. The first revelation emphasizes that interest 
deprives wealth of Allah's blessings. The second revelation condemns it, placing 
interest in juxtaposition with wrongful appropriation of property belonging to 
others. The third revelation enjoins Muslims to stay clear of interest for the 
sake of their own welfare. The fourth revelation establishes a clear distinction 
between interest and trade, urging Muslims to take only the principal sum and to 
forgo even this sum if the borrower is unable to repay. I t is further declared in 
the Qur'an that those who disregard the prohibition of interest are at war with 
Allah and His Prophet. The prohibition of interest is also cited in no uncertain 
terms in the Ahadith (sayings of the Prophet). The Prophet condemned not only 
those who take interest but also those who give interest and those who record 
or witness the transaction, saying that they are all alike in guilt. 
Since prohibition of interest had closed the door on exchange of more 
money for less money, even when a period of time intervenes. Muslims had 
always felt uncomfortable with the current practices of the Modern Banks 
worldwide. As soon as the Muslims started getting free from the clutches of 
their ruling masters they tried to manage their affairs in accordance with their 
own religious principles. Islamic economics and banking is the reflection of those 
desires of the Muslims in their economic affairs. 
The present work is an attempt to examine the beginning and growth of a 
significant aspect of Islamic economics, namely its financial sector. Within a 
period of hundred years since publication of Ilmul Iqfisad by none other than 
Allama Iqbal in 1902 Islamic economics has made commendable progress in the 
wake of Islamic resurgence. Efforts to establish financial institutions on Islamic 
principles are however preceded this work by a few years when Muslims of 
Hyderabad South tried to establish an interest free institution to save their 
Muslim brethren from the ruthless and greedy moneylenders. 
However, the first effort 'Mit Shamr' that drew the notice of others 
could start in 1963 in the Egyptian delta town that lasted for four years only. 
This is widely accepted as the first Islamic Bank of the modern era. Another 
Islamic financial institution of prominence 'Tabung Haji' also started in the same 
year, which is Still doing well. During the same period a failed attempt was made 
by S.A. Irshad in Pakistan in 1965 in the form of a cooperative bank. In India 
the most successful attempt was made in 1973 with the establishment of Bait-
un-Nasr Cooperative Credit Society at Bombay. 
Within a time span of forty years. Islamic banking and financial 
institutions have been fast to establish themselves in all parts of the world in 
the form of Islamic Commercial Banks, Investment and Holding Companies 
Takafu! (Insurance) Companies, Development Banks, and Islamic Equity Funds 
etc. Over 100 Islamic equity funds have now been launched since 1995 with 
assets under management in excess of $7 billion. I t is estimated that there are 
over 200 Islamic financial institutions operating in over 70 countries managing 
funds over $ 300 billion around the world, from commercial banks, investment 
banks, investment companies to leasing, and insurance companies. These 
institutions, that are growing at the handsome rate of 15% annually, invest 
money according to the Islamic economic principles like Musharkah, Mudarabah, 
Murabahah, 5alam, Istisna and Ijara, The popularity of Islamic banking 
continues to grow as the number of depositors increase. 
There are countries like Pakistan, Iran and Sudan that have tried to 
Islamize whole of their economy on Islamic principles, though significant 
complimentary steps are yet to be taken. Nevertheless these efforts are 
important in their entirety. No doubt there are some countries, which have 
serious reservations about the functionability of the Islamic institutions as 
financial intermediary, there are other that have expressed their desire to 
favor these Islamic institutions in no uncertain terms. The beauty of Islamic 
economics and banking is that within so short period of time it has won the 
friend and the foe in good numbers. 
From a modest beginning of an academic discourse to the corridors of 
power. Islamic banking has traveled at a remarkable pace that nobody could 
ignore. Albeit there are issues Still left to be resolved but whatever Islamic 
banking has already achieved, is no less important. I t has become one of the 
most popular subjects of discussion at social and academic gatherings. 
.Skarit^ Yjiiar 
^^ii^arli 
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C H A P T E R - 1 
M o d e m Banking: A Historical Perspect ive 
Introduction 
The history of modern banking is not old as compared to the importance 
it has received in the life of human being. During the last couplc of centuries it 
has got such immense importance that it looks almost impossible now to think 
without a bank. Each and every development of the past few centurics has 
contributed to the growth and development of modern banking. Whether it is 
the prevalence of money, discovery of mines of gold and silver, advanccmcnl 
in navigation to the modern transport and telecommunications. 
hi this first chapter of our thesis "Recent Developments in Banking 
Organization with Special Reference to Islamic Banking and Finance" we 
would try to explore how the modern banking has evolved to its present Ibrm. 
We would start from the word 'bank' itself then proceed to explain how the 
banking has developed in various countries. Almost all the major countries 
where banking has evolved during the initial stages of industrialization are 
cox'ered in the present chapter. Industrial revolution along with navigation and 
other transport facilities led several European countries to expand their empire 
much beyond their own borders, which also introduced many of their system 
including banking to their ruling countries. 
For the sake of convenience we shall avoid describing banking system in 
common wealtlT countries except India, which we have taken for several other 
reasons. We will start from a brief discussion about the credit mechanism as its 
growth along with trade and commerce is one of the biggest factors that 
necessitated the organizations like banking. Then we would take up the word 
'bank' itself, how it has come to present understanding that bank is an 
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institution that does financial intermediation between the savers and llie 
investors and provides several other services to its customers, in the next 
section a brief discussion on the banking history of some important countries 
like Italy, United Kingdom, Germany, France, U.S.A. and India is followed in 
the order. These discussions mainly consist of early developments of banking 
in the respective country, as the present form of banking in the world is not 
much differentiating. The early distinction of branch, unit, joint stock, group, 
chain and other forms of banking has blurred with the passage of time. 
However, some other distinctive features on the basis of spcciali/cd acli\ilic,s 
followed by a bank do still come to be recognized. For example, apart form the 
strengthening of Central Banking institution in every country one also (Inds 
several specialized banking institutions like development, industrial, 
agriculture, investment, merchant and many more at national as well as 
international levels. After the recent revolution in telecommunication a concept 
of virtual and net banking is fast catching. We have tried to introduce some of 
the recent developments in later part of this chapter. 
The Word 
The word 'bank' is said to have been derived from the public loans 
made by the Italian cities. The usual Italian name for the public loan was 
'Monte' signifying a joint stock fund, as the Germans were influential in Italy 
during the middle ages their name for a joint stock fund was 'hanck' meaning a 
heap or mound,' that the Italians converted into 'banco' which originally meant 
' shelf or 'bench' (Bank, Encyclopedia of Banking), however, the word was 
also employed for an accumulation of either stock or money. ^ 
' McLeod, 'Theory of Credil', BK.l , p.315 as citcd by Holdsworth, ,lohn. I.. ' M o n c ) and Banking". 
(5' ' 'Ed.). D. Appleton and Company. New York. 1930. p. 157. 
- Conanl A. Charles, VJ IhUory of Modern Bank}. fl/zAt'/.wee". N e w Yoik. Putnam's & Sons. I<)27. p 
8 
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Another opinion states that the word bank is derived from the word, 
' 'bancus' ' or ' 'hanque'' which means a bench because the early bankers, the 
Jews in Lombardy, transacted their business on benches in the marl-cet place. 
The definition of a bank given in an Itahan dictionary in 1659 was 
''Monte" a standing bank. Charles Conant quoting Cibrario Says "Regarding 
the theory of credit, which was invented in Italian cities, it is known that the 
first bank on public debt "II Prio Banco debito publico " was erected in Venice 
in 1171".^ 
The word was adopted into English indifferently meaning public loans 
or stocks of money. Bainbridge in 1646 spoke of the "three banks" at Venice, 
meaning three public loans or Monte. The issuance of paper money directly by 
the State was spoken of as "raising a banke". According to Holdsworth, "In 
colonial days in Massachusetts, the issue of paper money was referred "Raising 
a Bank". The word bank meaning the money rather than institution which put it 
in circulation". 
Modern Banking: A Historical Overview 
The modern banking is said to have evolved in Italian cities' during the 
medieval era. The private banlcers of the medieval Italian cities are considered 
/bid. 
Holdswor th , John , T., 'Money and Banking', (5' ' 'Ed.), op. cit. P .157 also see W e c d e n . Wil l iam B.. 
• Economic and Soda! Histo/y of New England 1620-1789\ Vol. 2, Bos ton . 1890, p. 318 . 
' Dav ie s repor ts that bank ing or ig inated in Anc ien t M e s o p o t a m i a whe re the royal pa laces and t emple s 
p rov ided secure places for the sa fekeep ing o f grain and o ther commodi t i e s . Rece ip ts c a m e to be used 
for transfers not only to the original deposi tors but also to third parties. Eventua l ly pr i \ ' a tc house s in 
M e s o p o t a m i a also got involved in these banking opera t ions and laws regulat ing Ihem were inchided in 
the c o d e of H a m m u r a b i . In Egypt too the central izat ion of harvests in state w a r e h o u s e s a lso led to the 
d e v e l o p m e n t o f a sys tem of banking. Writ ten orders for the wi thdrawal of separa te lots of grain b\ 
o w n e r s w h o s e crops had been deposi ted there for safety and conven ience , or which had been 
compul so r i ly depos i ted to the credit of the king, soon became used as a more general m e t h o d of 
p a y m e n t of debts to other persons including tax gatherers , priests and traders . Even a f te r the 
in t roduct ion o f co inage these Egyptian grain banks served to reduce the need foi' pi 'ccious meta ls which 
t ended to be reserved for foreign purchases , part icular ly in connec t ion with mil i tary act ivi t ies . I'or 
deta i ls see Davies , Glyn, "A history of money f rom ancient t imes to the present day". (3"' Ed.) Card i f f : 
Univers i ty of Wales Press . 2002 . p. 720. 
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the forerunners of the modern banking. However, the mechanism of crcdil. As 
Conant observes, dates back to the civiHzation of antiquity. He mentions that it 
(the mechanism of credit) was much more developed in Assyria and Babylon 
than in early Greece and Romans and after its development in the latter 
countries during their period of military and commercial ascendancy. It was 
left, however, for the sixteenth century to develop a bank note in something 
like its modern form and for the nineteenth century to spread its use.'' 
Assyria is reported to have issued a commercial instrument like 
promissory notes, bills of exchange and transfer cheque as early as seventh 
century B.C., one of the first form of banking was the exchange of foreign 
money for domestic money and the return o^ foreign money to the country of 
its origin. 
The banking business was subjected to official regulation in both Athens 
and Rome. The Roman laws required a banker known as 'argentarri' (dealers 
in Silver) to produce their account for official inspection and keep a cashbook, 
a deposit book and a daybook. The transfer of credit was permitted at Athens 
by the law of Solon, and commercial paper from Phoenicia and Egypt was 
negotiated upon the Athenian market. As one author points out that the Greeks 
taught Banking to Rome and the first names for bankers were of Greek origin. 
The Banking business at Rome was largely in the hands of foreigners and 
freedmen, but certain branches of finance were in the hands of native Romans. 
Patricians (original habitant of Rome), in their business relations, exacted a 
usurious rate of interest from the Plebeians (A noble appointed by the 
Emperor). The regular bankers the 'argentarri' were charged with the 
organization of the coinage by Mauritius Gratidianry in the T' century B.C.^ 
The Romans' control on politics and the business gradually extended Die 
scope of Roman Banking, subdivided the business and resulted in the creation 
Conant op. cit., 'A Hisloiy of Modern Banks of the Issue", p.l 
Ho ldswof th . op. cit. p. t5S . 
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of a complete body of jurisprudence. The organization of the greater commerce 
and banking as it existed in the Roman persisted during the fu'st pari of ihc 
Middle Ages. However, the lack of security for property in Western liuropc 
and the neglect of the laws of commerce gradually drove both commcrcc and 
credit within narrower limits and led to the withdrawal of metallic money foi' 
hoarding.^ 
During the later Middle Ages the growth of commerce and accumulation 
of capital began to draw precious metals from their hiding places and led each 
seigneur to coin his own money. The diversity of weights and varying market 
ratio betv/een gold and silver made the function of the exchanger an imporlanl 
one. The edicts of Leo the wise, the Byzantine Emperor of Constantinople, 
contained a series of provisions governing the moneychangers. Similar 
moneychangers existed in the Arabian cities also. In Italy when Venice, 
Florence, Naples, Genoa and i^isa bccame great commercial ccnlccs. The 
Italian bankers, were given special protections as representative of the Pope, 
helped in transmitting to Rome contributions collected in pAiropc and in several 
other countries. General regulations of the exchange and banking business 
appeared early in the Italian statues. The Jews and the Italian bankers spread 
their connections throughout the Western Europe. In the fifteenth century when 
Holland became a center of capital and enterprise, Amsterdam superseded 
Antwerp in commercial influence and the available capital ol' the world was 
attracted thereby the excellent organization of the bank of Amsterdam. At 
Hamburg the Jewish community was credited with the considerable share ol' 
the creation of public bank.'^ 
In England, the ground of modern banking was prepared with the influx 
of gold from America in Elizabethan age and simultaneous growth of the 
Davies acknowledges that after the fall of the Roman Empire banking was forgotten and had to be ic-
invented much later during the Crusades in Italian city-states such as Rome, Venice and Genoa, and in 
the fairs of medieval France, the need to transfer sums of money for trading purposes led to the 
development of financial services including bills of exchange. For details see Davies. op. cit. 
'' Conant , op. c i t . , ' / ) History of Modern Batiks of the Issue', p.8. 
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foreign trade. Another important factor that gave impetus to English banking 
was rise in Goldsmith's practices firstly in the form of goldsmiths notes that 
became payable to bearer and secondly, when Goldsmiths started offering 
interest to the depositors. (Sec below scclion Banking in (jrcal Britain) 
The Two Pioneers in Modern Banking 
Italy and United Kingdom (UK) are considered to be the pioneers ol' 
modern banking. In the previous section, we have seen that in Italy it were the 
money exchangers that paved the way for modern banking while in UK it were 
the goldsmiths that started the earliest form of modern banking. If one go by 
the business the first form of banking was exchange then deposits and then 
came the lending. Ownership wise first the banking was in the private hands 
either known as 'argentarri' in Venice or goldsmiths in UK, then a concept ol~ 
joint ownership developed with the passage of time. By the end of 16th ccntur}' 
deposit and the exchange banking had flourished on the continent of Europe 
with the establishment of'The Banco di Rialto' in Venice in the year 1584. 'fhe 
Bank of Sweden was established in the year 1556, Exchange banks were first 
started in Amsterdam in the year 1609 and in Hamburg in 1690 later on they 
also began to do deposit banking. In the following paragraphs a description is 
made on the early developments of banking in various countries like Italy. UK, 
Germany, France, USA and India. 
Banking in Italy 
Italy is considered to be the mother of modern banking as it is reported 
to be the first country to have developed the mechanism of modern credit. 
In Venice banking was in private hands and was a subject to legal 
regulation from time to time between I270-I584. During the later years, 
however, attempts were made to create public banks. Conant quoting Tommaso 
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Cartamin, an Italian Senator in 1584, mentions about 103 banks, of which 96 
had came to a bad end and only 7 had succccdcd." 
These early banlcs initially did business with their own money and 
subsequently with the public deposits. The use of deposit, as it appears, was nol 
at first intended to economize cash but to avoid its frequent handling. The early 
bankers employed the money entrusted to them in more or less speculative 
ways, and many a times came by degrees to make advances to the states and to 
grant credits to merchants and traders without proper security.'^ 
Since a single individual was hardly equipped with sufficienl capital to 
carry on the large operations involved, associations were formed for dealing 
with the state on the one hand and the taxpayer on the other, which became 
nucleus of large banking operations. Thus, great financiers grew up who 
dominated the politics as well as the finance of the European states. The 
business of banking was only a branch of the great affairs of these finance 
houses. According to Conant, these financiers acquired large territories, 
financed wars, purchased silver mines, etc. Each face of the banking was 
almost a necessary evolution of the conditions of that time. The moneychanger 
followed the merchants in his voyage over the world, when merchandise and 
metallic money constituted the only instruments of exchange. The crcalion ol" 
uniform monetary systems and wide areas of trade under a single polilical 
sovereignty, however, lessen the importance of this trade, but it was chielly the 
organization of credit, permitting exchanges without metallic money, which 
reduced the moneychanger to an essentially subordinate place and gave birth to 
the modern banking.'^ 
For details see, Sohrab, R. Dawar, "Law and Practice of Banking". Thomson Pi'inling I'rcss. 
Mumbai , 1972, pp. 1042. 
' ' Conant, op. cit. 'A History of Modern Banks of the lssiie\ p.9 
They, thus, became substantially banks of issue, they did not fbi'mally issue notes, but banking 
credits came to constitute certificates of deposit, which circulated as currency. 
" Conant, Op. Cit,, 'A Plisloiy of Modern Banks of the Issue', p. 14. 
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One more step was taken towards devising modern banking methods 
when the ItaUan bankers received cash under the name ofdcposils. Tlnis. writes 
Conant, gradually emerged all the attributes of the modern banking. The 
individual moneychanger, the Jewish lender, the Lombard banker gradually 
gave way as centralization advanced in economic and political life, to public 
banks doing business under official authority.''* 
The creation of "bank money" facilitated the complexity involved with 
the coinage system. The bill of exchange became a means for making 
productive loans. Deposits were accepted to be loaned for profit, and to attract 
more depositors were paid interest in lieu. The resources of the modern 
savings, attracted to the banks, became available for loans to the producing and 
trading elements. Thus, modern credit received its organization. The creation of 
bank notes and the extension of the mechanism of clearings and co-operation 
among the banks provided the motive power of the commerce. 
The first attempt to form a modern bank was in the form of St. George, 
which began just after the French revolution that brought closer to all the 
ancient banks in Italy. Another attempt was made in 1844 by the Charles Albert 
which was to be known as Bank of Genoa. King Victor Emmanuel later on 
reorganized this as the National Bank of the Kingdom of I t a l y . N e x t to be 
established was the Roman Bank in 1851 and the National Bank of Tuscany in 
1857. During 1890s the Roman banking plunged into deep crisis mainly due to 
over issuing of the paper notes. This necessitated the reorganization of Roman 
banking, which culminated in the emergence of Bank of Italy by merging the 
National Bank of the Kingdom, National Bank of Tuscany and the Tuscan bank 
of Credit.'^ 
" i b i d . . , p. 16. 
Ibid., p. 17&19. 
" i b i d . p. 23. 
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Banking in Great Britain 
Ground of modern banking in England was prepared with (he inllux ol 
gold from America in Elizabethan age and simultaneous growlli ol'llic loicign 
trade. Another important factoi that gave impetus to English banking was use 
in goldsmiths' practices firstly in the form of goldsmiths notes that became 
payable to bearer and secondly, when goldsmiths started offering mtei est to the 
depositors.'^ 
The Bank of England was started in 1694 largely as a result ol lindiicidl 
difficulties of William III who was engaged on war with Fiance fhc pubhc 
distrust of goldsmiths was also responsible for the same. One Mr Fattorson 
offered to raise £1200000 for the government as a loan provided certain 
concessions were given to the proposed institution particularly the right to issue 
notes. The government agreeing to the terms passed an act called the "Tonnage 
Act" with the main provisions as follows: 
1. It authorized the raising of £1200000 by subscription, the subscnbeis 
forming a corporation to be called "the Governor and Company of the 
Bank of England" 
2 No person could subscribe more than £20,000 in all 
3 The corporation was to lend the whole of its capital to the goveinmcnl 
for 8 percent and £ 4000 towaids expenses of the management 
4. The corporation was to have the privilege of a bank foi twelve yeais. 
however, the government had the power to annul the charter after giving 
one-year's notice to the corporation 
" Goldsmiths giadually discoveied that laigc sums ot money weie lelt in then keepings loi long 
peiiods They thought it sale and piofitable to lend out a pait of then customeis" monc\ pio\ ided such 
loans weie lepaid within a fixed time Fuithei, lealizing that the business of loaning ol othei peoples 
money at inteiest was piolitable, and in oidei to attiact laige amounts , (he moie cnte ipi is ing ol the 
goldsmiths began to olfci inteiest on money deposited with them, instead ol chaiging a III (oi ihtn 
sei vices in guaiding then clients gold 
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5. The corporation was forbidden to trade in any merchandise whatsoever 
but was allowed to deal in bills of exchange, gold or silver bullion and 
to sell any wares and merchandise upon which it had advanced money. 
The new bank proved a formidable competitor to the comparatively 
small private banking firms, hi the year 1708 another important act was passed 
which prohibited any other bank with more than six partners issuing 
promissory notes i.e. "Bank notes" The most important clause ol" this 
legislation was as follows: 
"That during the continuance of the said corporation of the governor and 
the company of the Bank of England, it shall not be lawful for anybody, politic 
or corporate, whatsoever, created or to be created other than the said governor 
and company of the Bank of England, or for other persons whatsoever united or 
to be united, in covenants or partnerships exceeding the number of six persons 
in that part of Great Britain called England, to borrow, owe or lake up any 
sums of money on their bills or notes payable on demand, or at less than six 
months from the borrowing thereof''*^. This act gave monopoly of note issue lo 
the Bank of England so far as joint stocks banks were concerned but left private 
banks having not more than six partners, free to issue notes. A new legislation 
in 1826, however, tried to restrict the monopoly of the Bank of England and 
allowed establishment of new banks with unlimited liability, consisting oJ'more 
than six partners, with the right to issue note with a condition not to open their 
offices within the radius of 65 miles from London. However, in the year 1833 
the new charter of the bank gave legislative sanction to the establishment of 
joint stock banks in London and by the year 1834, the London Bank and the 
Westminster Bank had started. 
The unlimited power to issue notes by joints stock banks resulted in 
numerous banking crises and failures followed by Peel's act of 1844. which 
" Ibtd.. p. 4. 
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restricted the right to issue notes to the banks then issuing and to the extent of 
their note issue at the time. Thus, providing for the gradual cxlinclion o f i h c 
right and laying the foundations oi" the monopoly of bank note issue foi' the 
Bank of England. That was an important turning point from the point of view 
that deposit banking came to supplant note issue banking. Now greater 
attention began to be paid towards deposit banking as the new banks did not 
have the power to issue notes neither the older ones having the right to issue 
notes could be able to increase their circulation. It was soon realized that 
cheque currency was almost as profitable as the issue of bank notes leading to 
gradual growth of this activity. Beginning of the 20th century followed the 
movement of amalgamation and absorption, which heavily reduced the number 
of banks. In the year 1947 the labor government nationalized the Bank of 
England by transferring the then existing stocks to the nominees of the British 
Treasury and by vesting in the crown the power of appointing its Governor. 
Deputy Governor and Directors. 
Banking in Germany 
The modern banking in Germany began with the establishment of 
Hamburg Giro Bank in 1619.^'This bank was formed on the model of the Bank 
of Amsterdam. The Bank of Prussia was established in 1765 which later on was 
changed to the Imperial Bank of Germany in 1875 after The Bank Act of 1875 
that unified the banking system of the entire German empire.^^ The Act covered 
the regulation of note issue, the nature of business, profit and their disposition. 
As Conant reports that by the time of this act there were 32 other banks in the 
country of them, two were commercial, one territorial and the rests as joint 
stocks banks. The Charter of these banks varied between 1-81 years except for 
-'Ibid., 
Kenneth, Mackenzie, ' T h e Banking System of the Great Britain, Francc. German}, and the United 
States of Amer iea ' , The Mac Million & Co.. London, 1937. p.155. 
- - Ib id . , p. 156. 
Clniplci One I? 
three; Bank of Anhalt Dessau (1847), Bank of Bremen (1856), and the Bank of 
Thuringia (1856), which were regarded as perpetual. The oklesi of ihe Hank 
with the limited charter was that of Pomerania established at Stestin in 1821. 
the Bavarian Bank of mortgage and exchange at Munich in 1834, the Bank of 
Leipzig in 1839, the Communal Bank of Breslau in 1848 and many more. 
Conant is of the view that these banks were mainly borne out of the fmancial 
necessities of the government to receive aids.^^ 
The German banking system consisted of the Bank of issue of the 
Federal States, the Joint Stocks Banks, the Private Banks, the Cooperative 
Banks, the Savings Banks, and the Mortgage Banks. 
Banking In France 
The French Banking system is the result of legislation passed in 1941 
and modified in 1945. To a certain extent these laws merely confirmed the 
organization, which had developed progressively throughout its history."'' 
According to Conant, the bank of France is the greatest and n many 
respect strongest of the bank of the world and also its development exhibits the 
most interesting phases of banking history outside the Great Britain."' 
Banking activities appeared in the 12"' centuiy during crusades since the 
necessary transfer of funds could be made easily between the branches oi' the 
Temple scattered from Western Europe to the Middle East. Even during these 
periods the Church's prohibition of interest loans continued in the banking 
operations, hitherto it had lost its effectiveness as the Popes themselves had 
started loaning to the bankers.^*" 
Conant . op. cit., 'A Hislory of Modern Banks of the Issue', p. 191-93. 
Henary, G. Martin, "Banking in France" in Benjamin, H. Beckhart . (Ed.). 'Banking Svslems . 
Columbia University Press. 1954, p. 241-331. 
Conant . op. cit. p 32. 
Ihid. p. 242. 
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During the Middle Ages the functions of banks were more like that of 
modern investment banks than that of deposit banks. Law's plan in 1716 led to 
the creation of the first public bank in France, which was to be a deposit bank, 
an issuing bank and a colonial company. The Royal Bills, which had been 
issued at the end of Louis XIVs regime, became banks note secured by 
commercial transactions, the bank collapsed in 1720 due to speculation in spile 
of the big effort of the King to prevent it. This experience prevented the 
creation of new bank till 1776 when a discount office created by a Minister, 
which was established to provide credit for trading, was later used by the Slate 
for its monetary transactions. This too was closed in 1793. The following years 
office of the current accounts, the discount office, and commercial banking 
offices were established giving a preview of the Bank of France which was 
organized in 1800 by Bonaparte.^^ 
The Bank of France was initially a privately owned company, which 
discounted bills and issued banks notes. However, in 1806 with the 
appointment of the Governor of the bank it was taken under the government. In 
1808 the official statutes defined its business. Under the patronage ol' 
successive political regimes the bank continued to expand and grow. 
By the 1®' half of the 19"' century banking largely remained a personal 
affair of the Jewish and Protestant families who formed private banks. 
The development of commercial banking in the middle of the 19"' 
century is attributed to Saint Simon who had many followers among 
businessman. The English joint stock banks served as models. The first bank to 
be created as joint stock corporation was the "Comptoir Nalional d Escompie 
de la Ville de la Paris" in 1848. Others are ''Credit Industrial et Commercial" 
in 1859, 'The Credit Lyonnais" in 1863 and "Sociele Generate' in 1864. -The 
Credit Commercial de France" in 1894 and "Banque National de Credit" in 
" Ibid,, p. 243. 
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1913"". Martin reports that "Banking in France has passed through ups and 
downs but it has always been in a position to face the crisis with conlltlcncc 
mainly due to separation of deposit banking with investment operation. Though 
banks failures occurred but mostly in small size banks. When there was a 
danger of big institution might fail, the government took action: "Banque 
National de Credit was reorganized in 1932 as the ''Banque Nalionale Pour le 
Commerce et Industrie", and ''Banque Alsace-Lorraine'''' were merged with 
"Credit Industrial et Commerciar^'^. 
The first regulation of French banking came in 1930s wlien the 
government created a credit commission, which conducted an inquiry and 
envisaged control of the banking system. In 1941 a committee was created to 
prepare the definitive status relating to the regulation and organization of the 
banking which first time tried to define and classify enterprises in the field of 
banking or finance, further, it aimed to control and direct such enterprises. '" 
After 1945 the National Constituent Assembly received the draft of a 
law for nationalization of the Bank of France and other big banks in November 
1945, which was completed and modified in May 1946. The Ministry of 
Finance and the Bank of France were put at the top of the new hierarchy. The 
composition of the Bank Control Commission was modified. The Permanent 
Banking Organization Committee became National Credit Commerce and the 
Bankers Professional Associations remained the link between the profession it 
self and these directing bodies. The Bank of France and four other main credit 
establishments were declared nationalized as of .January 1. 1946. ' ' 
Financial organizations in France could be classified into the following major 
categories; 
' ' Ibid,, p.244. 
' Ibid., p.245. 
Ibid., p. 246. 
Ib id . .p .246. 
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1. Private Sector: The traditional organizations including ciHiiniercial 
banks and financial institutions controlled by the Bank control 
commission. 
2. Semi Public Sector: Institutions of special status granted by the 
State that enjoys certain privileges. They are mainly created by the State 
to perform particular banking service i.e. postal checking services, 
saving banks and credit banks etc. 
3. Public Sector; It is the institution representing the government in ail 
kinds of credit transaction. 
4. Special Purpose: These created for the financing of reconstruction 
and equipment of important branches of the industry, they are connected 
directly with public treasury. 
The law of December 1945 (Art-4) divided all banks into three categories. 
1. Deposit Banks or commercial Banks (Regional, Local and 
Foreign Banks) 
2. Investment Banks. 
3. Long term and Medium term credit Banks.^^ 
Banking in the United States of America (USA) 
The banking history of the country can broadly be divided into three 
separate periods; the Free Banking era (up to 1863), National Banking (1863-
1913), and the Federal Resei-ve System (1913 till date). The banking .system of 
the United States possesses ceilain distinctive features. Unlike branch banking 
feature in European country the United States follows a unit banking system, 
which is marked, by a large number of small sized banks. According to 
Raymond the prevalence of unit banking is the most remarkable phenomenon 
of the US banking system. The primary reason, according to him, is regulator's 
wish to curb the growth of bigness and the concentration. Another reason 
" Ibid., 
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mentioned by Raymond is the limitations of the powers of state the 
governments." 
Another striking feature of United States banlcing system is the duality 
of control and supervision by the state and the federal governments. There is 
also a partial separation of commercial and investment banking in the country. 
The first commercial bank incorporated in USA was the Bank of North 
America established in Philadelphia in 1782. It financed the short-term needs 
of the merchants. By the period 1836 there were about 700 state chartered 
banks in the c o u n t r y . T h e Federal government chartered the first bank ol' 
United States 1791-1811 and the second bank of United States 1816-1836; 
however, the permanent arrangement of the banking in the country was made 
with the passing of the National Bank Act of 1863.^' 
The Central Banking organization came in to existence with the passing 
of the Federal Reserve Act in 1913. Federal Deposit Insurance Act was passed 
in 1933. Banking operations in the country came to a halt during great 
depression of 1930s when about 9000 banks in the country suspended their 
operations and an additional 2300 disappeared as a result of consolidation or 
absorption.^'' 
Following table (1.1) shows mergers, consolidations and absorpfion 
activities of United States commercial banking during 1924-1951. One could 
observe from the below table that during nine years from 1924-33 more than 
five thousand mergers and consolidation took place in the US. These were the 
period of hectic reorganization of banking in the country. In the next two 
Raymond, P. Kent, 'Money and Banking", (5"' Ed.), Holt Rinehart and Winston Inc. N e w York. 
1966, p. 170. 
" Banking Studies, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington DC. 1041, p. 628. 
" Thomas , G. Rollin, 'Our Modern Banking and Monetary System' , (4"' Hd.), Prentice Hall Inc. New 
.lersey p. 211 and also see Willis, Brook, "Banking in United States ol" Amer ica" in Bcn jamm. 
H. Beckhart , (Ed.), 'Banking Systems', Columbia University Press, 1954, pp. 927-1009. Also see. 
Kenneth. Mackenzie, op. cit.'Z'Ae Banking Sysleni of the Great Britain, l-'rance. Gennnny. (DH! the 
United States of America, p.191-220. 
"'//)/V/..p.931. 
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periods the average annual mergers and consolidation though declined but was 
still substantial averaging 190 and 88 per year. 
Table No. 1.1 
Mergers, Consolidations and Absorpt ions of Banks During 1924-1951 
Period Total Average 
1924-33 5257 526 
1934-37 760 190 
1938-51 1228 88 
Source Board of Governors of Federal Reserve Systems, Staff reports on concenti ation of banking in 
the United States, September W, 1952 
For the purpose of banking the whole country is divided in to different 
districts with each having its own federal reserve bank the coordinating body 
among them is called the Federal Reserve Board with its headquarter at 
Washington D.C. The Federal Reserve Bank is the central bank of the country 
The commercial banks in the country can be divided in two, the national banks 
that obtains the charter from the Federal Government and the state banks which 
functions under the regulations of the state government. Thus the commercial 
banks in the country are dual regulated. 
Banking in India 
Money lending operations are said to be very old in the country 
evidences of which can be found in Vedic, Buddhist and other ancient 
literatures. Muslim historians and European traveler's record that during the 
Muslim Rule in India indigenous bankers played a prominent part in lending 
money. During Mughal ascendancy various kinds of metallic money in 
different parts of the country provided great opportunity for money changing 
business, many among those traders came to be known as world bankers (Ja^al 
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Seths)^'^ When English traders came to India they tried to conducl banking 
business through their agency houses."^'' 
The first bank to make its appearance in India was the Bank o(" Deposit 
and Discount in Madras as early as 1683. After this another bank commenced 
operations in Bombay in 1724.^^ Both had sanctions of the Court of Directors 
of the East India Company and were managed by the local government in the 
interest of their own llnanciai needs. 
The earliest bank started by any agency house in India was the 
Hindustan Bank established in 1770 by Alexander & Company which was 
wounded up in 1832 when Alexander & Company failed. The Bengal Bank and 
General Bank of India were established about 1785. Later on the Bengal Bank 
was closed fearing attack by Tipu Sultan in the year 1791 and the General Bank 
of India was liquidated in 1793 owing its inability to earn profit and the 
reserves inflicted upon the company. These banks were chartered by the East 
India Company under the Act. of Indian Legislature.'^" The Bank of Bengal was 
the first presidency bank to be established in 1806, as the Bank of Calcutta, 
which received its charter as the Bank of Bengal in 1809. The Bank of Bombay 
and the Bank of Madras were established in 1840 and 1843 respectively. 
During U.S. civil war in 1862-65 the Indian banking was thrown into a 
crisis, mostly due to speculative activities."" The Bank of Bombay was amongst 
the first that went into liquidation in 1868 owing its allegiance to the massive 
speculation.''^ This shook the confidence of the Indian public in the banking 
" Panandikar , S.G., 'Banking in India', Bombay, (5*'' Ed.), Longmans Green & Co.. 1945. p. 2. 
Ibid., p. 2-3 
" Muranjan . S.K., 'Modern Banking in India', Bombay, Kamla Publishing i louse 1940. p.4 -5 
Panandikar, S.G., Op.Cil. , p. 5. 
"" As the supply of American collon to England was disrupted consequently I-jigkind luid to depend 
solely on the Indian Cotton. This brought immense export earnings to India, which led to specula l i \e 
enterprises entering banking. Soon many institutions were overtaken by disasters. 
Government withdrew its portion of the capital after the failure. A new bank having Ihc same name 
was established immediately with a capital of Rs. 1 Crore (10 millions). 
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system, which resulted in hampering the growth of Joint Stock Banking in tlie 
country/^ 
Between 1865-95 only two major Joint Stock banks could be established 
the Allahabad Bank in 1865 and Punjab National Bank in 1895. During 1906-
13, the National {SM'adeshi) Movement resulted in establishment ol" many 
banks like, Bank of India Ltd. in 1906, Indian Bank Ltd. in 1907. The Bank of 
Baroda Ltd. in 1909 and The Central Bank of India Ltd. in 1911, etc. 
From the early days of the East India Company to the year 1833 banks 
were established on the basis of unlimited liability. They transacted ordinary 
banking business and financed internal trade. They also issued notes for 
circulation. Most of these banks ended in failure owing to the combination of 
banking with other business and speculation. From 1833-1860, majority of the 
banks failed due to speculation and mismanagement. Some of the banks, 
however, were successful.'^'' After the adoption of limited liability principle in 
1928 even more number of banks failed. Panadikar reports that 481 banks 
failed during the period of 1913-36 and between 1937-43 another 475 banks 
had failed in the country.''"^ If one takes into account the banking history of the 
country during first half of the 20"' century around 1000 banks failed for 
various reasons from mismanagement, speculation to fraud. Keeping in view 
the safety following restrictions were imposed upon the three presidency banks: 
1. They were prohibited to deal in foreign bills and borrowings abroad. 
2. They were prohibited to lend for more than six months period. 
3. They were also prohibited from lending on the immovable properties. 
Most of the early banking failures in India could be attributed to lack of 
proper management and speculation, however, a good number of these bank 
failures were also fueled by rumors and lack of confidence among the bankers 
^^  Ibid. 
For details see tiie Government ol" India. 'The Indian Cenlral Banking Enqiiiiy CnmnuUL'c'. (I 'ait 1). 
Calcutta. Government of India. Central Publication. 1931. 522, p. 
"" i ' l inandikar, S.G., Op O r . p 14-15 
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themselves, whieh Ibreecl (he ;iulhori(ies (o (hink (or a ccii(rali/ctl hankini' 
institutions in the county. The Imperial Bank of India, which was carved out of 
the three presidency banks, is the reilection of that necessity. The following 
paragraphs have some more details of it. 
The banking crisis during the First World War forced the government of 
India to amalgamate the three presidency banks into the Imperial Bank of India 
in the year 1920. This bank was later on, after the independence of the country, 
converted into the State Bank of India in 1955. Some other princely state banks 
were merged or converted as the associates of the State Bank of India. The 
Central Bank in the countr)' was established separately as the Reserve Bank of 
India in 1933. 
Most of the foreign banks in India were established under a Royal 
Charter or English legislation.'"' The first Anglo Indian Commercial Bank to 
receive a Royal Charter was the Oriental Banking Corporation, which was 
formed by amalgamation with the Bank of Western India in 1842 at Bombay. 
In the year 1853 the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China, and the 
Chartered Bank of Asia were incorporated. Of the three-chartered banks the 
Oriental Bank failed in 1804 and the Mercantile Bank (Chartered Bank of Asia) 
had to relinquish its Charter in 1893 and reconstruct itself as the Mercantile 
Bank of India under the English Companies Act. 
Although efforLs were being made since 1836 to establish a foreign bank under the Ro_\ul C'liaitei- bm 
F.ast India Company and its associate agency house banks were successful in prcser\ ing banks in India 
charted by it f rom the competition of English banks. They were apprehensive that these banks would 
make profit at their expense on their annual remittances for home expenditure. The f such proposal 
for incorporation in London of an Anglo-Indian Bank, called the Bank of India was made in IX'i6. 
I lowevcr, the East India Company and its agcncy banks were opposed to the idea on the gi'ound thai 
the) would be able to extend their services to the government and the country in all directions 
contemplated by the proposed bank. The next project was the Bank of Asia of 1X40. which met with 
the same fate as the Bank of India, owing to the opposition of the agency houses, which had recovered 
from the disastrous failure of 1829-1832. 
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Evolution of Central Banks 
Banking experiences in several countries had taught the regulating 
authorities to confine the right of note issue to a single institution (called bank 
of issue). This right was granted either to an already functioning institution or a 
separate institution was created for the purpose. These institutions had special 
power and privileges accompanied by varying degrees of state control and 
supervision. In due course such bank of issue acquired other functions, duties 
and powers and by the end of the nineteenth century almost every country m 
Europe along with Japan and few in Africa had established a bank of issue with 
special privileges and powers. Most of these banks later on assumed I he role of 
a central bank in their respective country. However, it was only till the 
twentieth century that the term 'central banking' came to be applied to such 
institutions.''^ 
International financial conference which was held at Brussels in 1920 
passed a resolution to the effect that all countries which has not yet established 
a central bank should process to do so as soon as possible not only with a view 
to facilitating the restoration and maintenance of stability in their monetary and 
banking system but also in the interest of the world cooperation. Since that 
time, central banks have been established not only in the existing independent 
or self governing centers which did not yet had a central bank but also in man)' 
new independent states which had been created later on."*^  
At present a Central Bank is generally recognized as the bank, which 
constitute the apex of the monetary and banking structure of its countiy and 
performs the national economic interest in the following ways; 
1. The regulation of currency in accordance with the requirements ol' 
business and the general public. 
Dekock, M.H., 'Central Banking, Universal Book Stall. N e w Delhi. 1997 p. 4 
' ' Ibid., p. ...9. 
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2. The performance of general banking and agency services for the 
government. 
3. The custody of the cash reserve of commercial banks. 
4. The custody and management of nations reserves of international 
currency. 
5. The provision of credit facilities. 
6. The settlement of clearance balances between the banks. 
7. The control of credit in accordance with the needs ol' business and 
economy.''^ 
By the beginning of the twentieth century following banks had already 
assumed the role of the central banks in their respective country. 
Table No. 1.2 
Name of the Bank Year of Establishment 
Riks Bank of Sweden 1656 (Reorganized as State Bank of Sweden 
in 1668) ' 
Bank of Netherlands 1804 (After the Bank of Amsterdam become j 
discredited) i 
The Bank of Austria 1817 (reorganized as Bank of Austria and 1 
Hungary in 1878) ! 
Bank of Norway 1817 
National Bank of Copenhagen 1818 (Now known as the National Bank o]~ 
Denmark) 
The National Bank of Belgium 1850 
The Bank of Spain 1856 (Sprung from State Bank founded in 
1829) 
Bank of Russia 1860 , 
Reich Bank of Germany 1875 ' 
Bank of Japan 
[ 
1882 
Bank of Italy 1893 1 
Swiss National Banks 1907 
Soii/ce Central Banking, De Kock Mil, op at 
In India, Hilton Young CAirrency Commission recommended in 1926 Ibr 
creation of a Central Bank to be called the Reserve Bank of India to perform 
Ibid., p 16. 
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the central banking func t ions .F ina l ly , a bill providing for the establishment 
of the bank was introduced in the central legislature in 1933 and was passed in 
1934.^' The Reserve Bank of India commenced its work in 1935. The bank was 
later nationalized on .January 1, 1949. 
Later Developments in Banking Forms 
Nineteenth century mechanical discoveries resulted in great expansion 
of trade and commerce. Unmatched production of goods and invention of new 
means of transportation paved the way for commerce to becomc a matter of 
worldwide interest.'"'" Great Britain (UK) being geographically at the center ol~ 
the land hemisphere controlled most of the routes to the continent. This 
position, along with London being the chief financial market of its time, gave 
her an early edge to carrying out trade at the worldwide level.'"' 
After the end of the First World War the preeminence of London was 
overtaken with the consequent rise of New York, as much ol' the war 
indebtedness was liquidated by gold shipment. This resulted in making New 
York the chief free market in gold. Much Business then found its way to New 
York. This was helped by the fact that America had great resources, which she 
was prepared to lend for the reconstruction of their economies."''^ 
Post war years; therefore saw the emergence of new financial market as 
well as institutions involved in multilateral lending and borrowings. This 
The commission furtiicr rccommendcd lliat tlic Reserve Bank of India should be a shaieholdcis 
institution and that the members of the Indian legislatures {central & provincial) should be debarred 
from serving as directors of the bank so as to eliminate the danger of political pressure being eserciscd 
on the board of the bank. 
" First the bill was introduced by the government in the legislative asscmbK in 1927. but was 
withdrawn because the assembly desired the bank to be a state institution and a proportion of its 
director to be members of the legislature in the peculiar conditions of the country. 
Cheminant , Keith L.E., 'Colonial and Foreign Banking Systems', London. George Rullcdge & Sons. 
1931, p. 238. 
' ' Ibid.. 
' ' Ibid.. 
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phenomenon was come to be known as International banking. Many of the 
joint stock banks in UK and US entered in this arena mostly by three methods. 
1. By opening up branches in foreign countries. 
2. By buying up a part and if possible controlling part of capital of existing 
foreign banking firms. 
3. Forming affiliated institutions operating under the laws of the respective 
countries in which they were formed. 
The growing internationalization of banking received a great impetus 
from the veiy rapid post war developments of telegraphic, telephonic and 
wireless communication and the equally rapid growth of the new foreign 
exchange markets in the chief financial centers."^" 
Reconstruction efforts in many of the war torn European countries 
necessitated the establishment of multilateral financing institution which was 
materialized through the establishment of International Monetary Inind and the 
World Bank. 
International Banking 
The idea of international banking was realized through the establishment 
of International Monetary Fund in December 1945 and International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1946 when representatives of 
forty-four countries, under the Britton Wood plan, decided to found these two 
institutions; 
International Monetary Fund 
This was mainly established to enhance the monetary cooperation, 
facilitate monetary exchange, and maintain the exchange rate stability among 
the member countries. The aims of the IMF are to promote international 
" Ibid.. 
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monetary cooperation and exchange ra(e slabilit}' to assist in the rcmov;il of 
exchange restrictions and to assist in estabhshing a niuhilatci'al sxslcin ol 
payments. It seeks to facilitate expansion of the world trade with a view to 
promote high levels ol 'employment and income and develop Ihe productive 
resources of its member countries. 
The World Bank 
The World Bank consists of International Bank for Reconstruction ami 
Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) 
Its private sector arm is International Finance Corporation (IFC). 
The IBRD began its operation in June 1946; its broad aim is to provide 
and facilitate international investment for increasing production, raising 
standard of living and helping to bring a better balance in the world trade. It has 
been rendering yeoman's services for post war reconstruction in Western 
Europe and for the development of under developed countries all over the 
world. The major objectives of the IBRD are: reconstruction and development, 
capital investment form higher income country to low income country and 
payment adjustment encouraging developed countries to invest in developing 
countries and raising the standard of living. 
The International Development Association (IDA) was established in 
1960 to provide assistance to the poorer developing countries on terms that 
would bear less heavily on their balance of payments than IBRD loans. 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) was established in 1965. Its 
function is to assist the economic development of less developed countries by 
promoting growth in the private sector of their economies and helping to 
mobilize domestic and foreign capital for this purpose. 
The IBRD, IDA, and IFC have three interrelated functions; to lend 
funds, to provide advice and to serve as a catalyst to stimulate investments by 
others. 
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Development Banking 
Another very important constituent of the modern banking emerged alter 
the world war two. The origin of the development banking can be traccd back 
to the incorporation of the Industrial Bank of Japan. The concept is basically 
the outcome of the necessity of restructuring the war torn industrial economies 
of several countries."''^' The basic aim of development banking was ihc llnancing 
of the industrial concerns. After the World War II many regional development 
banks were established on the basis of economic cooperation of the region. 
Commonwealth countries also started establishing their own industrial, 
agriculture banks after they got independence from their rulers. 
An offshoot of development banking, these institutions were main!) 
established keeping in view the increasing reliance on international economic 
cooperation. The pioneering efforts in this respect was the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) which was established in 1958 under the treaty of 
Rome from which emanated the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Foundation of European Investment Bank gave impetus to the establishment of 
similar institutions elsewhere. Thus the Inter American Development Bank 
(lADB) was established in 1959. This was followed by setting up of African 
Development Bank (AFDB) in 1964 and Asian Development Bank (Al)B) in 
1966. The idea to establish Asian Development Bank was originally mooted at 
the llrst Ministerial Conference on Asian Economic Cooperation held in 
Manila in December 1963. Strictly speaking the term Regional Development 
Bank refers to those development banks, which have been founded by certain 
country groups in different parts of the world to foster their rate of economic 
growth and social progress through regional economic cooperation. Generally 
regional development banks operate on continental level."'^ 
' ' ' i 'or details see Sikidar. Sujit.. 'Devc/opmen/ Banking', New Delhi. Sullan Cliand & Co.. 19X5. pp 
244. 
l-or details see Saksena. R.M.. 'Regional Development Banking'. Bomba) ' . Somaiya l'ublicalii)ns, 
1972. pp. 729. 
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Virtual Banking 
Broadly speaking, virtual banking denotes the provision of banking and 
related services tlirough extensive use of information technology without direct 
recourse to a bank by the customer. The origin of virtual banking can be traced 
back to 1970s with the installation of Automated Teller Machines (ATM). 
Subsequently, other types of virtual banking services liavc gi'own in 
prominence like Shared ATM networks, Rlcctronic Funds Transfer ( I ' l f ) . 
Smart Cards, Stored Value Cards, phone banking and Internet & Intranet 
banking etc. 
Virtual banking services have been increasing very last even in the 
developing countries due to their manifold financial benefits like low cost 
services due to higher economies of scale, prompt services through electronic 
modes, the lower cost of operating branch due to reduced staff costs, enlarged 
range of services in comparison to the conventional banks services. 
The popularity that virtual banking services have vvon among ihe 
customers, owing to speed, convenience and round the clock scrvicc.s the) 
offer, is fast catching the customers.^^ 
In this present chapter an attempt is made to briefly highlight the 
historical developments of modern banking in several countries. In the next 
chapter we shall take up the issues of recent banking reforms undertaken in 
several countries after the banking crises especially during 1990s. 
* * * * 
Resci 've Bank of India, Repon on Trend and Progress of Banking in India: 1998-99. 
CHAPTER-2 
RECENT BANKING CRISES, REFORMS, AND 
RESTRUCTURING EFFORTS 
The Genesis of Crises 
The International financial system has been facing a number of crises 
time and again especially after 1970s the frequency of such crisis has 
substantially increased'. There is not a single geographical area or a major 
country that has been spared the effects of these crises. In many cases the early 
warnings signals have proved to be ineffective in predicting the crisis'. Even 
International Monetary Fund was unable to foresee the crises. Since mid 
eighties banking crisis have come to the fore of economic analysis. The 
stressful situation of banking, during the last couple of years, has quickly 
intensified and in the process has become one of the main obstacles to stability 
of the financial system. This brings to an uneasy feeling that there is sojnething 
basically wrongs somewhere. This prompted for a call for comprehensive 
reform of the international financial system to help prevent the outbreak and 
spread of financial crisis or at least minimize their frequency and severity."' 
Fear of global banking crisis has afflicted banks regulators since the 
great depression. During the 1930s more than one-fifth of the commercial 
' U.S. Banking crisis 1974, Herslalt Bani< Germany, Britisii Israel Bank U.K.. Stock Markcl Clrisis. 
1987, .lapanese Banking crisis 1990, break down of European Exchange Rale Mechanism (BRM) in 
1992-93. the Bond Market crash in 1994, the Mexican crisis 1995, East Asian crisis 1997. Russian 
crisis 1998, the break down of US hedge funds in 1998, Brazilian Exchange crisis 1999. and the latest 
Argentinean economic crisis in 200! . 
• Bank ibr International Settlements {BIS), Basel Commit tee on Banking Supervision. •Siiperrisniy 
Lessons to he Drawn from ihe Asian Crisis. Working Paper No. 2. .lune 1999. p. 56. 
' Chapra, M. Umer, "Allernalive Vision of Inlernalional Monetary Reform". In Munawai- Iqbal and 
David Llewellyn (ed.), Islamic Banking and Finance: New Perspectives on Profit Sharing and Risk. 
Edward Elgar, U.K., 2001. p,219. 
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banks in the United States suspended operations. In Europe, major bank 
failures or payments moratoriums were common. Withdrawals of bank loans 
and deposits played a major role in the balance of payment crisis of the period, 
particularly in Central and Eastern Europe. Johnson and Richard observe that 
overall the "great depression of 1930s could be defined in terms of financial 
collapse"." 
Costs of the Crises 
Estimating the cost of financial restructuring is one of the most 
challenging issues. There are costs both in inc private and public sectors to 
cover losses and contribute new capital. The private costs is difficult to 
determine, however, the government's gross costs for the restructuring arise 
from paying out guaranteed bank liabilities; providing liquidities; assisting in 
meeting capital adequacy requirements and purchasing non performing loans. 
During Asian crisis the gross costs ranged between 15 and 45% of GDP. 
In Indonesia the government has issued 150 trillion Rupiah (13 percent of 
GDP) of indexed bonds to the central bank to compensate it for the past 
liquidity support. Another 100 trillion Rupiah of bonds (9 percent of GDP) is 
again issued to the banks to finance the first wave of bank recaptalisation. In 
Thailand the government was authorized to issue bonds for 500 billion Baht 
(10 percent of GDP) to cover losses in the Financial Institutions Development 
Fund, and the government has, again, announced its intention to cover 
additional losses in a similar way. In Korea, parliament approved the issuance 
of 64 trillion Won of bonds to finance Korean Asset Management Corporation 
(KAMCO) and Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) around 15 
percent of GDP. ' 
Johnson. Orilbert G. and Richard Abrams. "Aspects of the inlenialional Bonking Safety Net". 
Washington D.C.. International M o n e t a n Fund. 1983. p. 1. 
Lindgren. et a!. "Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring Lessons From Asia". Iniernational 
Monetaiy Fund. Washington. D.C.. 1999. p. 37-39. 
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By the mid of 1999 Indonesia had spent $ 85 biUions (51 percent of 
GDP) towards its restructuring costs. During tlie same peiiod koiea had spent 
$ 46 billions (13 percent of GDP) towards its restructuring costs. Malaysia had 
spent 5 percent of its GDP (4 bilhons US. dollars) towards its restructuiiiig 
costs. Thailand's public cost for financial restructuring at the end of 1998 was 
around 34 billions of U.S. dollars that came around 25 perccnt of the GDP of 
the country. India too had lost more than Rs. 65 billion of the public exchequer 
towards bank restructuring by the year 2000 and now the non-performing 
assets (NPA) of Indian bank stood at $ 14 billion.'' 
Following table (2.1) gives the information about the costs incurred by 
international and other financial institutions agencies on restructuring few of 
the turbulent economies. 
Table: 2.1 
Help Provided by Multilateral Financial Institutions for Bank Restructuring 
(Figures in US $ billion) 
Country/Year IMF World Bank 
Regional 
Dev. Bank 
Bilateral Total 
Brazil, 1998 18 1 04 5 04 5 14 5 41 6 
Indonesia, 1997 1 1 2 05 5 04 5 21 1 42 3 
Mexico, 1995 17 7 - - 31 1 48 8 
Republic of Korea, 
1997 
21 1 1 0 0 04 2 23 1 58 4 
Russian 
Federation, 1998 
15.1 06 0 - 01 5 22 6 
Thailand, 1997 04 0 01 5 01 2 10 5 17 2 
Total 87 2 27 5 1 4 4 101 8 230 9 
1 
Souice Montek. S Ahluwalia ""I he IM! .ind the Woild Bank in the new 1 niancidl Aichi lct iuic 
liileinalional Monetaiy am! rinancial hMies fo! the /990s, United Nations. 1999 Vol XI p M 
Another study conducted by Claudia and Ceyla of IMF includes a 
survey of 24 countries^ that have gone restructuring of their banking system 
after the onset of crisis. According to Claudia and Ceyla the bank restructuring 
'' Sec Roy, Abhi|it, 'Pioductivities. iccoveiies key to longei proiits". The Hindu. Novemhei 2002 
p 16 
01 these 24 countries 4 aic industiial. 15 developing and 5 tiansition economies 
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operations have got two main olojcctives; firstly, to restore tiie llnaneial 
viability of the banking system and secondly, to restore the system's 
intermediation capacity and an appropriate level of banking services relating to 
aggregate economic activity.'* 
Table (2.2) gives the estimated costs of bank restructuring in percent of 
GDP in their respective countries. 
Table No. 2.2 
The Cost of Bank Restruc turing 
Country 
Onset of restructuring 
(Year) 
Estimated cost 
(in percent of GDP) 
Cote d' Ivoire 1991 13,0 
Ghana 1989 6.0 1 
Tanzania 1992 14.0 
Zambia 1995 3.0 
Indonesia 1994 2.0 
Korea 1993 n.a. 
Philippines 1984 4.0 
Japan 1995 n.a 
Hungry 1993 12.2 
Poland 1993 5.7 
Finland 1991 9.9 
Spain 1980 15 
Sweden 1991 4.3 
Latvia 1995 n.a. 
Moldova 1995 n.a. 
Kazakhstan 1995 n.a. 
' Claudia. Dziobek and Ceyla, Pazarbasioglu, •Lessons From Systematic rcslriicluring: A S i i n e y of 24 
Count r ies ' , Inlernational Monetary Fund, WP/97/161. December 1997. 
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Egypt 1991 n.a. 
Kuwait 1992 45 
Mauritania 1993 15 
Argentina 1994 0.3 
Chile 1983 33.0 
Mexico 1994 12-15 
Peru 1991 0.4 
Venezuela 1994 17.0 
Sourcc: Claudiii, D/Jobek and Ccyla. Pii/.iirbasioglu, 'Lessons I'rom Systemat ic rcsirLicluniig 
A Survey of 24 Countries". International Monetary Fund, WP/97/161, December 1997. p.5 & 21. 
These cost measures are limited to fiscal costs only. Costs borne by the 
private sector are not included. Hyperinflation in many countries substantially 
eroded the deposit values, which was mainly, shared by the depositors and thus 
are not included in the costs of these restructuring. 
A Precursor to the International Co-operations 
According to Lindgren el.al. 73 percent of the member countries ol ' the 
IMF experienced at least one bout of significant banking problems from 1980-
1996. Such crisis resulted in serious bank losses. Several arguments have been 
raised in analytical literature like volatility in the market environment, 
increased leverages of banks connected lending practices and regularity 
forbearance, etc. Some consider financial liberalization to be the cause in an 
environment where financial systems of many countries are not sound as a 
result of improper regulation and supervision. Others felt that the ultimate 
cause is the bursting of the speculator bubble in asset prices driven initially by 
the excess of financial intermediaries.^ 
Krungman, Paul. "What happened to Asia"? Mimeo. .lanuary 1998. 
ht tp/webmet.edu/knugmanAvww/dislnter .html. 
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It has also been argued that the root cause of the crisis was the maturity 
mismatch. Short-term international liabilities were far greater than short-term 
assets. Many other causes including higher and growing accumulation of Non-
performing assets, exacerbated by weaknesses in the accounting, disclosure and 
legal framework were also cited as the reasons for the crises (Cooper & Fraser, 
1984). Some are of the opinion that it has been the moral hazard that has largely 
been responsible for these economic distresses, for example, Kapstein in this 
regard says, "banks regulators have created for themselves a 'moral hazard" 
problem'. As the authorities have provided systematic safeguards, they have 
also encouraged imprudent behaviors on the part of some financial executives. 
If bank depositors were more like shareholders, they would try to prevent 
management from engaging in careless banking practices.'" Kapstein further 
admits that unlike previous post war decades, the 1970s were characterized by 
a unique combination of inflation, floating and erratic exchange rates and 
volatile interest rates. In these circumstances the major commercial banks in 
the industrial countries were forced to become more active in asset and liability 
management. He explains that in an effort to protect both their customers and 
their own institutions in the face of systematic shocks, bankers responded by 
promoting three developments in financial markets. These were globalization, 
innovations of financial practices, instruments, and speculations." 
Accompanying and contributing to these developments was the deregulation ol~ 
financial markets across the G-lO countries. 
The globalization of finance meant that banks increasingly engaged in 
international activities on both the assets and liabilities sides of the balance 
sheet, blurring the distinction between domestic and international finance, with 
net savers in one country becoming increasingly linked to net borrowers in 
another. 
Kapste in , B. Ethan, "Supervising Internationa! Banks Origins and Implications of the Baste 
lecord". Internat ional F inance Sect ion. Princeton Universi ty , N e w . l e r s c y , 1991. P. 11. 
" I b i d . 
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The second trend innovation or financial engineering was evident in tlie 
introduction of new practices and instruments during 1970s and 198fls. Among 
these innovations, two of the most prominent were securitisation in which 
traditional bank assets, such as mortgages were transformed into marketable 
instruments. These included the performance bonds (which ensure that firms 
will perform their contractual tasks with customers or the bank will pay the 
penalty), note issuance facilities, foreign exchange services, letter of credit and 
various instruments revised to buffer financial risks including interest rate caps 
and swap agreements. 
The third important trend was speculation, given the macro economic 
instability of the seventies; activities like foreign exchange trading became 
increasingly risky. For currency values could swing sharply on a daily basis. 
Accompanying and contributing to these changes in capita! markets was the 
wide spread deregulation of commercial banking. (Some details in the 
following pages) 
The possible bad effects accompanying these changes i.e. globalization, 
innovations and speculation could be realized when Bankhaus Herstatt in West 
Germany was ordered to close in 1974. The bank had incurred heavy foreign 
exchange losses around $ 450 million. The main sufferers were Italian and 
Japanese banks. The Franklin National Bank'^ of New York and the British-
Israel Bank of London too were closed in 1970s owing to similar causes. The 
three failures had made the regulators realise that liquidity or solvency 
problems of a foreign bank or the foreign branch of a domestic bank could have 
serious repercussions in domestic markets besides halting the international 
payment system, this prompted the formation of G-10 committee on banking 
regulations and supervisory practices now known as Basle Committee. 
For details please see. Herman, I. Liebling, "US Corporate profitability and capital formation: Aic 
rates ol" return sufficient? N e w York, Peragmon Policy Studies, 1980. 
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An honest analysis, of the above mentioned crises might lead to several 
conclusions. However, one that seems to be one of the most important is siiJ-eJy 
iinheailhy fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies. This brings a number of 
questions. The first is about what it is that enables the continuation of macro 
economic imbalances, unsustainable exchange rates and unhealthy financial 
systems. A second related question is about why some of the countries that 
have followed sound fiscal and monetary policies have also faced crises and a 
third but equally important question is about why some of the apparently well-
regulated financial systems have also faced crisis. 
Abbas Mirakhor of the IMF notes that there are many analysis ol" 
financial crises and a long list of their causes but surprisingly little is said about 
the one under line common denominator to all of them: debt contracts that are 
by nature out of sync, and unrelated to, income flows that the underlying 
productive and capital assets of these countries can generate to serve them. ' ' 
Islamic economists see this problem from another angle they point out 
that conventional economic literature has not been successful in providing 
satisfactory answers to the above mentioned questions because, they assert, it is 
not an implementation problem of an honest policy rather there is a problem in 
diagnose itself 
Chapra, for example, is of the view that the primary causc behind these 
crises is inadequate market discipline. Depositors in the financial markets are 
assured of their return with interest which makes the depositors take little 
interest in the soundness of the financial institutions. And since the banks' 
financing largely depends upon collateral, this makes the bank takes little 
interest in the evaluation of the projects to be financed. Very often in the 
collateral based financing the end use of the finance is not the same for which 
' Mi rakhor , A b b a s , ' H o p e s for the Future of Is lamic F inance ' , A'eiv Horizon. . luly-August 2002 . p.7. 
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the fund is raised.''' Can the collateral be a substitute for a more careful 
evaluation of the project financed? No says Chapra, this is because the value of 
the collateral can itself be impaired by the same factors that diminish tlie ability 
of the borrower to repay the loan. The ability of the market to impose the 
required discipline, thus, gets impaired and leads to an unliealthy expansion in 
overall volume of credit, to excessive leverage, and to living beyond means. 
The problem is further aggravated with the reinforcement of the tax system that 
inherently is biased in favor of debt financing where dividends are taxable 
while interest payments are treated as cost.'"' 
In the absence of risk sharing it is possible for the financier to lend 
excessively and also to move funds rapidly from place to place at the slightest 
change in the economic environment. A high degree of volatility, thus, gets 
injected into interest rates and assets prices. This generates uncertainty on the 
investment market, which in turn discourages capital formation and leads to 
misallocation of resources."' It also drives borrowers and lenders alike from the 
long end of the debt market to the shorter end. Consequently there is steep rise 
in highly leveraged short-term debt, which has accentuated economic and 
financial instability. IMF too acknowledges that the countries with high levels 
of short-term debt are "likely to be susceptible to financial crisis". 
The heavy reliance on short-term borrowing has injected a substantial 
degree of instability into the international foreign exchange markets. 
According to a survey conducted by the Bank for International settlement 
(BIS), the daily turnover in traditional foreign exchange markets adjusted for 
double counting had escalated to $ 1490 billion in April 1998, compared with $ 
Please see, Ta iwan S.P., (Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India). -Emerging trends in 
supervision in India ' , at the meeting of S A A R C Supervisors in Pune (India) on 27'-30/l /99. /i/.V 
Review, 13/1999. 
' Chapra, M. Umer, 'Alternative Visions of International Monetary Reforms", in Munawar Iqbal and 
David Llewellyn (ed.), /s/amic Banking and Finance: New Perspectives on Profit Sharing and Risk. 
Edward Elgar, U.K., 2001, p.221. Also see, Chapra, M. Umer, 'Towards a Just Monetary System', ' f he 
Islamic Foundation, Leicester, U.K., 1985, chapter 5, p. 107-45. 
BIS, Annual Report, June 1982. p.3. 
' ' International Monetary Fund, World Economic Out Look Report, May 1998. p. 83. 
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590 billion in April 1989, $ 820 billion in April 1992, and $ 1190 billion in 
April 1995. The daily Ibrcign cxchaiigc liiniovcr in April 1998 was moic lluin 
49 times to the daily volumes of world merchandize trade (See table 2 2 and 
2 3). 1 8 
Table 2.3 
Foreign Exchange Turnover in $ billion 
April 1989 $ 590 billion 
April 1992 $ 820 billion 
April 1995 $ 1190 billion 
April 1998 $ 1490 billion 
Sowce BIS. Oclobei 1980 
Table 2.4 
Volume of World Trade 
World Trade (Exports+lmports) 
April 1989 $499 billion 
April 1998 $ 908 7* 
* Average value of daily world trade in April 1998 comes to 830 3 billion 
Source IMF. International Financial Statistics 
The dramatic growth in speculative transactions over the past two 
decades has resulted in an enormous expansion in the payment system. Such a 
large volume of transactions implies that if problems were to arise, they could 
quickly spread throughout the financial system, Mr. Crockett, the Geneial 
Manager of the Bank for International Settlements admits this "our economics 
have thus become increasingly vulnerable to a possible break down in the 
payment system".'^ 
Another statistics, (table 2.5), which is instructive in this regard, show 
that the contingent liabilities of major banks constituted a large multiplex of 
' Chapia , M. Umei, "Why has Islam piohibited inteiest", Review of tslamic lIconomiLS. the Islamic 
roundat ion , Leicestei, U K , No 9, 2000, p 16 
' " b i s , / ? e v / e i t ' , 2 2 J u n e 1994, p 3 
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shareholders equity and in many cases longer than the banks third world lolal 
debt exposure. By 1987 for example Citi Corporation had contingent liabilities 
of $ 467 billion, J.P. Morgan had $ 203 billion and Chase Manhattan had $ 175 
billion. They constituted more than 50 times shareholders equity for Citi 
Corporation and over 40 times equity for Morgan & Chase Manhattan."" 
Table: 2.5 
Contingent liabilities of major U.S. Banks in 1987 ($ billion) 
Bank Contingent Liabilities ($ billion) 
Citi Corp. 467 
J.P. Morgan 203 
Chase Man 175 
Source. Kapslein, op cif, p -4 
One cannot undermine the fact that there is a close nexus between easy 
availability of credit, macro economic imbalance and the financial instability. 
Easy availability of credit makes it possible for the public sector to have a high 
debt profile and for the private sector to live beyond its means to have high 
debt leverage. If the debt is not used productively the ability to service the debt 
does not rise in proportion to the debt and leads to a financial fragility and debt 
crisis. The greater the reliance on short terms debt and the higher the leverage, 
the more severe the crisis might be. This is because short-term debt is easily 
reversible as far as the lender is concerned, but repayment is difficult for the 
borrower if the amount is locked up in loss making speculators' assets or 
medium and long-term investments with a long gestation period. 
Islamic economists, to prove that interest has solely been responsible 
behind the entire crises, cite many examples like East Asian crisis to the recent 
Argentinean economic crises.^' We shall not go in those details, as they are out 
side the purview of our present study. Although, some other reasons put 
"" Kaps te in . op cil, p. 4. 
See loot note one 
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principle for financial intermediation in the economy, are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
There is a point to note that not only Muslims but a number of Western 
economists too consider the present debt based system as the root causc ol' 
financial instability and vouch for a shift to an equity oriented financial system. 
Hicks, for example, pointed out that, interest has to be paid in good or bad 
times alike, but dividends can be reduced in bad times and in extreme situation, 
even passed. So the burden of finance by share is less.^^ 
In this present study we shall not go into detail about the overall 
economic crises faced in different parts of the world. The analysis will be 
confined to banking crises and an attempt would be made to find out what cure 
has been done or method adopted to tackle these crises. During the last two 
decades more than 120 countries have experienced some kind of systematic or 
nonsystematic banking crisis.^^ Many are of the view that interest and debt has 
played a pivotal role in these crises. 
In the following section we would like to explore some of the 
international efforts in streamlining the banking sector. A brief history of Bank 
for International settlement (Basle Accord) and its present efforts to deal with 
these banking crises is worth starting the discussion. 
The Basle Committee 
Three big failures of 1970s, the Herstatt Bank, Germany, the Franklin 
National Bank of New York and the British Israel bank of London, if anything, 
had warned the Central Bankers especially of G-10 countries that these banking 
crises if not contained could rapidly take on international dimensions from 
Hicks, Sir, Joim, 'Limited Liability. The Pros and Cons", in Tony Oilinial (Ed ). Limited Licihihn 
andllie Corporation, London, Croom Helm. 1982, p. 14. 
Lindgren, C., et a!, 'Bank Soundness and Macro Economic Policy. Wa.shinglon. Intcinalional 
Monetary Fund, 1996 and Capiio, G.. and D Klingebiel. 'Episodes of SyMeniatic and Bi>idcilinc 
Financial Crises', World Bank. 1999. 
40 I Recent Banking Crises, Reforms and Reslriicliiring Efforts 
crises if not contained could rapidly take on international dimensions from 
which all would suffer. By 1975, a new conimidec (the Basic ("oininidcc) oi) 
Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices was formed by Ihc G-10 
central banks governors, to be based in Basle at the Bank for International 
Settlement (BIS). The first draft of the committee that came in 1975 was 
known as concordat. 
The Basle Committee is made up of representatives from Belgium. 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands. Sv/eden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. In 1981 ihe 
committee issued its first report, which since then has become an annual 
feature and known as "Report on International Developments in Banking 
Supervision." The chief purpose of the committee is to close gaps in the 
supervisory net and to improve supervisory understanding and the quality of 
banking supervision worldwide. It has tried to pursue its objectives in firstly, 
by exchanging information on the operations of international banks and on 
national regulation policies and practices; secondly, by developing new 
approaches to the supervision of International banks; and finally, "reviewing 
the desirability of setting standards in bank capital and other areas.^'* 
The failure of Banco Ambrosiano, Italy and the Mexican debt crisis of 
early 1980s hastened the processes of strengthening international paymcnl 
system. Ethan B. Kapstein notes that after the bank failures of 1970s and early 
1980s, the public had begun to lose confidence in the banking system. Bank 
portfolios were filled with dubious or high-risk loans leading to fall in banks" 
profit and share prices with them. The fall in share prices eroded the ability oi~ 
banks to attract equity investments to build up core capital. A vicious cycle 
was, thus, taking hold and threatening to undermine the major commercial 
banks and the internal foundation of the international payments system.^' 
"" Basle Commit tee on Banking Supervision, 1989. ht tp: / /www.bis.org 
Kapstein, B. Ethan, "Supervising Internationa! Banks: Origins and Implications of the Ba.sle 
Accord". International Finance Section, Princeton University, N e w .lersey. 1991. ! ' . 11. 
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To avoid the panic, whicli could have easily turned into a contagion 
leading to collapse of the international payment system, the Basic Conimillcc 
began to seek support from other international organizations like International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) as well as the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). 
The Mexican crisis came as a timely warning to all those involved, the banks, 
the governments of the creditor states, the relevant international institutions as 
well as the debtors. The crisis threatened the international payment systems for 
two reasons; first, it threatened to install the trade investment and financial 
flows between the industrial and developing countries; second, the amount of 
debt was so large that if the banks were forced to write them off, they would be 
declared insolvent because the banks lacked the sufficient capital to absorb the 
losses. 
The debtor countries, for their part, could not earn enough foreign 
exchange to meet the interest payment in their obligations. To remain current 
on their loans, they needed more foreign exchange from the banks, from 
industrial countries and from multilateral financial institutions, which were not 
coming following the Mexican announcement. The United States entered 
into the morass as American commercial banks held around half of the banks" 
claim on third world countries. Two pronged strategies for dealing with debt 
problem, consisting of "Short term crisis management and longer term 
stabilization, were adopted.^^ 
The broad purpose of the strategy was to maintain the international 
payment system. The short-term requirement was to inject enough liquidity to 
maintain its uninterrupted operation. This was to be achieved through its 
assistance to Mexico, bilateral agreements between developing and industrial 
countries, IMF stabilization credits and corresponding increase in IMF quotas 
For details please sec. Cohen, Benjamin, .)., "In Whose InleresI? Internalional Banking and 
American Foreign Policy". New Haven. Yale University Press, 1986. 
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and restructuring of existing bank debt, along with tiic extension ol' licsh loans 
by commercial banks.^^ 
The US was to ask for increase in IMF quota. However, before that il 
asked Federal Reserve Board, Office of the Comptroller of the Cuirency (OCC) 
and Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to prepare a new regulatory 
programme for improved supervision and regulation of international lending It 
contained five key elements. 
1) Strengthening of the existing programme of examination and evaluation 
of country risk. 
2) Increased disclosure of banks' country exposure. 
3) The creation of special reserves against losses. 
4) Supervisory rules for accounting for fee associated with loan 
transactions. 
5) Strengthened international cooperation among foreign banking 
regulators through the International Monetary Fund."*^ 
The US Senators realizing the importance of capital in banks concluded 
that bank capital had the quality of a "public good" in that its social benefits 
were greater than its private benefit; if each bank were to raise more capital, it 
would help to restore confidence in the international financial system as a 
whole; and, the imposition of tougher capital standards would ensure that 
shareholders would also share the burden along with the US tax payers.^'^ 
To avoid its' own bank being singled for tougher capital regulations as 
compared to others in the market. The U.S decided to promote these 
regulations at international forums. The International Lending Supervision Act 
(ILSA) of 1983 was the resuh of above-mentioned US Policy. This Act called 
Kapstein, op cit., p 10. 
" " u s Congress , House, Commit tee on Banking, Tmance and Uiban AtlaNs Inlei naliomil Bank 
98th Congi ess, l " Session, Apiil 20, 21, 1983, p 234 
This IS the ciux of whole issue tow aids which Islamic economists point out ( I ) Bank capital has the 
quality of public good and (2) the shaieholdeis should shaie the buidcn I lowevei . the d i l l c i e n t c lies in 
the level of dosage. The US authoiities wanted mciease in shaie, the Islamic economists wanls lull 
shaie capital The US authoiit ies wanted the shaieholders to shaie some ot the buiden while the Islamic 
economists wants shaieholdeis to shaie lull buiden 
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upon the regulators to require increased level of bank capital and it encouraged 
"governments, central banks, and regulatory authorities ol'other major banking 
countries to work toward... strengthening the capital bases of banking 
institutions involved in international lending."^® In 1984 one of the top ten U.S. 
bank "Continental Illinois, required a $ 6 billion infusion of the Federal 
Reserve Funds to meet its immediate financial obligations. Despite the 
emergency infusion of cash by Federal Reserve, the bank collapsed and a 
Federal bailout followed. This event together with ILSA heightened the 
regulatory supervision in the U.S. The l-cderal Reserve Board wanted the banks 
to strengthen their balance sheets through financial market, lor this, action 
required on both the assets and the liability sides. On assets side Federal 
Reserve examined loan quality of the banks while on the liability side it tried to 
increase capital levels in the bank. For furthering its objective at the 
multilateral levels the Federal Reserve Board decided to make use of Basle 
Committee. 
After three years of intense debate, the Basle Committee announced in 
1987, that its members had reached agreement on a proposal for "International 
Convergence of Capital measurements and Capital soundness".'^' The accord 
had three parts; the definition of Capital; the application of risk weights to 
specific assets categories; and the treatment and off balance-sheet activities. 
Peter Hayward, Secretary of the then Basle Committee conceded, "The purpose 
of the capital agreement was to strengthen the capital base of the banking 
system" the presumption behind this remark is that there is a direct relation 
between levels of capital and bank soundness. It was agreed that banks must 
have certain minimum level of capitaP^ and the banks should also assign 
certain risk to each category of asset. 
Kapstein, op.cit., p. 13. 
BIS. Annual Report. 19S7. 
This capital was further subdivided into tier one and tier two depending on the natuie o( then 
subscription. 
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In 1997 the Basle Committee released a set of twenty-iive basic 
principles for effective banking supervision, which camc to be known as (lie 
Basle Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision. 
The Basle Core principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
Endorsed by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) these twenty-
five core principles have been drawn up by the Basle Committee in close 
consultation with the supervisory authorities in fifteen emerging market 
countries including Chile, China, The Czech Republic, Hong Kong, Mexico, 
Russia, Thailand, Argentina, Brazil, Hungry, India, Indonesia. Korea. 
Malaysia, Poland and Singapore for adoption by all countries. 
These twenty five core principles represent the basic elements of an 
effective supervisory system and cover preconditions for effective banking 
supervision, licensing and structure, prudential regulations and requirements, 
methods of ongoing banking supervision, information requirements, formal 
powers of supervisors, and the Cross Border Banking." The Basle Core 
principles, as it claims, are intended to serve as public reference for supervisory 
and other public authorities worldwide to apply in the supervision of all banks 
within their jurisdictions. The twenty-five core principles are setout below. 
Principle: 1 Preconditions for effective banking 
Supervision. 
Principles: 2-5 Licensing and structure. 
Principles: 6-15 Prudential regulations and requirements. 
Principles: 16-20 Methods of ongoing Banking Supervision 
Principle: 21 Information requirements. 
Principle: 22 Formal powers of supervisors. 
Principles: 23-25 Cross Border Banking. 
http/Avww.bis.Org 
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Preconditions for effective banking supervision 
1. An effective system of banking supervision will have clear 
responsibilities and objectives for each agency involved in the 
supervision of banking organizations. Each such agency should possess 
operational independence and adequate resources. 
Licensing and structure 
2. The permissible activities of institutions that are licensed and subject to 
supervision as banks must be clearly defined, and the use of the word 
'bank' in names should be controlled as far as possible. 
3. The licensing authority must have the right to set criteria and reject 
applications for establishments that do not meet the standards set. The 
licensing process, ownership structure, directors and senior 
management, its operating plan and internal controls, and its projecfed 
financial condition including its capital base etc. 
4. Banking supervisors must have the authority to review and reject any 
proposal to transfer significant ownership or controlling interest in 
existing banks to other parties. 
5. Banking supervisors must have the authority to establish criteria Jbi" 
reviewing major acquisitions or investments by a bank and ensuring that 
corporate affiliations or structures do not expose the banks to undue 
risks or hinder effective supervision. 
Prudential Regulations and Requirements 
6 Banking supervision must set prudent and appropriate minimum capital 
adequacy requirements for all banks. Such requirements should reflect 
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the risk that the banks undertake, and must define the component of 
capital, bearing in mind their ability to absorb losses. 
7 An essential part of any supervisory system is the evaluation of Ihc 
bank's policies, practices and procedures related to the granting of loans 
and making of investments and ongoing management of the loan and 
investment portfolios. 
8 Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks established adhere to 
adequate policies, practices and procedures for evaluating the quality of 
assets and the adequacy of loan loss provisions and loan loss reserves. 
9 Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks have management 
information systems that enable management to identify concentration 
within the portfolio and supervisors must set prudential limits to restrict 
banks' exposures to singe borrowers or groups of related borrowers. 
10 Banking supervisors must have in place requirements that banks lend to 
related companies and individuals on arm's length basis, that such 
extensions of credit are effectively monitored, and that other appropriate 
steps are taken to control or mitigate the risks. 
11 Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks have adequate policies 
and procedures for identifying, monitoring and controlling country risk 
and transfer risk in their international lending and investment activities, 
and for maintaining appropriate reserves against such risks. 
12 Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place systems 
that accurately measure, monitor and adequately control market risks. 
13 Banking supervisors must be satisfied that banks have in place a 
comprehensive risk management process (including appropriate board 
and senior management over sight) to identify, measure, monitor and 
control all other material risks and, where appropriate, to hold capital 
against these risks. 
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14 Banking supervisors must be determined that banks liave in place 
internal controls that arc adequate for the nature and scalc of ilicir 
business. 
15 The Banking supervisors must be determined that banks have adequate 
policies, practices and procedures in place including strict 'know your 
customers' rules, that promote high ethical and professional standards in 
the financial sector and prevent the bank being used, intentionally or 
unintentionally, by criminal elements. 
Methods of Ongoing Banking Supervision 
16 An effective banking supervisory system should consist of some form of 
both onsite and offsite supervision. 
17 The Banking supervisor must have regular contact with the bank 
management and a thorough understanding of the institutions' operation. 
18 The Banking supervisors must have a means of collecting, reviewing 
and analyzing prudential reports and statistical returns from banks on a 
solo and consolidated basis. 
19 Banking supervisors must have a means of independent validation of 
supervisory information either through on the spot site examination or 
use of external auditors. 
20 An essential element of banking supervision is the ability of the 
supervisors to supervise the banking group on a consolidated basis. 
Information Requirements 
21 Banking supervisors must be satisfied that each bank maintains adequate 
records drawn up in accordance with consistent accounting policies and 
practices that enable the supervisor to obtain a true and fair view of the 
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financial conditions of the bank and the profitabihty of its business and 
that the bank publishes on a regular basis financial slalenients lhal I'airly 
reflect its condition. 
Formal Powers of Supervisors 
22 The Banking supervisors must have at their disposal adequate 
supervisory measures to bring about timely corrective action when a 
bank fails to meet prudential requirements (such as minimum capital 
adequacy ratio), when there are regulatory violations, or where 
depositors are threatened in any other way. 
Cross-Border Banking 
23 The Banking supervisors must practice global consolidated supervision 
over their internationally active banking organization. 
24 A key component of consolidated supervision is establishing contact and 
information exchange with the various other supervisors involved. 
25 A Banking supervisor must require the local operations of foreign banks 
to be conducted to the same high standards as are required of domestic 
institutions. 
Bank Reforms and Restructuring: Some Experiences 
During the last two decades over 120 countries developed and 
developing have experienced banking crises in one form or the other. 
Whenever, the crises erupted and begun to intensify and spread the government 
had to intervene to restructure and recapitalize the banks in order to overcome 
the negative effect of the dysfunctioning banking system on economic growth 
and wealth. According to Charles Enoch et al, this was mainly done to 
('/iciplcr / u (J 4') 
Strengthen the bank capital, together with additional financial and operational 
restructuring of banks to restore public confidence in the banking syslem, 
reduce uncertainty, accelerate resolution of banking crisis, and promote 
economic recovery through reestablishing banking and payment services, and 
ensuring that viable businesses can fund their operations;'"* For bank 
restructuring public fund was mainly needed to; 
(1) Make payouts to depositors of closed banks, 
(2) Compensate banks that agree to accept deposit transfers, 
(3) Facilitate an acquisition, merger, or purchase and assumption. 
(4) Help recapitilize banks, and 
(5) Restructure assets.^^ 
In the following sections we shall look into the experiences of some of 
the prominent countries that have faced the crisis. A sample of eight countries 
is chosen for analysis. Of these three; Japan, Sweden and USA are from the 
group of G-10 while three; Korea, Thailand and Philippines are from the 
former Asian tiger group and two countries China and India are taken to 
represent the growing economy. In selecting the country care is taken to 
accommodate countries following different economic ideologies. 
We shall begin our discussion from Japan one of the three G-10 member 
countries followed by Sweden and the U.S.A. South Asian countries like 
Korea, Thailand and Philippines, and growing economies like China and India 
are followed in order. ^ ^ 
^^  Enoch, Charles, Gillian Garcia, And V. Sundarrajan, 'Recapital izing Bank With Public Funds". /A//-
Staff Papers, Vol. 48 No. 1. IMF Washington DC, p. 58-59. 
Ibid. 
Information of the countries mainly US, Sweden, and China are taken f rom variou.s web .sites of IMF. 
World Bank, Bank for International Settlement (BIS) and several news portals. For details please relcr 
to bibl iography. 
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Japan 
Japan faced a full-blown systematic financial crisis in 1997 when 
several high profile financial institutions went into bankruptcy. Nissan Life 
Insurance, one of the nationwide insurance companies was ordered to suspend 
its operation. Sanyo Securities, a second tier securities firm filed an application 
for rehabilitation after it defaulted on its borrowing. Hokkaido Takushoku 
Bank, one of the city banks and Yamaichi securities also were ordered to 
suspend their operations. 
In 1997, the Japanese authorities introduced the Prompt Corrective 
Action (PCA) under the law to ensure the soundness of financial institutions, it 
had two main components. It introduced a self-assessment process that held the 
banks themselves responsible for valuing their assets on a prudent and realistic 
basis, according to well-defined guidelines. By 1998, the severity of the 
problems faced by the Japanese banking system, and the need to use public 
funds to restructure it, were finally recognized. In February 1998. the Diet (The 
•lapanese Parliament) passed two laws to amend the Deposit Insurance Law and 
to establish emergency measures for stabilizing the financial system. The new 
laws authorized the provision of 30 trillion yen (17 for dealing with bank 
failures and 13 for recapitalization of banks) to bail out banks and to protect 
depositors. 
The Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA) was established in June 1998 
to take over the supervision of the banks from the Ministry of Finance and to 
consolidate the segmented supervisory function previously held by various 
bodies. It was granted considerable operational autonomy and independence. In 
October 1998, the Diet passed the Financial Revitalization Law and the 
Financial Early Strengthening Law and amended the Deposit Insurance Law to 
provide a broad framework for the resolution of banking problems. At the same 
" Kanaya, AkhiVo & Woo. David, ' The Japanese Banking Crises of the 1990s Sources and I essons 
Inleinational Economics Section. No . 222, Princeton University, N e w Jersey, 2001, pp 54 
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time the Diet also doubled the total amount of government luncls sel aside lor 
38 
the strengthening of the banking sector to 60 trillion Yen (12% of GDP), out 
of which 25 trillion Yen were earmarked for recapitalizing weak but solvent 
banks, 18 trillion Yen were earmarked for dealing with insolvent banks through 
nationalization and liquidation, and 17 trillion Yen were earmarked for full 
deposit protection of insolvent banks. The Financial Revitalization Committee 
(FRC) was established to oversee the bank restructuring process. 
Sweden 
The banking problems of Sweden came to light in late 1990 following 
which the government adopted comprehensive approach to meet the 
challenges.^^ 
a. A separate restructuring authority, known as the Bank Support 
Authority, was set up. 
b. The government took steps to raise confidence in the country's fmancial 
system. It guaranteed that the banks and all other credit institutions 
would meet their commitments as and when they arose. 
c. The respective roles of all concerned agencies, the Ministry of Finance, 
the Riks Bank, the fmancial supervisory authority, and the bank support 
authority were clearly defined. There was free exchange of information 
between these agencies. 
d. On the basis of capital adequacy and financial ratios, banks were divided 
into those which were viable and those, which were not. The former 
category was eligible for financial assistance while the banks in the 
latter were to be closed or merged with other institutions. 
Ibid. 
Reserve Bank ol ' India , 'Reports on Trends and Progress of Banking in India'. Mumbai . 1998. p. 38-
42. 
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e. The support agreements contained conditions relating to change in 
management and improvement of internal control and risk management 
systems. 
f. Structural reforms included strengthening of accounting, legal and 
regulatory frameworks and prudential supervision. 
g. Separate Asset Management Companies, securum and retriva. were scl 
up respectively for Nordbanken and Gota Bank, the two institutions, 
which received most of the budgetary support. These were solely funded 
and capitalized by the government. 
United States of America 
The 1980s and the early 1990s witnessed the most severe banking crisis 
in the U.S. since the Great Depression years, hi this crisis, involving mainly the 
Savings and Loans institutions (S&Ls), or thrifts. Over 9,000 institutions were 
either closed or merged. 
According to the U.S. News and World Report, July 9, 1984, banks 
were failing at a second post depression rate since the depression of 1930s. The 
number of troubled institutions on the "problem" list monitored by Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC),"*" soared from 217 in 1980 to 700 in 
1984." 
State and federal regulators in America closed 79 banks in 1984. During 
the same period another 947 were on the 'problem' list. Scores of Savings and 
Loan institutions were near insolvency. More than 21 rural banks were sucked. 
Even some of the largest banks, supposed symbol of financial safety and sound 
judgment, were also hit. To prevent a national banking crisis, the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation engineered a US $ 4.5 billion-rescue operation. 
The agency that guarantees savings and checking deposits up to Dollar 100,000 
•" Anwar , M., Modeling Interest Free Economy-A Study in Macro Economics Developmeni. 
International Institute o f l s l a m i c Thought (HIT), l lerndon, U.S.A. 1987, p. 19 
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Bank of America, the second largest reported $ 1.6 billion loan losses in 
agriculture, shipping and real estates.''^ 
In dealing with troubled banks, the Federal Deposit insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) mostly opted for the strategy of "open bank assistance" 
which involved preventive intervention before closure. This usually included 
assistance from the Federal Reserve in the form of emergency credits for 
temporary liquidity purposes. In the case of merger with healthier banks, FDIC 
entered into "income maintenance agreements", where it stood guarantee Ibr a 
minimum return on the earning assets that were acquired. 
The crisis brought a number of changes in the regulatory framework. 
The Competitive Equality Banking Act, 1987, provided for the establishment 
of "bridge banks" to take over the operations of a failing bank and maintain 
banking services for its customers. It helped "bridge" the gap betvv'een the 
failure of a bank and the time when the FDIC could implement a satisfactory 
resolution of the failing bank. 
The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 allowed for placing temporary stewardship of problem banks with the 
federal authorities and in some cases allow for a temporary public equity stake 
when institutions are sold to the private sector. The FSLIC was liquidated and 
the FDIC took over insurance of thrifts. A new Office of Thrift Supervision 
was established to regulate thrifts. The Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) 
was set up and given six years to clean up the assets of the thrift industry. 
The FDIC Improvement Act, 1991, among other things, provided for 
rules requiring regulators to act quickly (Prompt Corrective Action) when a 
bank's core capital falls below 2 per cent of risk assets and to replace 
management and limit the asset growth of "critically undercapitalized" banks. It 
also provided for restrictions on the Federal Reserve's ability to provide credit 
to ailing banks and introduction of differential deposit insurance premiums. 
Ibid. 
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Richard London after analyzing the American banlcing system concludes 
that "Americans, crushed under the heel of high interest rale and sky rocketing, 
inllation... can take a lesson from the people of Islam and the banking system 
they have created".''^ 
Korea 
After the crisis, in November 1997, the government announced a blanket 
guarantee for deposits maintained with banks and other fmancial institutions. 
This was followed in December 1997 by a comprehensive reform package that 
included exit of unviable fmancial institutions, restructuring of others, and the 
strengthening of banking regulation and supervision.'''^ 
The process of banlc restructuring in Korea took the shape of voluntary 
mergers and foreign investments. The government to purchase Non Performing 
Assets (NPAs) and to recapitalise the banks provided sizeable public funds. 
The funds were provided through the issuance of bonds by the two government 
bodies, the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) and the Korean 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (KDIC) which was a new agency formed by 
merger of all deposit insurance protection agencies and also by purchase of 
shares, ordinary and preferred, purchase of subordinated debt, purchases of 
non-performing loans and repayment of depositors. 
The bad loans were purchased by KAMCO at a fixed price, 36 per cent 
of book value for secured loans and one per cent for unsecured loans based on 
historical estimates of loan recovery. 
Supervision was placed with a new agency, which was also in charge of 
restructuring fmancial institutions. Regulations were tightened in the areas of 
London, Richard, V., "Islamic Banking Practice cut out the Middle man" . Spot Light, .kmc 3. 1985. 
pp. 22-23. 
Lindgren C. {el. al.), 'Financial Sector Crisis and Restructuring Lessons from Asia". IMF Occasional 
Paper. 188, IMF, Washington D.C. 1999, pp.19. 
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risk concentration, connected lending, maturity and currency mismatciics, cross 
guarantees, and in making financial statements more transparent. 
Thailand 
Thailand's financial sector had been facing problems since the early 
1980s. The remedial measures then taken included strengthening of the legal, 
regulatory and supervisory arrangements, government takeovers, change in 
managements, mergers and closures, and financial support. The basic 
weaknesses, hov^ever, persisted and, in 1997, deeper structural weaknesses in 
the economy brought these weaknesses to the fore again. 
Immediate regulatory action involved suspension of operation of 58 
finance companies, which were required to submit rehabilitation plans. The 
Financial Sector Restructuring Authority (FSRA) and the Asset Management 
Corporation (AMC) were created to aid the restructuring process. The FSRA 
was established as an independent body under a separate Act in October 1997 
to review the rehabilitation of the suspended companies and, where 
rehabilitation was not feasible, to oversee their liquidation. 
Legal reforms were also undertaken which included amendments to 
bankruptcy and foreclosure procedures to ensure orderly resolution of 
corporate debts. Regulation was further tightened too, to bring accounting and 
classification of loans in line with international norms. 
The FSRA assumed the responsibility of either rehabilitating or 
liquidating the troubled units. The most important point to note about the Thai 
financial restructuring programme has been that an entirely new institutional 
framework was created and the legal and regulatory framework was 
simultaneously amended to meet the requirements of the situation. 
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The Philippines 
The problems faced by banks in the Phihppines were exposed duiing 
early 1980s. The government declared a moratorium on external debt 
repayment. This led to a run on banks and capital outflows. By end of 1985, the 
Philippines National Bank (PNB) and the Development Bank of the Philippines 
(DBP) were declared insolvent. These banks accounted for nearly half ol' Ihc 
banking system's assets. Their non- performing loans formed about 70 per cent 
of their combined portfolios and about 21 per cent of the banking system's 
assets. 
The rehabilitation programmes included downsizing, transfer of non-
performing assets to the Asset Privatization Trust, recapitalization, writing off 
of government deposits, introduction of new management, closing of branches 
and cost reduction programmes including significant staff cuts to the extent of 
nearly 25 per cent in PNB and 40 per cent in the case of DBP. In 1989, PNB 
was privatized up to 30 per cent and further to 57 per cent by 1996. 
China 
Extensive bank restructuring is being earned out in China since 1997. 
Four of the largest state-owned banks, viz.. Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, Construction Bank of China, Agricultural Bank of China and Bank of 
China, are undergoing restructuring programmes aimed at improving their 
efficiency and increasing profits which had stagnated mainly due to huge non-
performing assets estimated to be at about 20 per cent of total outstanding 
loans. 
The series of measures taken by the government to improve 
management, capital and asset quality included increasing banks' independence 
from local governments, setting up asset management companies, conversion 
of debt into equity, mergers, closures and liquidation, and direct capital 
injections from the central government. Between 10 and 20 per cent of total 
bank employees were be laid off in the process. 
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India 
Bank reforms in India were part of the larger economic reforms initiated 
in the country during 1991, when country was faced with severe economic 
crisis. According to an estimate the public sector banks suffered losses of 
Rs.32.93 billion in 1992-93 and Rs.43.49 billion in 1993-94. According to a 
high official of the Reserve Bank of India, the factor which mainly contributed 
to the build-up of Non-Performing Assets (NPAs) was the lack of focused 
attention on the end use of funds.''^ 
Another estimate by Standard & Poor's and The Credit Rating 
Information Services of India Ltd. (CRISIL), says that India's scheduled 
commercial banks require between US$11 billion-US$13 billion in new capital 
to support losses embedded in impaired assets. 
The banking reforms specially focused on prudential guidelines, 
competition, merger, setting up of supervisory and surveillance mechanism and 
in house strengthening of banks. The implementation of prudential norms and 
guidelines has constituted a significant step towards introduction of 
transparency. 
In order to strengthen the capital base of banks, the Reserve Bank in 
April 1992 introduced a risk weighted assets ratio system as a basis of 
assessment of capital for banks in India. It stipulates that Indian banks having 
branches abroad should achieve the minimum capital adequacy norms of 8 
percent by March 31, 1995. Foreign banks operating in India were to achieve 
this norm of 8 percent by March 31, 1993. Other banks were to achieve this 
norm of 8 percent by March 31, 1996.'^ ^ 
Talwai", S.P., Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, 'Emerging trends in supervision in 
India' at the meet ing of S A A R C Supervisors in Pune (India) on 27-30/1/99. 
Reserve Bank of India, "Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 1992-1993", B o m b a ) . 
1993. p. 1. 
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In 1991 a committee on financial sector reform recommended following 
important policy measures; 
1) Reduction in preemption of bank's resources; Statutory Liquidity Ratio 
and Cash Reserve ratio (SLR& CRR to the minimum level). 
2) Deregulation of interest rates: to reflect the market conditions. 
3) Abolition of branch licensing policy: to make the entry of private sector 
possible. 
4) Introducing new capital adequacy and other prudential norms covering 
Income recognition, assets classification and provisioning for bad loans. 
Prudential norms were primarily introduced to serve two purposes. First, 
to reveal the true position of banks' loan portfolio and secondly, to help in 
assessing the level of deterioration in the banking assets. The capital adequacy 
measure was aimed towards incentive based regulation for well capitalized and 
efficient banks to compete, while costs were imposed on under capitalized and 
poorly managed banks. 
After the introduction of new prudential and accounting norms in 1992-
93 most of the public sector banks were found to be undercapitalized. To cover 
this the government had to pump Rs. 10,9871.2 million during 1993-95, which 
rose to Rs. 20,0461.2 million by 1997-98.''^ An asset would be considered 
substandard if it is classified as NPA for a period of not exceeding two years, 
doubtful when it remains NPA for a period exceeding 24 months (reduced to 
18 months from 2001) and loss when it is identified as loss asset either by bank 
or international/ external auditor but amount is not written off wholly or partly. 
Banks were asked to classify their advances (Assets) into four categories 
i.e. standard, substandard, doubtful, and loss. Substandard, doubtful and loss 
assets are individually and collectively known as Non Performing Assets 
"" See Government of India, 'Commit tee on Financial Sector Re fo rms ' . (Chairman. M. Nars imhan) . 
1991. 
Reserve Bank of India. "Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India. 1997-98". B o m b a \ . 
1998. p. 20. 
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(NPAs). Accordingly a provision has to be made by the banks in the ibllowing 
manner; 
Table 2.6 
Assets Classification and Provisioning 
S. No. Assets Classification Provisioning 
1 Standard Assets Nil 
2 Substandard Assets 10 percent of total outstanding 
3 Doubtful Assets Up to one year 20%, 1 to 3 years 30% 
4 Loss Assets More than 3 years 50% then 100% 
Souice Nais imhan Committee on Bankmg Reloims, Government of India. 1998 
After the adoption of new regulatory norms there has been an 
improvement in banks performance, however, the cost of these bankmg 
distresses has been enormous on public exchequer as can be seen m the 
following table, which shows the cost incurred by the government on bankmg 
sector during 1998-2000. 
Table: 2.7 
Loss of Public Money in Public Sector Banks during 1998-200 (Amount In Rs. Crores*) 
Year 
Total 
Advances 
Gross NPA 
Maintenance 
C o s t @ 
5%/annum 
Opportunity 
Cost 
Total Loss 
1998 284971 45653 31405 3430 6885 
1999 325328 51710 35444 3899 6821 
2000 380077 53294 34290 3772 6599 
* 1 c io ie IS equal to 10 million 
Souice Sood, R.K , "Non Peitoiming Assets in Public Sectoi Banks An Anal)s is ol Causes and 
Solutions theieof", Indian Bankeis Association Bulletin, Vol , XXllI , No , 7. Mumbai. Iul> 2001. p 17 
60 I Recent Banking Crises. Reforms and Res/nicltiring Efforts 
Table 2.7 shows that during the three years period, 1998-2000, the 
government of India had to inject more than Rs. 203 billion of public money 
into the ailing banking system. This is enormous especially for a poor country 
like India. Moreover, it has continuously been observed that there is no end of 
the government support to the ailing financial institutions in the country 
especially banks. During the last two years few more thousand crorcs of public 
money has gone to the maintenance of the ailing financial institutions in the 
country. 
Conclusion 
During last two decades more than hundred countries have some kind ol" 
financial crises. The frequency and the cost of these crises have been on 
increasing trend. Whenever a crises occurred government to prevent the 
contagion had to enter with millions of taxpayer's money. Many times the cost 
of these crises has been to the tune of 45 percent of the total GDP of the 
country. An analysis of these crises whether national or international level 
reveals that there was a unanimous call for increased capitalization of the ailing 
institutions. In many countries regulators now believe that the capital has the 
public good, which is considered as cushion for unforeseen losses, capital 
adequacy is, thus, considered as the measure of banks' internal strength to 
absorb risks. 
As for the deposit insurance is concern current researches has shown 
that this has adversely affected the efficiency of the financial institutions aparl 
from aggravating the moral hazard. In the words of Ajit and Bangar, "Deposit 
insurance is not necessarily the appropriate response to avoidance of instability. 
The main criticism against it is that it encourages excessive risk taking. 
Besides, it has been argued that since depositors are protected by insurance 
coverage, they have little or no incentive to monitor their banks activities. 
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There is moral hazard inherent in deposit insurance especially if" the insurance 
is provided officially with implicit guarantees"."^'' 
Some of the Western economists who claim the present system to be the 
most efficient have not been successful in providing convincing answers for the 
causes of these crises. 
Islamic economists on the other are of the view that the root of the 
problem lie in interest based (fixed contract) system, which is pro rich and 
inherently biased in favor debt capital. This system enlarges the gap between 
rich and poor and results in various economic evils that lead to financial crises 
and instability. James Robertson endorses this view in these words, 'the 
pervasive role of interest in the economic system results in the systematic 
transfer of money from those who have less to those who have more. When we 
look at the money system that way and when we begin to think about how it 
should be redesigned to carry out its function fairly and efficiently as part of an 
enabling and conserving economy, the arguments for an interest free inflation 
free money system for the twenty first centuiy seem to be very strong'.^" 
Recent researches in financial theory have shown that efficiency is 
independent to the capital structure rather a fixed pay system is more prone to 
instability and inefficiency than a system based on risk sharing. One of the 
famous theorem propounded by Miller Modigliani states that the value ol~ the 
firm is independent of its financing decision.""'' Lloyd Metzler of the University 
of Chicago proposed an alternative system in which contracts were based on 
equity rather than debt, and in which there was no guarantee of the nominal 
values of liability since these were tied to the nominal values of the assets. 
AJit. D., and Bangar , R.D, "Banks and Financial Inlermedialion: Performance and Issues", Rcsci-\'e 
Bank of India, Occasional i ' apers , Vol. 18 No. 2 & 3, Bombay, 1997. p. 331. For some good tinalysis 
of Deposi t Insurance also see, D. Ajit , 'A Case for Risk Based Deposit Insurance System in India". 
http/Avww.rbi.org. September 30, 1998. 
.lames Robertson, ''Future Wealth A New Economics for the 21" Century . Casscll Publications. 
London, 1990. p. 130-1 
Miller. M. and Modigliani, F., 'The Cost of Capital Corporation Financc and theory of ln \cs lmcnts" . 
Published mAER, Vol. 18. 1958, p. 423-443. 
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Metzler showed that such a system did not have the instability characteristics of 
the conventional banking system."''^ 
The unprecedented growth in equity market during recent years in 
various parts of the world has also aided fuel to the thesis that as the economy 
marches towards advancement its reliance on fixed pay instruments decreases. 
Advancement in science and technology reduces the cost of information and 
asymmetry that makes debt based instruments economically unviable. 
Islamic economists point out that the allocation of fmancial resources on 
the basis of profit/ loss sharing gives more weight to the profitability ol~ 
investment, whereas an interest based allocation gives it to credit worthiness. 
The allocation made on the basis of profitability is expected to be more 
efficient than that made on the basis of interest.^^ 
A number of economists (Islamic as well as conventional) have argued 
to shift to an equity oriented financial system on the ground that it will reduce 
the instability of the financial markets. It has been argued that the nominal 
value of deposits in conventional system is guaranteed whereas the same is nol 
with the advances, which creates a discrepancy between assets and liabilities 
and ultimately to a crisis. On the contrary the profit and loss sharing system 
promptly cover any discrepancy on the assets side, as the nominal value is not 
guaranteed in this case. This will enhance the stability of the banking system. 
Besides, PLS system will put a check on abrupt capital flight, as it is the 
interest rate differential that leads to volatility in fmancial markets brings 
uncertainty and abrupt movement of capital from one to another place. As 
pointed out by a prominent economist at the IMF that a debt based system 
needs bankruptcy proceedings, debt restructuring, and workout mechanism and 
processes which the present international financial system lacks."""* 
Metzler. Lloyd. A. •Wealth. Saving and the Rate of Interest, Journal oj Poliiical F.conomv. Vol 59. 
1951. p . 9 3 - n 6 . 
" Iqbal. Munawar and Llewellyn, David (cd.). Islamic Banking and Finance /Veii' I'erspeclives on 
Profit Sharing and Risk. Edward Elgar, U.K.. 2001, p. 13. 
' Mirakhor, Abbas, "Hopes for the l-uture of Islamic Finance", op. cit. p.7. 
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It is argued that rising interest rate spell danger not only to the westei n 
banking system but also to whole of the humanity. Higher inteiest latcs could 
boost charges on most foreign loans. Economic forecasters at Data Resources 
Inc in Lexington, Massachusetts assert that a hike of 1 or 2 percentage point in 
international prime rate greatly increases the pressure for a moratorium or an 
outright default by a debtor country - an event that would mean steep losses for 
the banks involved. 
Table: 2.8 
Structure of Income of some Industrialized and developing Countries 
Interest income Non interest income 
Net Interest income 
(Spread) 
Countries As a percentage to Gross income As % to total Assets 
1985 1994 1985 1994 1985 1994 
Industrialized 
Countries 
1 USA 73 3 65 7 26 7 34 4 3 5 3 8 
2 U K 65 5 56 8 34 5 43 2 3 1 2 3 
3 Australia 61 0* 58 7 39 0 41 3 2 9* 2 6 
4 France 81 6 55 5 184 44 6 2 r * 0 9 
5 Germany 70 0 74 5 30 1 25 5 2 4 2 2 
6 Switzerland 52 6 45 3 47 4 54 7 1 4 1 4 
Developing 
Countries 
1 India 91 4 86 5 8 6 13 5 2 5 2 5 
2 Mexico 64 2 78 4 35 8 21 7 N A 5 1 
3 Portugal 76 0 72 7 24 1 27 3 2 4 2 8 
4 Turkey 49 3 140 7 50 7 40 7 1 9 124 
5 Spam 81 7 74 8 183 25 2 3 6 2 6 
N.A Not available, * foi the yeai 1986, ** toi the yeai 1988 
Source Oiganization foi Economic Coopeialion and Development (OCCD) Bank Piolitabiiit)-
rinancial Statements of Bankb 1985-1994. Pans. 1996 
64 I Recent Banking Crises, Reforms and Reslriicliiring Efforts 
Table 2.8 compares the structure of income of some ol'lhc industrialized 
and developing countries. We see that the average net interest income (spread) 
as percentage of total income for advanced countries is around 2.2 percent 
while the same for developing countries is 5.8 percent. As the country advances 
towards industrialization and its fmancial market gets diversified and matured 
the avenues for its income (other than interest) get enlarged. On ihc other hand 
the financial market and products of developing countries are nol as diversified 
therefore the interest component of income in these countries are higher than 
those in advance financial markets. There seems to be a kind of inverse relation 
ship between the level of industrialization of a country and the incomc from 
interest of bank in the same country. In the primitive stage banks do not have 
many avenues to increase their income other than normal lending operations. 
However, as the industrialization increases and fmancial markets gets mature 
the income avenues of the banks also increases and so the non-interest incomc. 
Reforms and restructuring is the term often used by conventional 
economists to deal with any financial crises, however. Islamic cconomisls arc 
not content with this they call for reorganization of the system on different line. 
According to them, reforms and restructuring is merely a patchwork and not 
enough to avert the crises forever. For this, one has to reorganize the whole 
financial system on the basis of profit and loss sharing. At their own level 
Islamic economists have tried to introduce this system in some Islamic 
countries, which will be discussed in the coming chapters. Islamic economists 
call, for adopting equity based financial system, is not in the sense that debt 
based financial instrument would be totally prohibited rather they are of the 
view that debt based instrument should also be exposed to risk and be linked to 
the actual economic activity. They also offer some other solutions to improve 
the economic health, which according to them shall be fully implementable 
when the root cause i.e. 'interest' is eliminated from the economy. We shall 
discuss these issues in some details in the coming chapters. 
* * * * 
CHAPTER-3 
Bank Reorganization: An is lamic Way 
Introduction 
The elimination of interest is the core of Islamic Ihiaiicial syslcm. Nol 
only Islam but in all the major religions of the world interest has been held as 
contempt. Besides Islam, Hinduism, Judaism and Christianity all have tried to 
restrict the practices of interest in some way or the other. In Islam the ruling 
against interest {riba) is very clear and final.' For Christian interest was highly 
condemned till beginning of the industrial revolution and Judaism permitted 
interest extract only from the non-Jews. While in Hinduism Manu's laws tried 
to restrict interest practices.^ 
Several of the ancient philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, the two Catos, 
Cicero, Seneca and Plutarch, for various reasons, were against the practices of 
usury. St. Thomas Aquinas was of the view that money was invented chiefly 
for the purpose of exchange and that its principal use was its consumption and 
annihilation where by it is sunk in exchange. Hence it was unlawful to make 
payment for the use of money lent.^ Zamir Iqbal, a research officer at the 
World Bank, points out that prohibition of interest is not limited to Islam but is 
also shared by Judaism and Christianity and the first interest free bank in 
' For Islamic view on interest (riba), plca.se rel'er to the Quran, chapters; 30:39. 4:161. 3:130-2. and 
2:275-81. 
" .lames Hastings, et al (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, T & T Clark, Edinburgh. Volume. 
12. 1958, p. 548-558, Bokare, M.G., Hindu Economics: Eternal Economic Order, .lanki Prakashan. 
N e w Delhi, 1993. Also see, Noonan. .h'., .lohn. T.. The Scholastic Analysis of Usury. Cambridge . 
M.A. Harvard University Press, 1957. 
' All. Naz im and Ali, Nas im, Information Sources on Islamic Banking and Economic, I9H0-I990. 
Kegon Paul International. London. 1994. p.11. 
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documented history Agibi Bank was established in pre-Isiamic period circa 700 
B.C. in Babylonia. This bank functioned exclusively on an equity basis.'' 
In the S"^  century, Charlemagne made usury a criminal offence. And it 
was only in the 16"^  century that interest became prevalent in the Christian 
world and that too when Popes started financing kings and other business men. 
even during that period multiple agreements were made among several parties 
to circumvent the existing laws against the interest. It is quite interesting to 
explore that in spite of prohibition of usury (interest) in all the major religions 
how the interest or usury has become so indispensable to the present world 
financial system. It has become so inseparable part of the system that financial 
system without interest or banking without interest even among the experts 
could be held as the Utopia. In the following paragraphs we shall try to brielly 
visualize how precious metals deposited with goldsmiths developed to bank 
money and became a source of earning interest. 
The present interest-based banking system, which now ibrnis the 
foundation of the monetary system in every modern nation, as we have seen in 
the first chapter, originated from the practices of goldsmiths who established 
the first modern bank in Europe. These goldsmiths initially offered their 
services to those who wished to deposit gold coins for safekeeping. Upon 
taking a deposit the goldsmith would issue a receipt to the depositor. The 
receipt would be issued in 'bearer' form, meaning that any individual bearing it 
could claim back the face value in gold from the goldsmith on demand. As time 
progressed, the public found that the goldsmiths' receipts would be accepted in 
payment for goods and services. These receipts had become the earliest form of 
'bank money'. As time passed goldsmiths realized that there was little need to 
lend the vault gold itself as their own receipts were by now regarded as money 
among the general public. A further step was taken when goldsmiths started 
issuing receipts to be lent out as a proxy for gold coins. This was of great 
Iqbal, Zamir , 'Financial Engineering in Islamic Finance", in Thunderbird Inlernciiional J)//w/ies.s 
Review, .lohn Willy and Sons. 41 (4/5), .iiily-Octobcr. 1999, p. 541-60. 
67 I Bank Reorganizalion. An Islamic Way 
advantage to them as receipts could be manufactured at almost no cost, whilst 
gold could not be. By lending the receipts instead, the goldsmiths charged 
interest on the amount lent. Upon repayment, the receipts could be destroyed as 
easily as they had been manufactured, but the interest charged would remain as 
revenue. 
Interest & Debt 
One may not read the following facts and figures without horrors thai 
between 1980 and 1992 the poorest countries in the world paid three times 
more to the IMF and the World Bank than their original debt. The poor 
countries of sub-Saharan Africa owe three times more than they can earn 
annually through exports. The debt burden of IMF and World Bank loans kills 
19,000 children every single day. In Ethiopia debt repayments are four times 
greater than spending on health. In Tanzania, where 40% of the population dies 
before reaching 35, debt repayments are six times more than health spending. 
Eleven Latin American countries met in Uruguay during March 1986 to 
discuss ways of trimming the interest bill on their $ 350-billon debt. 
proposals to cut interest bill include a cap on the rate of interest, interest 
forgiveness and limiting debt service payments to a fixed percentage of export 
earnings. 
American consumer debt is $112 billon through credit cards. $200 
billons on auto loans, US $ 26 billons on home loans and US $ 184 billons on 
others. According to an ABC report in early 1986, 98.2% of American 
consumers have a hard time in making payments. They would pay bills of one 
credit card through another card and so on.^ 
During Regan's President ship the U.S. debt position rose Irom $1 
trillion in 1981 to US $ 2 trillion in 1986. Officials acknowledge that the major 
^ Anwar , M., Modeling Interest Free Economy-A Study in Macro Economics ({- Development. 
Imernational Institute of Islamic Thought (/IIT), Herndon, U.S.A. 1987, p. 19 
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problem is not the debt but the interest. The interest for 1986 was $ 196 billion, 
which rose to US $ 207 billon by 1987.'' 
According to the latest reports, Argentina has defaulted its $ 726 million 
payment due to the World Bank. The Argentinean President Eduardo Duhaldc 
in is statement said, "We do not like not paying our debts, but we are in a 
quandary: If we do not pay, we default on our debt, and if we do pay we will 
drain our reserves."^ 
These are a few scattered reports highlighting the issue of debt, interest 
and their consequences upon the people and the government of the borrowing 
countries. Now there is no disagreement that debt based contracts is one of Ihc 
most important factor responsible in making the present financial system highl}' 
vulnerable. There are many more aspects to this issue one of them i.s 
highlighted by, IMF Executive Director, Mirakhor Abbas, in these words; 
"there are now US $ 32 trillion of sovereign corporate bonds alone. Compare 
this to the production and capital base of the global economy and one observes 
an inverted pyramid of huge debt piled up on a narrow production base that is 
supposed to generate the income flows that are to serve this debt. In short, this 
growth in debt has nearly severed the relationship between ilnance and 
production. Analyst are now worried about "debt bubble". For each dollar 
worth of production there are thousands dollars of debt claims. An Islamic 
financial system has the potential to redress this serious threat to global 
financial stability because of its fundamental operating principle of a close link 
between financial and productive flows and because of its requirements in risk 
sharing."^ 
In the following sections we shall describe about the factors that led to 
emergence of Islamic economics and its financial system. It is a well-known 
fact that in Islamic economic system does not allow interest. However, there 
" Ibid. 
7 , N o World Bank debt payback: Argcnlina". The Times of India. Monday Oeccmbci 2002 p. 16. 
Mirakhor Abbas. 'Hopes For The Future of Islamic Finance ' , New Horizon. .Iul>-August. 2002. p 7. 
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are more to Islamic economics than interest's prohibition, we brieily describe 
here some other distinguishing features between both the systems. 
Islamic Economics versus Conventional Economics 
Prohibition of interest has not been the only factor responsible for the 
development of Islamic banking. Banking is just a part of overall economic 
system whether conventional or Islamic. Failure of the conventional economic 
theories to resolve out many contemporary problems like unemployment, 
inflation, increasing income inequality, along with the falling down of Ihc myth 
of Philip curve^, and many a times conflicting objectives of the conventional 
economic theories escorted the Muslim thinkers to reconstruct the objective of 
the economics as subject of social science. Chapra, a research advisor at 
Islamic Research and Training Institute (IRTI), submits that continued 
deviation of the conventional economics from normative to positive approach 
resulted in many conflicting objectives like.'" 
A. Harmony between individual preference and social interest 
B. Equal distribution of income and wealth. 
C. Reflection of the urgency wants by prices. 
D. Perfect competition 
Chapra argues that market forces, unlike the presuming conventional 
economists, may not always be in harmony between the individual preference 
and the social interest. He cites the case of pollution, which is social cost to the 
society and any efforts to reduce it would violate the condition of Pareto's 
optimality. He also asks why conventional economics does not take into 
'' The recent experiences o(" s tagnation, iiigii rates of unemployment existing s imultaneously w ith high 
rates of inflation has raised serious doubts about the validity of the Phi l ip 's curve, which postulated a 
stable t radeoff between inflation and unemployment . 
Chapra , M.U.. What is Islamic Economics. IDBs" Prize Winning Lecture Series No. Islamic 
Research and Training Institute (IRTl) and Islamic Development Bank ( IDBl) Publical ion. p. 19. 
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account the social costs resulting from lack of need fulfillment, unemployment, 
mequitable distribution and economic instability. 
Inequality in income and wealth tend to be biased in favor of rich at the 
cost of poor. This diverts the scarce national resources in favor of production of 
status symbol, inessential unproductive goods at the cost of socially preferable 
need fulfilling items. For example Arthur Okun remarked that market tend to 
award prizes that allow the big winners to feed their pets better then the losers 
can feed their children." 
The reason given by Chapra behind the market failure in his own word 
is that, "the secularist paradigm has led to an excessive commitment to 
neutrality between ends, abstinence from value judgments and choice primarily 
through the market" which is not inconformity with the needs of goal 
realization.'^ 
Contrary to this, Islamic economics is based on a paradigm, which has 
socio-economic as its primary objective. This objective takes its roots in the 
belief that human beings are the Vicegerents of the one Allah, who is the 
creator of the universe and eveiy thing in it. They are brothers unto each other 
and all resources at their disposal are a trust from Him to be used in a just 
manner for the well being of all. They are accountable to Him in the hereafter 
and will be rewarded or punished for how they acquired and used these 
resources. In Islamic economics the human beings are not considered lo be 
dependent primarily on maximizing wealth and consumption, rather it requires 
a balanced satisfaction of both the material and spiritual needs of the human 
beings. The fundamental difference between both the economic systems is well 
represented in their respective banking systems. 
" Okun . Ai thui , "Eqiialily and nffitiency I he Big hadeofj'. Washington DC . 1 he Bioking 
Institution. 1975, p 11 As cited by Chapia . W'ha! n Islamic Lcononucs'. op t i t 
Chcipid. M U . 'Whal is h/aniic CLonomics . Op cit p 21 
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The Idea of Islamic Banking 
During initial stages on the discussion on Islamic banking there were 
differing opinion on definition riha the first were of the view that all forms 
of fixed return on lending irrespective of its amount or percentage is nba and 
therefore prohibited. They argued, since interest, whether cxorbilanl or 
reasonable, is addition to the capital borrowed, it is a riba and therefore does 
not comply with the Quran. Thus, they define riba or interest, as any 
predetermined fixed return for the use of m o n e y . I t was considered irrelevant 
whether the riba relates to loan for consumption or productive purposes, 
whether the loans are personal or commercial, whether the borrower is 
government, a private individuals or a company and whether the rate of interest 
is high or low. ''^  
Few weie of the view that it is only usury (the exorbitant rate), which is 
exploitative therefore prohibited. They argued that since bank interest is a 
profit, earned on its operation, is not riba. They regard interest to be prohibited 
only when it is exorbitantly high and exploitative. Further, they were of the 
opinion that inlsrest charges should be permitted when they are especially 
used; 
• By the government to induce savings to finance trade. 
• As a fins or punishment for debtors who have not fulfilled their 
obligations willfully, and 
for loans made to finance productive investment. 
" Ahmad . Shaikh M., Economics of Islam J Compai alive Study, Shaih M Shial 1 ahoic . 1952. p >2 
And also K.u'blen. Ingo, ' i s lam and 1 inancial Inlcimediation". IMI- Slaff Fapeis. Vol 29. No i. I9S2 
p i l l 
Kiisten, Ingo, i s l a m and Financial Inlei mediation", IMF Staff Papers, Vol.29. N o 1. 1982. p.l 11 
Shawky El-Fangari , Mohammad, (Aiabic) ' 'On the Legality of Interest"", L' Egvpte Conlempoi aine 
Vol 52. 1979, pp. 565-582. As quoted by Kirstcn. 1982. p. 110. 
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It was also argued that in an inflationary economy lender will be 
exploited due to fall in the future value of his money and since Quran does not 
permit exploitation therefore at least compensatory is not prohibited. Another 
part of the same argument is that, since Islam is the religion of all people and 
all times to come therefore, it cannot deny its people enjoying banking facilities 
or isolating its masses from such a large sector, this argument is based on the 
pretext that banking without interest is not possible at all. 
There is a third group which has an opinion that modern banking 
because of it being principally based on riba may not be the necessary 
ingredient of Islamic economic system, few of the basic services which are 
provided by these banks like saving deposit, current deposit and vault 
facilitation etc. can also be provided by the bait-al Mai (public treasury). They 
argued that the bank interest is against the basic objective of Shaiiah. 
Islamic economists gave various reasons for the prohibition of interest 
or riba, the three main among them are mentioned by Cummings e! a!: 
• Interest or usury reinforces the tendency of wealth accumulation in the 
hands of few. 
• Islam does not allow gain from financial activity unless the beneficiary 
is also subject to risk. 
• Islam regards the accumulation of wealth through interest as selfish. 
The main economic reason given for the prohibition of riba was that it 
hampers investment and employment and is always exploitative and brings 
Cummings , John T., and others 'Mslam and Modern Economic Change" in Islam and Devclnpmeni 
Religion and Sociopolitical Change, (Ed.) By .I.L. Esposito, Syracuse University Press, 1980. pp. 25-
47 . p.32. 
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instability to the economy.'^ Some other reasons put forward by Islamic 
1 ft 
economists can be summarized as follows. 
1) Transaction based on interest violates the equity aspect oi~ economic 
organization. The borrower is obliged to pay a pre-determined interest 
on the sum even though he may have incurred a loss A fixed charge on 
capital is unjust since the results of productive enteiprise in which 
capital is invested are uncertain. 
2) The inflexibility of an interest based system in loss situation leads to a 
number of bankruptcies resulting in loss of productive potential and 
unemployment. A system based on profit sharing is more stable than a 
system based on fixed charge for capital since the cost of capital in a 
sharing system automatically adjust itself to variations in productivity 
under changing business conditions. A shock to asset position is 
automatically absorbed on the liability side. 
3) The interest system dampens investment activities because it adds to the 
cost of investment. 
4) The interest-based system is security-oriented rather than growth 
oriented. 
5) The interest-based system discourages innovation, particularly on Ihc 
part of small-scale enterprises. 
6) Under the interest based system banks are only interested in recovering 
their capital along with interest. 
7) Under profit sharing system it is the real sector of the economy which 
determines the rate of return unlike in the financial sector which is based 
17 Ahmad, Shmkh M , Econoniici of Islam 4 Compaialive Sliidy, Shailh M Ashia l . l .ahoie 1952 p 
Ahmad , Ziauddin, 'Concept and Models of Islamic Banking An Assessment' papei piescntcd al the 
Scminai on Islamization o1 Banking, Novembe: 27-29, 1984, Kaiachi , Pakistan and AbduHah. 1 uad 
and Iqbal Munawai , ' S o m e Stiategic Suggestions loi Islamic Banking in the 21'"' Ccnlui \ in ReucM of 
/s/i://;»c Ccowo/»/cs, The Islamic roundat ion , Leiccstei. UK Vol 9 , 2 0 0 0 p 41-44 
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on interest. This system (PLS) puts a check on tlie supply of money and 
controls inflation. 
8) Risk sharing system will bring more innovation in the economy and 
encourage new entrepreneurs to venture into the market. 
Mannan in his book Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice, sums up 
the Islamic view on interest in these words "Islam prohibit interest because 
interest has nothing to do in influencing the volume of savings, because it 
makes depression chronic, because it aggravates unemployment problem and, 
finally because it encourages unequal distribution of wealth".'^ 
In spite of all these debates on the harmful effects of riha the issue, 
however, kept haunting time and again in various Muslim countries till a 
universal and comprehensive definition of riba was adopted during the Islamic 
Conference held in Jeddah in 1973. On the basis of this the Islamic Fiqh 
Academy of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), in the year 1985, 
adopted a definition of riba in these words, "any increase or profit on a loan 
which has matured, in return for an extension of the maturity date, in case the 
borrower is unable to pay, and any increase or profit on the loan at the 
inception of the loan agreement, are both form of usury {riba), which is 
prohibited under the Shariah".^^ 
There is now a general consensus among Muslim religious scholars and 
economists that there is no difference between usury and interest and following 
characteristics define its prohibition."' 
1. It is fixed ex ante. 
2. It is tied to the time period and the amount of the principal. 
Mannan , M.A. , Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice, Idarah-l-Adbiyat-i-Delli i . 1970. p. 380. 
"" A h m a d . Ausaf . "The Evolution of Islamic Banking" in Encyclopedia of Islamic Bankin<^ <K 
Insurance. Published by the Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance. London. 1995. p. 17. 
Zamii- Iqbal and Mirakhoi', -Progress and Challenges of Islamic Banking'. Papei' pi-cscnlcd al the 
Ninth Annual International Conference on Islamic Economics , Tehran. Iran. September 1-2. 1998. p.3. 
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3. Its' paynicnl is guaranteed by the borrower regardless of the oulcomc ol' 
the transaction for which the money is borrowed. 
4. The state apparatus sanctions and enforces its collection. 
Emergence of many Muslims states during first half of twentieth century 
gave impetus to the idea of Islamic banking, which caught swiftness by the 
1970s. By 1980s several Muslim countries had started a concerted effort to 
Islamize whole of their economy and by the end of twentieth century there is 
hardly a country with substantial Muslim population where Islamic banking is 
not introduced. At present there are more than 300 Islamic financial institutions 
in different parts of the world enjoying about $ 300 billion of public deposits. 
Several western and conventional financial institufions have also started 
offering Islamic windows to their customers. (More about this in later part of 
this chapter) 
The Rationale of Islamic Banking 
The rationale of Islamic banking revolves around two basic questions. 
Firstly, is the financial intermediation necessary? And secondly, is the financial 
intermediation possible without interest? 
As for the first question, Islamic economists are convinced that financial 
intermediation is necessary. In the words of Professor Sidiqi, "we suggest that 
financial intermediation is a necessity {darurah) in the full technical sense ol' 
the Shariah term. If an Islamic society does not have financial intermediaries it 
will either become weak and wither away or people alien to that society will 
takeover the function of financial intermediation with dire consequences for its 
financial as well as monetary system".^^ 
Some other reasons mentioned by Islamic economists, for the necessity 
of financial intermediation, are the same as put forward by the conventional 
" Siddiqi, M.N., ' I s lamic Banks: Concept , Percept and Prospects ' , Review of Islamic Economic.s. The 
Islamic Foundation, Leicester, UK, No. 9, 2000, p. 26. 
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economists. For example, financial intermediation enhances the cfUcicncy ol~ 
the saving and investment process by reducing transaction costs and 
eliminating the mismatches inherent in the needs of surplus and deficit units ol~ 
economy. Besides this agency problem^^ arising due to asymmetric information 
is also reduced by financial intermediation. Munawar Iqbal e/ al stress that 
"Islamic financial intermediation endeavors to replace interest by other modes 
and instruments both for mobilizing savings and putting those savings into 
productive use. The functions that the banks perform are important whether the 
economy concerned is secular or Islamic. People need banking services. Now, 
since the banking services are needed but interest is prohibited. Islamic 
economies have to find alternative ways of performing various banking 
functions. This challenge provides the rationale of Islamic banking".'"^ 
As for the second issue i.e. is financial intermediation possible without 
interest or fixed payment basis. Islamic economists reply in affirmative. They 
are of the view that it is not only possible but more desirable and efficient in 
many ways.^' As noted in the Pakistan Shariat Court judgment on riha, " The 
writers on Islamic economics are unanimous on the point that banking system 
can discharge all its present day functions even without the element of interest. 
These thinkers also agree that the reorganizing banks on Islamic lines should be 
done on the basis of Shir kah and Mudarahah."-'' 
Modern commercial banking activity is based on creditor and debtor 
relationship where banks only play intermediary roles between the savers 
A g e n c y p r o b l e m s arise when one parly serves as an agent for another . T h e t w o m a j o r types oT 
p r o b l e m s a re that o f moral hazard and adverse select ion. Mora l hazard ar ises d u e to h idden act ion when 
o n e party has the incent ive to shif t the risk onto another u n i n f o r m e d party. A d v e r s e se lec t ion is due to 
h idden in fo rmat ion , when one party has access to more in format ion . A g e n c y p rob lem also occurs due 
to a conf l i c t ar is ing out of se l f i shness . Weak regulatory and legal sys tems worsen this p rob l em. (I 'or its 
ana lys i s , see, N a d i m ul Haq, ' D e v e l o p i n g o f Financial marke t s in D e v e l o p i n g Economics " . Addres s at 
ihe Financial Reform Conference, T rans Asia Hotel , C o l o m b o , Sri Lanka, March 18. 2002) . 
Iqbal, M u n a w a r , et al, 'Challenges Facing Islamic Banking", IDB/ IRTI , . leddah. Occas iona l Paper 
No . I. 1998, p . I 3 . 
For m o r e detai ls please see the above sect ion, "the idea of Is lamic banking". 
Pakis tan Federal Shariat Cour t . ludgment on Interest {Riba), Is lamic E c o n o m i c s Trans la t ion Scries 
N o . 8, IDB/ IRTI . .leddah, 1995, p. 74. 
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(depositors) and the investors (borrower). It charges higher interest from Ihe 
borrower and pays lower to the depositor the balance (spread) is kept by the 
bank to meet its own costs and pay for its shareholders. This kind of creditor-
debtor relationship is not permissible under Islamic iramework. The other 
Islamic principle in matter of Islamic financial transaction is that there should 
be no reward without risk bearing. This principal Is applicable both to labor and 
capital. As no payment is allowed to labor unless it Is applied to work, no 
reward for capital is allowed unless it is exposed to risks. Financial 
intermediation in an Islamic framework is based on these two principles.'^ 
Shaikli Mahmud Ahmad searched through several theories of interest, 
developed since the time of Adam Smith, to show that there had been no 
satisfactory explanation of existence of a fixed and predetermined rate of return 
to Tinancial assets. He went further; analyzing the writings of economists such 
as Keynes, Bohm Bowerk, CasseJs, and Samuelson, to argue that an objeclive 
assessment of these writings would lead one to believe that all of these writers 
held a reasonably strong conviction that the existence of a fixed and 
predetermined rate of interest was an impediment to the process of economic 
growth and development. Mohsin S. Khan, in his article 'Islamic Inleresl-Free 
Banking: A Theoretical Analysis,' notes^^ that the abolition of interest-based 
transactions is not a subject alien to even western economic thought. Several 
western writers including Fisher, I., 100 % Money, (1945), Simons, H., 
Economic Policy for a Free Society, (1948) and Friedman, M., 'The Monetary 
Theory and Policy of Henry Simons,' in Friedman, M., (ed.), The Optimum 
Quantity of Money and Other Essays, (1969), among others, have argued that 
the current (one-sided liability) interest-based financial system is 
Cizaka, Murat , "Historical Background" in Encyclopedia of Islamic Banking rf Insurance. Published 
by Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, London, 1995, p.17. 
Khan, S., Mohsin , 'Islamic Interest-Free Banking: A Theoretical Analysis-.' J l i ^ 
33. 1986, pp. 1-27. -
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fundamentally unstable ^^  In Simon's view the basic flaw in the traditional 
system is that, as a crisis developed and earnings fell, banks would seek to 
contract loans to increase reserves Each bank could do so, however, only at the 
expense of other banks ^^  
Frequent economic and banking crises especially banking failures in the 
United States during 1930s and in 1980s only increased the consternation and 
led to belief that there is something fundamentally wrong with the banking 
sector. Many experts were of the view that fractional reserve banking system 
was inherently unstable and therefore should be replaced with two sepaiate 
financial institutions Such arguments for a profit loss based system have also 
been made in the wake of bank failures in other countries 
1. Deposit Banks with 100% reserves 
2 Investment Trust, to perform the lending functions. 
Mirakhor, Abbas, Executive Director of the International Monetaiy 
Fund (IMF), in his article Progress and Challenges of Islamic Banking speaks 
about the conventional economists who during late 1950s tried to answer two 
fundamental questions regarding banking that had not been addiessed (1) Why 
did banks develop and (2) why were all their operations based on fixed fee 
contracts? Mirakhor says that these questions were unfortunately, albeit 
indirectly, relevant to the theory of Islamic banking.^^ 
The explanation given for the existence of banks was "necessity of an 
intermediate between the preference of lenders for short term liquid assets and 
Moneta iy economists msist that a ze io nominal inteiest late is a necessaiy condit ion loi optimal 
allocation of lesouices They a igue that attei switching f iom metallic to Hat money, adding one 
maigmal unit ot leal balance costs no leal lesouices to the community Theie lo ie . imposing a positive 
pi icc on the use of money would lead t iadeis to economize on the use ot money, m then puisuit to 
m i n i m i / e then tiansaction costs They would theiefoie use some leal lesouices instead ol mnnc \ 
l l o \ \ e \ c i . when the late oi inteicst is zcio t iadeis will have no incentive to substitute ical K s o u i c t s loi 
monc) Moie leal lesouices can theiefoie be diiected to consumption and investment 
1(1 
II 
Khan S . Mohsin, Op cj/. p 9 
Simons, H , Economic Policy foi a Fiee Sociely, Chicago, Univeisity ot Chicago Pi ess 1948 
" M u a k h o i , Abbas, 'Progiess and Challenges of Islamic Banking", Review of Islamic Lconomics I he 
Islamic Foundation, UK. Vol 4 N o 2 . 1 9 9 7 p 5 
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the preference of borrowers for long term illiquid liabilities. Another was (hat 
bank being operating at high volume enjoy beneilts from economics ol'scalc 
According to Mirakhor, the second question why do banks operate at fixed lee 
basis has been much harder to explain, not only this but many other related 
questions regarding interest rate ceilings on bank liabilities and other controls 
and regulations like reserve requirements, control on assets and entry and 
deposit insurance needed answers/"' 
By the mid 1980, economic and financial theory had demonstrated that 
there were disadvantages in the fixed pay off contracts that dominated interest 
based banking because; following conclusions were drawn for fixed pay off 
contracts;^'* 
• These contracts create inefficient default or non-performing assets. 
In the presence of asymmetric information, debt contracts suffer li om 
adverse selection effects and moral hazard effects. 
Reserve requirements gave unnecessary extra liquidity to the regulatory 
authority, which in many cases aggravated the fiscal imbalance. 
Deposit insurance reduced the depositor's willingness to watch the 
functions of these banks. All the above had an adverse effect on the 
functionary of there banks especially during crises. 
Fixed fee contracts create a fundamental conflict between the interest of 
the borrowers and the lenders. 
Socially desirable sectors with low profitability will not get finance 
more over new entrepreneurs with good projects may not get finance in 
absence of security required. 
11 
u 
llVid., p. 6. 
Mirakhor. Op. cil., p.7. 
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• It has been observed that during the crises, to attract more deposit these 
institutions have increased their deposit rates while their earning reduccd 
they trapped into the crises. 
• On the contrary, Islamic banks are those, which are based on equity 
finance and are more immune to such crises. The real value of their 
assets and liabilities would be equal to all points to time. There will be a 
close relationship between investment and deposit fields. 
• Return on liability is the direct function of the return to assets. 
• Adjustment to shock that results in banking crises and disruption of the 
payment mechanism is more rapid than in conventional system. 
Factors for Rapid Growth of Islamic Banking 
A systematic analysis of the evolution of the Islamic banking can 
broadly be grouped into the following two; 
1. Theoretical preparation (Islamic banking as an idea) 
2. Practical Efforts (Establishment of various banking and financial 
institution in different parts of the world). 
The Theoretical Preparation for Islamic Banking 
Theoretical development of Islamic banking can broadly be divided into 
following subheads; 
1: Early writings on Islamic Banking 
There are several writings of the classical Islamic economists who are 
considered to be the founding pillars of the modern Islamic banking. Their 
ideas were taken up and followed by others in the later years for further 
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developments oi' the Islamic banking. Owing to last developmenls during 
recent years, the works of these writers may not be looked as much clear in 
perception but they obviously arc considered to be the architects of Islamic 
banking mainly for conception and proposition of their ideas. 
An analysis of the literature on the subject reveals that during the first 
half of the century, almost half of the total literature available in the world 
was in the Urdu language the rests being either in English or in Arabic 
language.^^ 
Some Muslim intellectuals and fuqaha (Jurists) like, Maulana Syed Abul 
Ala Maudoodi, Imam Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, Anwar Iqbal Qureshi, 
Mohammad Nejatullah Sidiqi, Muhammad Uzair and Ahmad al-Najjar are 
considered to be the pioneers of the Islamic banking movement.''^ 
The first book on the subject in English language by any professional 
economist is Islam and the Theory of Interest by Anwar Iqbal Qureshi of the 
Usmania University, Hyderabad, (Duccan) first published in the year 1946. 
Maulana Hifzur-Rahman Seoharvi's Islani Ka Iqtisadi Nizam (Economic 
System of Islam) in 1938 and Syed Manazir Ahsan Geelani's Islami Maashiat 
(Islamic Economics) in 1947 are the first book level treatment of Islamic 
economics, though; they did not specifically deal with the issue of Islamic 
banking. In Arabic language Muhammad Abu Saud (1965) and Abdullah Al-
Arabi, al Muamlat al-Masrafia al-Miiasra \va Ray al-Islam, (Contemporary 
Banking Transactions and Islam's Views Thereon) 1965 wrote on the subject. 
Muhammad Baqir-al-Sadr's Iqtisaduna (Our Economy) 1961, al-Biink Larihvi 
Fil Islam, (Interest Free Bank in Islam) 1974 and Al-Najjar 's. Bank hi la 
FaM'aid Ka Istratijiyah li al-tanmiyah al-Iqtisadiah, (Bank Without Interest as 
a Strategy for Economic and Social Development of Muslim Countries) 1971. 
See. Siddiqi, M.N., 'Contemporary Literature on l.slamic Economics", in Ahmad . Kluirhid (ed.). 
Sliiclies in Islamic Economics, The islamic Foundation, UK. 1981. 
Ahmad Khurshid, "Islamic Finance and Banking: The Challenges and Prospcels". Rcvic^\' of Islamic 
Economics. The Islamic Foundation. Leicester, UK. No 9. .luly 2000. p.59. 
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have also dealt on Islamic banking. Hamidullah Siddiqui's, Anjuman Qard Hen 
Bila Sood, (Interest Free Loan Society) article in 'Maanf. 1944, gives ihc 
account of first practical effort in the field of Islamic banking; his several other 
writings, A Suggestion For an Interest Free Islamic Monetary Fund (1955). 
and Interest Free Lending Banks (1962) also belong to the above category 
Some other mentionable works are summed up in the (table, 3 1) 
Table No. 3.1 
S o m e Early Writ ings on Islamic Economics and Banking 
W r i t e r T i t le of t h e B o o k 
Y e a r o f 
P u b l i c a t i o n 
L a n g u a g e 
Naiem Siddiqui, Islami Usool Par Banking 1948 Uidu 
Maulana A.A. 
Mawdudi Sood 1951 Uidu 
Sliaikh Ahmad Irshad Bila Sood Bankari 1964 Uidu 
Mohammad Akram Islami Maishat Men Bank aiir 
Bachaten 
1965 Uidu 
S Hasanuzzaman Interest free comiimption Loans and Consumer Behaviow 1964 Cngl ish 
R K Ready Egyptian Municipal Savings Banks 
Project 1967 Cnglish 
Shaikh Mahmood 
Ahmad Banking m Islam 1969 Cnglish 
Muslehuddm Ahmad Banking and Islamic Law 1974 English 
Shalibi Ahmad Islamic Bank 1969 Aiabic 
Mohammad Issa Banks Without Interest 1970 Aiabic 
Baiyun Nun 
Abdussalam 
The Shape of The Banking System 
in Islamic Economy 1972 Aiabic 
Souue M N S\ddiqi, Muslim Economic Thinking A Suiyey of Conlempoiaiy Lileialiii e Op cit 
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Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi's A Model of Interest Free Banking and 
Ghuir Sudi Bankari (Banking Without Interest, 1969) are considered lew ol'llie 
important contributions to Islamic banking in many respects. In his book 
Professor Siddiqi has dealt with a banking model, creation and control of 
credit, consumer and government finance, and provision lor short-term intei-est 
free loans to business. He has also introduced certain financial papers to 
replace bonds and securities. 
Mohammad Uzair's An Outline of Interest less Banking (1955) has the 
distinction of being the first published work exclusively devoted to the subject 
of Islamic banking. Another of his work, Factors Contributing to the Success 
of Interest Free Banks (1958) is also worth mentioning. 
It may be noted that the majority of the second-generation writers on 
Islamic banking, unlike first generation that mainly consisted of Ulanui. 
belonged to professional economists. 
The period from 1930 to 1974 is characterized by theoretical writings on 
Islamic economics and banking, which can undoubtedly be described as the 
foundation period of Islamic banking. Most important writings of the period 
include Muhammad Uzair (1955), Mohammad Nejatullah Siddiqi 1961, 1969, 
Abdullah Ali Arabi, 1967, Baqir-al- Sadr 1961, 1974 and Ahmad-al-Najjar, 
1971." 
2: Seminars, Conferences, Committees and Institutions 
Seminars and conferences have played a vital role in the concept, 
development and practices of the Islamic banking. In this regard Finance 
Minister's conference in Karachi in 1970 and Egyptian study of 1972 are path 
breaking in many respects. However, it was the first International Conference 
on Islamic Economics held at Makkah 1976 that served as a catalyst at an 
" Siddiqi, M. N. , Banking Wiihout Inleresi, Markazi Maklaba Islami, Dcilii, 1979, pp. 19.5-207. 
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intcnidlional level and led to dii exponential giowlh ol lilcialuK on Iht 
subject ^^  Islamic Fiqh Academy Semmar at Jeddah in the yeai 1985 is 
impoitant m respect that a common definition of Riha was the outcome ol this 
semmai A consensus on the definition of R}ba that ended all pievious 
speculation and controveisies Some other seminai, committees and 
conferences, which had played impoitant lole in the dcvclopmenl ol the 
discipline and have become a regulai feature since 1970s and kept the tempo of 
Islamic banking high, aie mentioned in the table 3 2 
Table No. 3.2 
S o m e Important Conferences and Seminars on Is lamic B a n k m g 
Conference Place Year 
1®' International Conference on Islamic Economics Makkah 1976 
The Conference on islamic banking and Strategies for 
Economic Cooperation Baden Baden 1982 
The Second international Conference on Islamic 
Economics Islamabad 1983 
Conference on islamic Banking Its impact on world 
financial and commercial practices London 1984 
Workshop industnal Financing Activities of islamic 
Banks Vienna 1986 
International Conference on Islamic Banking Tehran 1986 
International Conference on islamic Banking and 
Finance Current Issues and Future Prospects 
Washington 
Dc 1986 
Islamic Banking Conference Geneva 1986 
Islamic Banking Conference London 1988 
Islamic Banking Conference Toronto 1997 
International Conference on Islamic Economics, 
Bankmg and Finance Loughborough 2000 
SOLIILCS Vaiious. issues of Islamic Economic Studies and Islamic Economics Bulletin 
'C l i ap i a M U 'What is Islamic Economics Op c i t , p 48 
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3: Compilation of Previous Works 
Proper recording and compilation of previous works is important in 
many respects. It is an indicator of the direction and development of the 
subject. One of the most important and path breaking work under this category 
was done by Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi A Survey of Conlemporaiy 
Literature on Islamic Economics it was prepared in 1974 and published in 
1980. Another important work by Siddiqi, published in 1982 is Recent Works 
on History of Economic Thought in Islam: A Survey, this paper surveys the 
recent writings in Arabic, English and Urdu on the economic thinking of 
twenty seven eminent Islamic thinkers of the past from Imam Abu Hanifa to 
Aliama Iqbal. Few other important works in this field includes M. Akram's. 
Annotated Bibliography of Contemporary Economic thought in Islam and 
Glossary of Islamic Terms in Islam prepared in 1973. It has compiled the work 
done in the field in English and Urdu languages. This bibliography was first 
published in 1983; another important work published in 1974 is done by Atiyah 
Jamal al- Din Daiii al Bahilh fd Iqtisad al-Islami Arabic (A Guide to 
Researcher in Islamic Economics). 
M. A. Mannan's Abstracts of Researches in Islamic Economics. 1984. is 
the listing of the works carried out by International Centre for Research in 
Islamic Economics (ICRIE) either independently or in collaboration with 
others. Nazim Ali and Nasim All (1994) have compiled several important 
works in their book, Information Sources on Islamic Banking and Economics 
1980-1990. This work covers the writings during the period of 1980 to 1990. 
The latest important addition in this field is Islamic Economics & Finance A 
Bibliography by Javed Ahmad Khan, published by Mansell, U.K. in 1995. 
4: Research Paper and Magazines 
Various magazines and publications have become a regular feature on 
the subject of Islamic economics, finance and banking. Occasional papers. 
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seminar proceedings published by various institutions like Islamic Research 
and Training Institute, (IRTI), Islamic Development Bank (IDB), 'die Islamic 
Foundation, UK, Center for Research in Islamic Economics, (CRIE) have 
played important role in disseminating the information on the disciph'ne. 
Harvard Islamic Finance Information Programme (HIFIP) has become one ol" 
the important annual features for Islamic finance during last few years. Some 
of the important magazines and journals on the subjects are; RevicM' of Islamic 
Economics, UK, Islamic Economic Studies, .Teddah, King Abdul Aziz University 
Journal of Islamic Economics, Jeddah. Islamic Economic Bulletin, Aligarh. 
India, Journal of Islamic Economics, Malaysia, Thoughts on Economics. 
Dhaka, Bangladesh, Journal of Islamic Banking and Finance, Karachi, and 
New Horizon, Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance, UK. etc. 
5: Research Institutions and Professional Associations 
Several organizations and research institutes have played important role 
in the development of concept and practices of Islamic banking ''' However, few 
of the organizations are specifically devoted to the cause of Islamic banking 
practices that includes; the International Association for Islamic Banks, 
Accounting and Auditing Association for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI), Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance (IIBI), and the recently 
Islamic Financial Services Board. 
(a) The International Association of Islamic Banks ( lAIB): 
Established in 1977 by the Islamic Development Bank. This association is 
playing an important role in the meeting of central banks and monetary 
agencies of the Islamic countries as well as the meetings of the specialized 
The Assoc ia t ion o f JWuslim Social Scientis t , U.S.A. (1972) ; the Is lamic Founda t ion . Leices ter . U.K. 
(1973) ; Is lamic E c o n o m i c s Research Bureau . Dhaka , Bang ladesh (1976) ; the C e n t e r I 'or Re.search in 
Is lamic E c o n o m i c s , the King Abdul Az iz Univers i ty , Jeddah (1977) ; the Internat ional Institute of 
Is lamic Though t , Herndon . Virginia , U.S .A. (1981) ; the Is lamic Research and Tra in ing Inst i tute (IR TI) 
of the Is lamic D e v e l o p m e n t Bank (1983) ; the Internat ional Insti tute of Is lamic l - conomics . I s lamabad 
(1983) ; the Internat ional Associa t ion for Is lamic Economies (1984) . 
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bodies of the OIC in the field of banking and insurance. The association aims 
lo strengthen ties between Islamic financial instiluUons, fostering cooperation, 
cooi'dinating their activities and monitoring their operations to insure that they 
conform to Shariah. It provides technical assistance and expertise to the people 
wishing to establish Islamic banks. It also represents the common interests of 
Islamic banks at national and the international level. 
(b) Accounting and Auditing Association For Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI): Is a self-regulated organization founded by Islamic 
banks worldwide in 1991. It is striving to regularize accounting across Islamic 
banking. It has established sixteen accounting standards including four on 
accounting, and three on governance. It has also started issuing Shariah 
standards. 
(c) Institute of Islamic Banking and Insurance (IIBI): Established in 
1993 to render a service to Islamic banking & insurance. The institute offers a 
diploma course in Islamic banking and insurance and publishes a monthly 
called New Horizon. Its main objectives are as follows; 
1) Promotion of knowledge of Islamic banking and insurance through 
conferences, seminars, lectures and publications. 
2) Education of personnel in Islamic banking & insurance. 
3) Assistance and advice on all aspects of Islamic banking & insurance. 
4) Development of Islamic financial institutions. 
5) Study and research on issues and problems in the field of Islamic 
banking & insurance. 
(d) Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB): A Malaysia based 
organization is recently established by the Islamic Development Bank (IDE). 
Accounting and Auditing Association For Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) with the active collaboration of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). According to IMF sources the IFSB will serve as an association of 
Chapler Thivc | XS 
institutions that have responsibility for the regulation and supervision of the 
Islamic financial services industry and will: 
J. Set and disseminate standard and core principles as well as adapt 
existing international standards for supervision and regulation, 
consistent with Shariah. 
II. Liaise and cooperate with other standard setters in the areas of monetary 
and financial stability. 
III. Promote good practices in risk management in the industiy lliiougli 
research, training and technical assistance.'^® 
The Practice of Islamic Banking 
Endeavors to establish interest free financial intermediary has been 
made in different countries at different times. Initially the purpose to establish 
such institution was avoidance of interest and providing cost free loans to the 
needy. In the beginning, we find individual level efforts at different parts of the 
world some in the form of Baitul Maals, Anjuman (Associations), cooperatives, 
non banking companies, nidhis or even in the form of banks but avoiding the 
name Islamic for fear of annoying the hostile political establishment in the 
country.'^' 
During Muslim ascendancy Baitul Maal were catering to the economic 
needs of the people. As Muslim power declined and replaced over by the 
Europeans who established modern banks functioning on the basis of interest. 
Muslim not happy with these institutions tried to reestablish their old format 
i.e. Baitul Maals the first such examples can be found during the last decade of 
the 19"' century when a prominent scholar of Hyderabad, India tried to 
establish an interest free institution called 'Anjuman MoM'odul Ikhwan'. this 
Inlernalional Monetary Fund, News Brief, No. 02/41, May 1, 2002. 
The First highly acclaimed modern islamic bank 'Mit Ghamr" was not named Islamic due to this 
tear. 
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was followed by another such institution in Hyderabad called An/iinicin Inulcicl-
c-Bahmi Qardh Bila Sud established in 1923 by the employees of the 
Department of Land Development (Mohakm-e-Bandobasl-w-Dakhila Hucjooq-
ul-Aradhi), within 20 years of its establishment this organization had an asset 
worth Rs. 100,000 this Anjuman (Association) was distributing Rs. 5000-6000 
loans per month and enjoyed a membership of 1000 (Muslims and Non-
Muslims) with a reserve of Rs. 3000 in 1944.''^ During the period of Aasafia. 
12 such organizations had established, few of them continued till partition of 
the country in 1947. 
In Pakistan, the first modern banking venture adhering to the tenets of 
Islamic law was founded in the late 1950s. A few landlords who voluntarily 
contributed interest free deposits to the fund backed the institution; credit was 
advanced to poorer landlords for agricultural improvements. No interest was 
charged for the credit, but there was some administrative fee to cover operating 
costs. Increasing demands of loan not backed by corresponding deposit soon 
led to collapse of this pilot project.''^ 
Some other experience in this field continued in the form of 
Cooperatives and Muslim Funds. However, it was only in 1963 when a first so 
called modern Islamic banlc The Mit Ghamr Local Saving Bank could be 
established in Egypt. Since then there is spurt in Islamic banking activities. By 
the period 1997 the number of Islamic financial institutions rose up to 176 with 
deposits of around U.S. $ 112 million and assets worth U.S. $ 147 million. At 
present there are about 300 Islamic banks with more than $ 250 billion 
deposits. 
Since Islamic banking is a recent phenomenon there is not much 
innovation in its services. Neither are there too many kinds of Islamic banks 
i lamidullah, Mohammad, in te res t Free Credit Soeiety" Maarif. Azamgarh, Vol. 53. No.. 3. 1944. 
pp. 211-6. 
Dclwin. A. Roy, ' Is lamic Banking' , in Tim. Niblock and Rodney Wilson. (FAI). The Poliiical 
Economy of I he Middle East, Volume III, Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., U.K. 1999, pp. 344-73, 
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like in conventional i.e. central, commercial, cooperative, regionai. 
developmental etc. For the purpose of study we can divide these Islamic banks 
into two chronological orders. 
Those Established Before 1980 
Institutions established before 1980 were mainly the result of three kinds 
of efforts. Individual, community and governmental, these efforts were easily 
reflected in the character of the institutions. 
As mentioned above that the first modern effort to establish interest free 
institutions can be traced back to 1890s in the southern India. This was mainly 
a welfare association collecting donations and skins of animals sacrificed 
during festivals from the public and providing interest free loans to the needy. 
Another such institution called 'Anjuman Imdad-e-Bahmi Qardh Bila Siid' 
(Interest Free Credit Society) was also established in Hederabad. (Duccan) 
India during 1923.''^ 
Patni Co-operative Credit Society, a Surat based institution, which still 
continues its business was established in 1939.''^ In 1940 Muslim Fund Tanda 
Baoli, Rampur (a district in North India) was established, however, partition ol~ 
India badly affected the functioning and further establishment of such societies, 
especially in Indian part, for fairly a long period. Muslim Fund Tanda Baoli 
was closed down due to partition effect. After a long gap of almost 15 years 
few social and religious organizations like Jamiat-e-Ulama-e-Hind and Jamat-
e-Islami Hind again took the initiative in establishing interest free institutions. 
The first to be established then was Muslim Fund Deoband in the year 1961, 
"" H a m i d u l l a h , M o h a m m a d , "Interest Free Credi t Soc ie ty ' , op. cit. 
B a g Siraj , M.I . . ''Islamic Financial Institntions of India, Their Nature. Problems rf Prospects I 
Critical Evaluation of Selected Representative Units" Paper Presen ted at the C o n f e i c n c e on " i s l a m i c 
F inance C h a l l e n g e s and Oppor tuni t ies in the 2 1 " C e n t u r y " at Loughborough Univers i t> . D u r h a m . 
Uni ted K i n g d o m , Held in Augus t 13-15. 2000 . 
91 I Hank Rcorgwuzation: An Islamic ll'<iy 
which is still working with public deposits over Rs. 90 milion.'*'' Accovdine, lo 
the information provided by the Federation of interest l<rcc Organi/alion 
(FIFO) there are more than hundred Muslim Funds in the country. Of them, 
thirty Muslim Funds arc the members orFIi-O."^ Toor Baitul Mai. Hyderabad 
was established in 1966, and Muslim Fund Najibabad (MFN) in 1971, this 
group is the largest Muslim Fund in the country with more than 40 bi-anches all 
over hidia and around 200,000 shareholders. It enjoys deposits of around Rs. 
360 million. Muslim Fund Najibabad has also floated a subsidiary called Al-
Najib Milli Mutual Benefits Ltd. in the year 1990. 
Bait-un-Nasr, Urban Co-Operative Credit Society (BUN) India's largest 
and most professional Islamic financial institution was established in Ihc year 
1973, BUN is the largest Cooperative Credit Society in any of the Metros of 
India with more than 155050 shareholders and 20 branches with deposits 
around Rs. l25 million and loan turnover of more than Rs. 365 million in the 
city of Mumbai alone.''^ Few restrictions including prohibition to function 
outside the geographical boundary of Mumbai resulted in the formation of 
Barkat Investment Group in the year 1983. 
In other parts of the world as well independence of many Muslim states 
by the period of 1950 gave momentum to the idea of Islamic banking and so to 
their establishment. The most glaring example of this period was the 
establishment of the Mit Ghamr Local Savings Bank in Egypt in 1963 by a 
noted social activist Ahmad-al-Najjar. It is widely accepted as the lirst modern 
For more details about Muslim Funds please sec, Khan .laved Ahmad and Nisar Shariq. Collaleral 
fAI-Rahn) As PmcHced by Inleresl Free Credit Sod ties: WUh Special Reference lo Muslim I'lituls in • 
North India, (Research Paper Submitted to King Abdul Aziz University, .laddah), November 2(){)2. 
pp36. 
Federation of Interest Free Organization (FIFO) is an apex institution of Muslim Funds in India, 
FIFO extends credit facility to Muslim Funds at the t ime of crunch. It also provides training and other 
facilit ies to its members . 
Dalvi. M. Abdul Wahab . "Random Thoughts on Some Economic and Legal Challenges lo Islamic 
Banking System" Paper Presented at the Seminar on "Islamic Economics Issues and Challenges '" 
Organized by the Indian Association For Islamic Economics ( lAFIE) at N e w Delhi. India in October 
1999. 
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Islamic bank. It performed all the flinclions of a modern Islamic bank. This 
experiment combined the idea ol 'German savings banks wiOi Ihe principle ol 
rural banking within the general framework of Islamic values. This 
experiments, however, lasted for four years only. 
Another unique experience of this period was the establishment of the 
'Pilgrims' Management and Fund Board of Malaysia', popularly known a 
T a b u n g Haji ' in the year 1963. The reason for the establishment of this 
institution was the desire of Malaysian Muslims that money spent on 
pilgrimage must be clean and untainted with r/^a, since this was not possible 
by depositing the money with ordinary commercial banks, the Pilgrims' Saving 
Corporation was established which latter incorporated into the Pilgrims" 
Management and Fund Board in 1969. 
Nasir Social Bank established in 1971 by a Presidential decree was the 
first example of the interest of government in establishment of an interest free 
institution. The establishment of Dubai Islamic Bank by some traders followed 
it in 1975. It was an outcome of the private initiative. 
Islamic Banks 1980- 2000 
This period is characterized by the high growth of Islamic banks in 
terms of volumes as well as in numbers. More than 150 institutions have been 
established the turnover and deposits too have increased many fold. Almost 
eveiy Muslim country including some western and Muslim minority country 
has seen the establishment of Islamic banks. Many conventional banks too had 
opened Islamic windows to cater for its customers. Various high level 
committees have been established to evaluate the performance of these banks. 
Islamic banking has achieved new heights in this period, various innovations 
have taken place. They have moved from traditional methods of funding to 
financial engineering. This is also combined by the various issues Islamic 
banks are facing. Now various comparative studies of Islamic banks vis-a-vis 
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conventional banks have exposed Islamic banks to new competitions. I'inancial 
returns ol ' the Islamic banks are also compared now with those of inlciesl-hascd 
banks. '" 
Anthony Cook, Senior Vice President of Brown Brothers llarriman the 
U.S. Private Banks, says; "Twenty years ago, Muslim Investors who wanted to 
invest under Shariah, had the option of earning zero interest. But since then, a 
number of organizations have created Islamic investments outlets and. by 
legitimizing and professionalizing them, they have opened up opportunities for 
a much longer audience". '" 
Table (3.3) shows the geographical distribution of Islamic banks by the 
period of 1997. The total number of institutions, as per the information 
provided by the International Union of Islamic Banks, is 176 of these the 
maximum concentration is in South and South East Asia, which has 47 
institutions this is followed by Africa which accommodates 20 Islamic 
fmancial institutions. As per the number of institution third place is occupied 
by Middle Eastern Countries i.e. 15 and the GCC countries having the total 
number of Islamic fmancial institutions in their region is only 12. 
Table No. 3.3 
Region Number of Institutions %age 
South and South East Asia 82 47 
Gulf Cooperation Council 21 12 
Other Middle Eastern Countries 26 15 
Africa 35 20 
Europe and America 12 6 
Total 176 100 
Source: Directory of Islamic Banks and Financial Jnsliliitions J 997 
Wilson, Rodney, 'Islamic Financial Market', op. cit. p. 
Financial Times, October 26, 2000. 
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Table (3.4) shows Ihc deposit wise position of each region, in ihis 
category the first place is occupied by the GCC region which enjoys more than 
64 % of the total deposits of the Islamic financial Institutions, followed by 
other Middle Eastern countries which controls around 19% ol" the total 
deposits. Rests of the regions have negligible deposits proportion in 
comparison to the over all average. 
Table No. 3.4 
Funds Managed by Islamic Financial Institutions by Regions 
Region Funds Managed ($ million) %age 
South and South East Asia 2250.7 8.2 
Gulf Cooperation Council 17834.5 64.7 
Other Middle Eastern Countries 5430.1 19.7 
Africa 334.5 1.2 
Europe and America 1723.0 6.2 
Total 27573.0 100 
Source: Directory of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions 1996. 
During the last few years the deposits and businesses of Islamic banks 
and other financial institutions have multiplied many folds. And according to 
information provided by BBC, the Islamic banking is serving 1.2 billion 
Muslims and is valued at $ 180 billion." Another estimate values the assets ol" 
Islamic financial institutions to the tune of $ 230 billion that is more than a 40-
fold increase since 1982.^^ Yet another report by NeM> Horizon suggests that 
there are more than 200 Islamic financial organizations operating i/i the world 
and managing funds over $ 300 billions. 53 
' ' B B C . Monday , August , 12, 2002. http : / /bbc.co .Uk / l /hi /business/2188006 .stm 
www.islaiTiicbanking-finance.net 
/Veil' Horizon, Institute of Islamic Banl^ing and Insurance, London . April , 2002, p.2 
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Islamization of Financial System 
Measures to Islamize the financial system have been introduced in 
several countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, the U.A.E., Bahrain. 
Jordan, Malaysia and Pakistan and Iran. Early eighties is specially mentionable 
in this regard when full fledge governmental efforts were noticeable to Islamize 
the entire economy in Pakistan, Iran and Sudan, which we shall discuss in the 
following sections. 
Islamic Banking in Pakistan 
It was first attempt of any modern Muslim State towards the 
Islamisation of its economy. In September 1977 the President of Pakistan asked 
the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), the top Islamic body of experts that 
advises government of Pakistan on religious issues, to prepare a blue print of an 
interest free economic system and set a time limit for the elimination of riha 
from economy. The council appointed a panel of economists and bankers, 
which submitted its reports in February 1980, which after several consideration 
and modification was adopted in the year 1980." '^' And by .January 1981. all 
domestic commercial banks had started accepting deposit on the basis of profit 
and loss sharing (PLS). Over the next tliree years, steps were taken to develop 
new non-interest bearing financial instruments in which PLS deposit could be 
invested. Further steps were instituted in January 1985 to formally transform 
the banking system to one based on no interest within next six months. 
However, transaction with the government continued to be based on interest. 
The Supreme Court of Pakistan in its landmark Judgment ordered the 
government of Pakistan to transform whole of its financial system in tune with 
Shariah compliance by July 2001. In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court 
Elimination of Interest from the Economy, "Report of the Council of Islamic Ideology (Pakis tan) in 
Ahmad.Ziauddin ct of (cd.). (iiuf Banking in fsfnm^^ Institute ol I*olicy Studies . Islumiihad. 
p. 104. 
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in Pakistan in January 2000 has ordered that the country convert its llnanciai 
system to an Islamic one by June 2001."""' 
Islamic Banking in Sudan 
The process of Islamic banking started in 1977 with the establishment of 
Faisal Islamic Bank, Sudan (FIBS). By 1983 three more banks had opened 
Tadamun Islamic Bank, Sudan (TIBS), Sudanese Islamic Bank, and Islamic 
Co-operative Bank. Since September 1983 the whole Financial System of 
Sudan was started to be converted to the Islamic model. 
During the period of 1985-1989 many of the recently converted Islamic 
banks were reverted back to their original conventional operations. This is the 
period when Islamic banks were forced to operate in an extremely hostile 
environment characterized by negative media coverage, lawsuits and heavy 
regulations.^^ Since 1989 after the coming into power of the Islamic Salvation 
Front, the whole economy has again been transformed to conform to Islamic 
Law. 
Islamic Banking in Iran 
Following the islamic revolution in 1979 the Iranian authorities took 
steps to bring the banking system's operation into correspondence with the 
requirements of Islamic law. Since February 1981 the Bank Markazi (Central 
Bank Iran) started taking administrative steps towards elimination of interest 
from banking operations. A high level commission composed of bankers, 
academics, businessmen and Shariah scholar prepared a legislation for the 
elimination of riba from the economy which was passed by the parliament in 
August 1983 as the law for usury free banking. The law required the banks to 
" Lalesl Decision of Pakistan Supreme Court is discussed in chapter six. 
Basliir, M. Abdel-Hamoed, 'Risk and Prolilabiiity Measures in Islamic Banks: Tin; Case of I wo 
Sudanese Banks ' . Islamic Fxonomic Shidies. IDB/IRTI, .leddah. Vol.6, No.2. May 1999. p. 3. 
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convert their deposits in line with the Shariah within one year, and their total 
operations within three years, from the date of passage of the law, anti spceillcd 
the types of transaction that must constitute the basis for assets and liabilities 
acquisition by banks. 
Islamic Banking in South Asia 
Bangladesh 
Two professional bodies "Islamic Economics Research Bureau" (IliRB) 
and "Bangladesh Islamic Bankers Association" (BIBA) took the practical steps 
for imparting training on Islamic Economics and banking to a group of bankers 
and arranging some national and international seminars/workshops to mobilize 
local and foreign people and attract investors to come forward to establish 
Islamic bank in Bangladesh. 
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited; is considered to be first interest-free 
bank in South East Asia, incorporated on 14"' March 1983. A1 Baraka Bank 
Bangladesh Limited (Al-Baraka); the second Islamic bank of the country 
commenced banking business as a scheduled Islamic bank on May 20. 1987. 
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Limited (Al-Arafah) was incorporated in 1995 and 
started operation as Islamic bank in the private sector banking in 
Bangladesh from September 1995. Social Investment Bank Limited (SIBL); the 
fourth Islamic bank in Bangladesh. It was incorporated in 1995. Faysal Islamic 
Bank of Bahrain (FIBB) is functioning in Bangladesh with effect from 11 
August 1997.^® 
Besides the five Islamic banks as mentioned above, the Prime Bank 
Limited has opened two Islamic banking branches in 1995 and 1997 
Iqbal. Zubair and Mirakhor Abbas. "Islamic Banking ' , IMF Occasional Paper No.49. Inlernaiional 
iVIonelaiy Fund, Washinton DC, 1987. p.9. Also see, Wilson. Rodney. ' I s lamic Finance ' . I'T Financial 
Publishing. London, 1997. p.41-42. 
Sarker. Abdul Awwal . •Islamic Banking in Bangladesh: Pcr ibrmance, Problems & Prospects ' . 
liileniallonalJownal of Islamic Financial Services. Vol.1. No.3, Octobcr-Dccember 1999. 
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respectively, while Dhaka Bank Limited has started operation with an Islamic 
branch along with the conventional banking operations sincc inception ol" the 
bank on July. 1999.''^ 
Malaysia 
From a modest beginning in 1963, with the establishment of the 
Malaysian Pilgrims Fund 'Tabung Flaji' to the establishment of llnst Islamic 
bank in the country in 1983 the country has witnessed tremendous economic 
developments. Malaysia is probably the only Muslim country that has 
substantially succeeded in developing a strong indigenous Islamic banking and 
financial sector. Further, it is the only Muslim economy, which has a strong 
industrial base, with GDP growing at annual rate of 8 per cent. Over the last 30 
years it has invested large sums of money in education, roads and 
transportation systems, telecommunications, and industrial manufacturing. 
For the experts of Islamic banking, Malaysia is among the countries that 
have gotten the highest prospects for Islamic banking in the world. In the words 
of Zamir Iqbal and Mirakhor Abbas, "It is not an accident that Islamic banking 
is making its most promising progress in Malaysia. This country has one of the 
least repressive financial systems, no fiscal deficits, low inflation, low interest 
rates, and a dynamic and vibrant equity market as well as a strong pi-ivatc 
sector".'''' 
Established in 1983 Bank Islam Malaysia, Berhad (BIMB) is a single 
full-fledged Islamic bank in the country, it has 75 branches in different parts of 
the country. Islamic Banking Act was passed in 1983 immediately after the 
establishment of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad. Interest free banking scheme 
known as Skim Perbankan Taupa Faedah (SPTF) introduced in March 1993. 
Ibid. 
Zamir Iqbal and Mirakhor, 'Progress and Challenges of Islamic Banking . I 'apcr prcsciitLcl ai tlic 
Ninth Annual International Conference on Islamic Rconomic.s, Tehran, Iran, September 1-2. 199X p 
35 
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another bank, Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad (BMMB) launched in October 
1999. National Syriah Advisory Council (NSAC) is the highest Shariah 
authority on Islamic banking and Takaful (Islamic insurance) was established 
in May 1997. A higher learning institute, a college of Islamic Banking and 
Finance, popularly known as KPKI (Kolej Perbankan dan Kewangan Islai:]) 
was established in 1998 to give a boost to the knowledge of Islamic banking. 
By the end of 1999 fifty-two financial institutions including 22 comnicrcial 
banks were offering Islamic Financial services, they enjoyed RM 35754 
million of assets, RM 24739 million of deposits and RM 14007 million of 
financing facilities. 
The year 2001 marked a significant period for the Islamic banking 
industry. In terms of performance, the industry registered encouraging growth 
during the year. According to the Governor of the country's Central Bank, the 
total assets of the Islamic banking increased by 25.2%, amounting to RM58.9 
billion as at end-2001 representing 8.2% of the overall banking system. In 
terms of profitability, significant growth was recorded with an increase in pre-
tax profits by 69.9% to RM905.9 million during the year. Among the measiirc.s 
implemented in 2001 to further develop and strengthen the regukuoi-} 
framework of the Islamic banking industry were the adoption of Risk Weighted 
Capital Ratio (RWCR) framework; the implementation of Rate of Return 
(ROR) framework; and the implementation of training and awareness 
programmes. In the area of research and training in Islamic banking and 
finance, an industry-owned institute named Islamic Banking and Finance 
Institute Malaysia (IBFIM) was established.'^' 
Malaysia has played important role in establishment of the International 
Islamic Finance Market (IIFM) and the international standard-setting body 
' ' ' Zeti Akhtar Aziz. Governor of the Central Bank of Malaysia (Bank Ncgara Mala \ s iu ) . • Lconomn. 
and Monetary Developments in Malaysia for 2001'. at the B N M 2001 Annual Rcpoit Press 
Conference . Kuala Lumpur. 20 March 2002. Also appeared in BIS Review 21/2002. p. 2. 
(lutjiici- Ih i cc I 100 
besides headquartering recently established Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB). 
Indonesia 
It is the latest entrant in the field of Islamic banking. Bank Maumalat 
established in 1992 is the first Islamic bank in the county. In its short history it 
has focused largely on rural lending, small and medium enterprises. Bank 
Syariah Mandiri was founded by the merger oi' Jour bankrupt banks under ihc 
government's bail out programme by launching a Shariah division in 1999 is 
the second Islamic bank of the country. 
Brunei & Thai land; In Brunei the first Islamic bank, Bank of Brunei 
Berhad was launched in January 1993. While the government of Thailand has 
allowed for the establishment of Islamic bank in the country during 2001. 
Thailand is also organizing an important conference on Islamic banking in the 
year 2002. 
India 
A country, which can rightly be credited to have played a jTioiiccring 
role in the development of Islamic finance and interest free credit societies,^'' a 
country that has produced many prominent writers of the contemporary Islamic 
finance world, is yet to grant permission for Islamic banks in the country. 
Banking system of the country is still governed on the basis of laws made 
during colonial rules with modifications from time to time. To cater for their 
need Muslims in India have taken the route of cooperative credit society and 
non-banking finance corporations (NBFC), the prominent among them have 
been Bait-un-Nasr and Barkat Group of Bombay, Al-Ameen Group of 
Bangalore and Muslim Fund Group of Najibabad. 
See the above section, ' T h e Practice of Islamic Banking ' and 'Those established before 198()s". 
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Barkat Group established in 1983 is an offshoot of Bait-un-Nasr 
Bombay this group flourished very fast till 1997. All hidia Council ol~ Muslim 
Economic Upliftment (AICMEU) and Baitul Maal of Bombay were established 
in 1984, while Al-Ameen, Bangalore, started its business in 1986. Sycd 
Shariyat and Al-Baraka Finance House Ltd. (Now Al-Barr) were established in 
1989. Baitul Islam and Assalam Finance and Investment were established in 
1990. 
In 1994 Barkat and Muslim Fund Al-Najib group joined together to 
market aggressively the concept of Islamic fmance.^'^ This tic swelled up Ihc 
deposits to Rs. 550 million with 60 Branches all over India. 
In the year 1996 Barkat Investment Group along with some other 
Islamic financial institutions convinced India's premier business house the Tata 
Group to launch a mutual fund scheme specially designed for Muslims in view 
of their inhibitions towards interest. The scheme named 'Tata Core Sector 
Equity Fund' TCSEF succeeded in raising Rs. 230 million from the public. 
The non-banking financial companies (NBFCs) crisis during late 1990s 
resulted in revocation of the licenses of many Islamic financial institutions and 
after the liquidation of Barkat Investment Group in May 2000, the Islamic 
financial activities, in India, have got big setback. With the closure of Bait-un-
Nasr (the oldest and most professionally managed cooperative society) the 
future of Islamic financial institutions in the country looks bleak. '^"" 
' ' ' Barkat Investment Group marketed for Al-Naj ib Milli Mutual Benefi ts Ltd. in Soutli India, opened 
its branehes there and run on its own, however it avoided Joining Al -Naj ib in its operation in the North 
India as it was not fully convinced about its dealing f rom Islamic point of view. Al-Naj ib Milli Mutual 
Benefi ts Ltd. did the same for Barkat in the North but had no control over B a r k a f s operat ion. 
N o w Tata I.T.Sector Fund, Barkat Investment Group was only a marketing associate of Tata Core 
Sector Equity fund (TCSEF) . 
See. The Future of Islamic Finance in India. Islamic Economics Bulletin. Vol .12 No.5 . Sep lember -
Oetober , 2002, p. 4-5. 
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Practices of Islamic Banking Systems by Western Banks 
The development of" Islamic banking and llnancc has been helped (oo h\ 
the interest of western banks such as ANZ Grindlays, Chase, Citicorp. HSBC 
and Morgan Stanley have introduced Shariah compliant products and services. 
The importance of Islamic banking is also evident by the decision of major 
stock exchanges such as the Dow Jones and FTSE to offer Islamic indiccs; 
evidence from the International Association of Islamic Banks suggests that 
assets managed by those banks have tripled during last four years. 
In the United States, the first Vice President of the Federal Reserve 
Bank calls that "Islamic bankers have been quite ingenious in developing 
financial transactions that suit their needs: we bank supervisors, loo, can be 
ingenious and will want to work with any of you should you decide that you 
want to engage in Islamic banking in the United States".''^ 
Most of the large Western financial institutions, following the example 
of Citibank, have their own Islamic subsidiaries or, at the very least. Islamic 
"windows" or products aimed at their Islamic clientele. There is now even a 
Dow Jones Islamic market index. 
Professor Rodney Wilson aptly remarked, "It is an excellent reilection 
of the success of Islamic banking that many conventional commercial banks 
are now offering their clients Islamic financial services".*^^ In USA several 
groups of bankers are practicing Islamic system with a better result. 
Concerning the application of Islamic banking principles in America. Ken in 
his article Islamic banking: faith and creativity, notes Tsiamic banking is 
making inroads in America as several groups of bankers and Muslim scholars 
Ernest T. Patrikis, First Vice {'resident, i^ederal Reserve Banlv of New Yori<. -Islamic l-iiniiue in the 
United Slates -- The Regulatory Framework', Islamic Finance and Investment Conference . New Yoik . 
Ma> 23, 1996. 
Rodney, Wilson, 'Deve lopment of Financial Instruments in an Islamic Framewoik" . m Khan. M 
Tahim (ed.) Islamic Financial Institutions. IRTI/IDB, .leddah, 1995, p. 164 
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attempt to create an interest-free banking system tiiat uses lease agreements, 
mutual funds, and other methods to avoid interest payments"/'^ 
HSBC has launched its HSBC Amanah Finance division, focusing on 
Islamic financial products. There are also western based, but exclusively 
Muslim financial institutions such as the United Kingdom based, Ummah 
Finance Group, which offers an Islamic Unit Trust and the Kleinworth Benson 
Islamic Unit Trust which is based in .lersey^^. Murahahah or cost-plus 
financing transactions have earned Kleinworth Benson $ 4 billion in 1992, 
while ANZ Grindlays earned $400 million. The banks arrange for transactions 
within the limits set by the Islamic banks and get it approved by the Shariah 
advisors of investors or by banks engaged in the transactions.^" 
These institutions have mostly adopted the pattern of Islamic banking in 
cost-plus financing, leasing and equity financing for their chents in the Middle 
East. Southeast Asia and a few international corporations in Europe and I.atin 
America. More recently Switzerland's UBS has announced to start Islamic 
banking activities. However, some of the Islamic economists are apprehensive 
about the sincerity of these multinational financial institutions as far the 
commitment towards cause is concern. Three senior economists at IDB 
including the chief of research division at IRTI are of the view that the modus 
operandi of these institutions is purely commercial. They are of the opinion that 
these conventional banks may not follow correctly and faithililly the perccpfs 
of Islamic banking. "In all major Islamic banks, there is a Shariah board, which 
regularly reviews the operations and contract of the bank to determine their 
compliance with the requirements of the Shariah. Similar arrangements do not 
exist at the conventional Western banks in most of the cases. It is also 
suspected that conventional banks may not be able to keep fully separate 
Ken, B., 'Islamic Banking: Faith and Crealivily. N e w York Times. Lale N e w York lidilion. D1 -i 
Apr 8 1994, p. 1. 
Rodney Wilson, (Ed.), Islamic Financial Market, Rulledge, 1990, p. 29. 
Parker, M., 'Get t ing the message across: Islamic banking gets recognized by the Western banks". The 
Middle East, October . 1993 no., 227, p. 28. 
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accounts for their Islamic banking operations. In the event they do mix 
"Islamic money" with their general pool of investible resources or Ihcy do nol 
keep separate accounts for Islamic banking activities, there is a strong 
possibility that permissible returns may be 'contaminated' by 
Selected Islamic Banking institutions 
Islamic Development Bank (IDB) 
The landmark development in the practice of Islamic banking was the 
establishment of Islamic Development Bank (IDB) in Saudi Arabia in the year 
1975. It was the first inter governmental effort of Muslim countries with the 
purpose of fostering economic development and social progress oi' member 
countries and Muslim communities individually as well as jointly in 
accordance with the principles of Shariah. The present membership of the bank 
consists of 52 countries. The authorized capital of the bank is 6 billion Islamic 
Dinar (Each Islamic Dinar being equal to one Special Drawing Right SDR oi" 
I.M.F.). Its subscribed capital is Islamic Dinar 4.1 billion, whereas the paid up 
capital amounted to about Islamic Dinar 2.5 billion. The ordinary resources of 
the Bank consist of members' subscription (paid up capital, reserves and 
retained profit), which amounted at the end of April 2000 to Islamic Dinar 3.5 
billion^^ (US $ 4.8 billion). Unlike conventional banks the IDB has developed 
new Shariah compliant financial schemes and instruments to support its 
ordinary financial resources. These instruments and schemes are IDB Unit 
Investment Fund (IDB UIF), the Export Financing Schemes (EFS) formerly 
known as the Longer-term Trade Financing Scheme (LTTF) and Islamic 
Banks' Portfolio (IBP).^' 
" IqbjI . Munawar , et a), -Challenges Facing Islamic Banking', op. cit. p. 57. 
Al-.larhi. M. Ali and Iqbal Munawar , 'Islamic Banking Answers lo Some l-reqiienlly Asked 
Ones/ions', Islamic Development Bank (IDB), Islamic Research and Training Institule ( IRI ' I ) . .Icddah. 
Occasional Paper No. 4, 2001, p. 33. 
" Ibid, 
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Unit Investment Fund (UIF); this is a credit fund started in 1990 with 
the aim of contributing to the economic development of the member countries 
through pooling of the savings of institutional and individual investors. 
Investments in the Fund are restricted to Islamic banks, financial institutions, 
pension funds, charitable organizations and similar institutions. 
The Export Financing Schemes (EFS); started in 1987 under the name 
The Longer-term Trade Financing Scheme (LTTF) with the aim of expanding 
the Banks' operation in the field of trade financing to facilitate the export of 
member countries' commodities. 
Islamic Banks' Portfolio (IBP) for Investment and Development: an 
income fund started with the cooperation of other Islamic banks in 1987. The 
IDB manages the portfolio in its capacity as Mudarib. 
In addition to the above, other programmes of the IDB includes; Import 
Trade Financing Operations, Export Financing Schemes and assistance and 
grants to Muslim communities in non-member countries. 
In pursuance of its objectives the IDB resort to the following activities; 
1. Participate in the equity capital of productive project and enterprises in 
the member countries. 
2. Invest in social infrastructure projects in member countries by way of 
participation or other financial arrangements. 
3. Make loans to the private and public sector for financing of productive 
projects enterprises and programmes in member countries. 
4. Establish and operate special funds for specific purposes including 
assistance to Muslim communities in non-member countries. 
5. Operate trusts funds. 
6. Undertake research to enable the economic financial and banking 
activities in Muslim countries to confirm to the Shariah. 
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Kuwait Finance House (KFH) 
Established in 1977 as an Islamic investment bank, operating under 
special government decree, which recognizes the Islamic nature of the 
institution. Government of Kuwait played an active role in the establishment oi" 
this institution, which subscribed 49 % of the paid up capital of the 1 louse, II is 
one of the most successful Islamic commercial bank in the world. KFH has a 
permanent Al Falwu and Shariah supervisory authority comprising of thicc 
highly respected Islamic religious authorities and Jurists. KFH is the second 
largest retail bank in Kuwait employing about 1,300 people. It has around 22 
branches and a market capitalization of some KD1.75 billion (US$ 5.7 billions) 
which puts it among the 10 largest banks in Arabic region. All its activities arc 
based on Islamic Law.^ "* 
Dar-al-Mal-al-lslami (DMI) 
This is one of the two major holding companies controlling a number of 
Islamic banks throughout the world. Established by Saudi Prince Mohammad 
bin Faisal with an authorized capital of US $ 1 billion, the DMI is a holding 
company registered under the laws of Bahamas in 1981. Today DMI operates 
in 14 different countries trough 22 institutions, which include Islamic 
Investment companies. Islamic banks and Islamic insurance companies. A 
number of heads of Islamic states, statesmen, leading government personalities 
and Ulama of the Muslim world became honorary founder of DMI trust. The 
objective of DMI is to promote the development of an Islamic financial and 
economic system, tluough mobilization and utilization of the financial 
resources and potential of Muslims in accordance with Islamic principles, laws 
and traditions. DMI resorts to the activities that can be summarized as follows: 
Othman, AbdulQawi and Owen, Lynn. "Adopting And Measuring Customer Scrvicc Qualil) (Sq) in 
Lslamic Banks; A Case Study In Kuwait Finance House". Internadonal Jnurnal of Islamic hiiidiicuil 
Services. Vol. 3. No. 1, 
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1. To undertake financial operations required by Muslims within the 
framework of principles and percepts of Shariah. 
2. To implement its various activities through subsidiaries established in 
Islamic and other countries. 
3. To invest funds of Muslims to generate Hakd profits. 
4. To promote and consolidate cooperation among Muslims. 
The DMI group consists of following major categories of companies; 
Islamic investment Companies: Providing opportunities to 
businessmen and financial institutions to participate in agricultural, 
commercial, industrial, real estates development and other financial operations 
in conformity with Shariah. 
Massaref Islamic Banks: Providing a diversified range of modern 
banking services and facilities based on Islamic principles to meet the need of 
various kinds of clients. 
Islamic Takafol Companies (Islamic Insurance): Providing both to 
individuals and institutions, an Islamic alternative to contemporary insurance in 
accordance with the concept of solidarity and brotherhood for mutual aid and 
assistance. 
Islamic Business Companies: Providing channels for utilization DMI 
funds and its subsidiaries in the fields of trading, industry and services, which 
are profitable for the investors and beneficial to the Ummah. 
Al-Rajhi Group 
A relatively new entrant is another fast growing private Islamic banking gi-oup 
of Saudi Arabia. Once a largest moneychanger in Saudi Arabia has now 
entered in Islamic banking business. This is functioning under the direct control 
of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the central monetary agency 
ChaplL'r Three | 108 
of the country. In terms of managed assets and paid up capital the Al-Rajhi 
Banking and Investment Corporation is by far the largest institution in the 
country. 
Al-Barakah Group 
Established in 1982 by Saudi Shaikh Saleh Abdullah Kamel. it is among 
the few largest Islamic banking groups in the world. The group has financial 
interest in around 50 countries. It has twelve affiliates and financial interests in 
some other sister institutions. The Al Barkah group covers a wide spectrum of 
activities including banking, insurance, securities, trade, agriculture, industry, 
tourism, venture capital, research and training etc. The group aims to achicvc 
the goals of Muslim individuals and communities Vv^ ithin the Iskimic 
framework. 
The Islamic International Bank for Investment and Development 
(IBID) 
A Cairo based IBID was established in 1980 by a ministerial decree in 
accordance with the investment law of Arab and Foreign Funds Zones law of 
1974. It was register with the Central Bank in 1980. 
This period is also characterized by another landmark development in 
the history of Islamic banking when a full fledge governmental effort were 
noticeable to Isiamize the entire economy in Pakistan, Iran and Sudan, which 
we shall discuss in the following sections. 
Faisal Islamic Banks (FIBS) 
Prince Mohammad bin Faisal of Saudi Arabia founded the Faisal 
Islamic Banks of Egypt and Sudan in 1977 and J 978 respectively. In Egypt this 
bank was established by a special Act in which 51 % shareholding was 
Egyptian and Saudi and other Muslim nationals holding 49%. 
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In Sudan the concept of Islamic banking was introduced with (he 
establishment of Faisal Islamic Bank in 1978. Its success cleared the way for 
the estabhshment of other Islamic banks in the country. The authorized capital 
of the bank is LS 100 million, of which 40% of each is divided between Saudi 
and Sudanese shareholders and the rest 20% from other Muslim countries.^^ 
The banks own five subsidiaries undertaking different economic activities like 
construction, insurance, agriculture and industry, trade and services and 
clearance. The bank has a Shahah supervisory board appointed by the General 
Assembly of the shareholders. 
Jordan Islamic Bank 
One of the most respected Islamic banks established by a temporary 
special law in 1978. It is a public shareholding limited company with an 
authorized share capital of JD 6 million. This is the third largest bank of the 
kingdom with more than 40 branches. It constitutes around 9% of the total bank 
deposits in the country.'^ 
Table no. 3.5 gives the assets wise position of Islamic banks during the 
period 1995-96. Al-Rajhi group is the first among them in all position i.e. 
assets, capital, profits and staff followed by Kuwait Finance House and Faisal 
Islamic Bank of Egypt. Some other top most Islamic financial institutions are 
follovv'ed in order. 
' ' See. Fuoad Agaban i ' s conimenls on Khan M. Fah im ' s paper on ' I s lamic Banking as Pracliccd now 
in the Woi-ld', in Ziauddin et a! (ed.), Money and Banking in Islam, Inslitule oC Poiic> Studies. 
Islamabad, 1983, p.277. 
Wilson, Rodney, ' ( samic Finance", op. cit. p.38. 
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Table No. 3.5 
Leading Islamic Banks 
Bank 
Assets 
($ M) 
Capital 
($ M) 
Profits 
($ M) 
Staff 
Al-Rajhi Banking and investment 
Corp. 7711 1091 214.1 5823 
Kuwait Finance House 4273 229 130.9 1400 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt 1658 132 72.1 1236 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Bahrain 1542 85 16.1 272 
Dubai Islamic Bank 1527 74 4.6 n.a 
Qatar Islamic Bank 884 52 8.5 296 
Bank Islam Malaysia 779 80 13.8 895 
Jordan Islamic Bank 750 56 6.1 913 
Dar al-Maal al-lslami (Geneva) 634 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Sudanese Islamic Bank 630 n.a. n.a. n.a 
Faisal Islamic Bank of Sudan 571 n.a. n a. n.a. 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 383 35 3.8 110 
Al-Baraka Investment Bank Bahrain 163 23 4.4 67 
Bahrain Islamic Investment Co. 29 14 0.5 7 
Source: Wilson Rodney, Islamic Finance, op. cit. p. 28 
Conclusion 
Modern Islamic banking practices started with the establishment of Mit 
Ghamr in 1963 have shown tremendous growth and potentials since then. 
Research works have shown that Islamic banking principles are not only viable 
but also more efficient and stable than their counterpart conventional banks due 
to their participatory nature. Islamic banking has established itself as an 
emerging alternative to interest-based banking and is gaining roots in both 
Muslim as well as non-Muslim countries. 
Several observations of the various international bodies Hke, World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Finance Corporation 
(IFC), Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have 
advocated the possibility and viability of the equity based and participating and 
investment policy of Islamic banks. 
In the World Development report 1989 the Islamic banking system is 
highlighted as under; " Islamic banks offer savers risky open-ended mutual 
fund certificates instead of fixed-interest deposits. This is not unlike 
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cooperative banks and mutual funds in the west, where deposits earn variable 
interest and double as equity. Difficulties arise on the lending side. 
Arrangements to share profits and losses lead to considerable problems of 
monitoring and control, especially in lending to small business"." 
According to the information provided in the Directory of Islamic Banks 
and Financial Institutions prepared by the International Union of Islamic 
Banks, there are 176 Islamic banking institutions in the world out of which 
47% are in the South and South East Asia, 27% in Gulf Cooperation Council 
(GCC) and the Middle East, 20% in Africa and 6% in Western countries. 
Deposits and total assets of the Islamic banks are US$112.6 billon and 
US$147.7 billion respectively. Islamic banking is growing at the rate of 10-
15%) per annum compared with the growth rate of 1% recorded by the global 
financial services industry.^^ Latest available figures suggest that Islamic 
banking has crossed the $250 billion mark and, in spite of recession in 
international capital market, growing annually at the rate of 10-15 %>. 
* * * * 
" World Development Repon, 1989, Box 6.3 
Pakis tan Legal Dec is ions (PLD) , Supreme Court Judgments on Riba. Laiiorc: P i .D i ' l iblishci s. 2000 . 
pp. 739 -740 . 
CHAPTER-4 
MODELS OF ISLAMIC BANKS 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have discussed the idea and rationale ol" 
Islamic banking. The present chapter is exclusively devoted to discussion about 
the Islamic banking models. We have seen how banks function as financial 
intermediaries between the savers and the ultimate users of these funds. Apart 
from these intermediary functions conventional banks also perform several 
other functions and provide services to their customers including safe deposit, 
drafts, travelers' cheque, ATM (Automated Teller Machine), money transfer, 
overdrafts, letter of credits and guarantees etc., banks also engage in public 
issues by announcing, authorizing, underwriting and issuing of shares to the 
public. In present days globalization era a good number of banks in various 
countries are found in floating mutual funds and insurance companies and 
actively engage in capital market activities. Today's convenience, virtual, and 
E-banking performs much more number of other functions on behalf of their 
customers. 
Generally banks' functions can be divided into two. One the primary or 
the intermediary and two the secondary or services. Primary functions are 
purely those where bank actually acts as an intermediary while secondary are 
the services which bank provides to its customers and levies a service charge 
on them.' 
' Since in conventional form of banl<ing interest is the kingpin of all the functions a number ol 
luncl ions mentioned under secondary activities are also performed on the basis ot interest. l l o \ s e \ c r . 
Islamic banks can easily perform these functions on service charge basis. '1 he fundamental point ol 
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For Islamic economists it is the intermediary function of conventional 
bank which has been a cause of worry as it is performed on ex ante basis and 
not linked to the actual outcome of the business financed. In Islamic economics 
capital just like entrepreneur must be exposed to risk for any return. As regards 
the numerous banking services, several writers are of the view that they would 
continue to be performed as it is. Though, some modifications are suggested by 
Islamic economists.^ 
In conventional form of banking banks receive deposits from the public 
at low interest and advances them at higher, the balance amount, known as 
'spread' is kept by the bank for its own expenses, reserves, and distribution 
among shareholders. Islamic economists object to this fixed pay system and 
attribute major banking failures to this way of business. They argue that since 
the money advanced has no guarantee of generating positive income, therefore, 
the banker should also not have the guarantee of fixed positive return on 
capital. Rather it should be linked to the actual outcome of the business. 
In chapter one we have seen how the banking has developed out of the 
practices of goldsmiths to the modern days. We have also described about the 
recent banking reforms and restructuring undertaken in several countries and 
about the reorganization of banking on Islamic lines, which may rightly be 
considered as one of the latest developments in banking organizations. As 
noted by Stephen, "The emergence of contemporary Islamic financial industry 
is one of the key developments in modern banking and finance because of the 
impact it has had on its core markets over a short period of time. The fact that a 
certain financial system, whose core values and principles are based upon 
contention between conventional and islamic banliing is the primary junction i.e. fmanciai 
intermediation on the basis of interest. 
Sami Hasan Ahmad Hamoud, 'Tahvir a! amal a! masrafiyah binia yallafiaqii HY// sluirial a! 
Islainiyah, Dar a! illihad al araby HI tibaah. (Cairo), 1976. p. 350-387. As quoted by Siddidi . M.N.. 
i s l a m i c Approaches to Money, Banking and Monetary Policy - A Review", in ArilT M. (cd.). 
Moiielary and Fiscal Economics of Islam, International Centre for Research in Islamic l-conomics. 
King Abdul Aziz University, .leddah, 1982, p. 32. 
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specific religious and ethical percepts, has taken root deserves due 
recognition".^ 
In the present chapter we will chiefly discuss about the models of 
Islamic banks and in the process some discussion on principles, objective, 
features, and financing techniques of Islamic banks shall also be undertaken. 
Since Islamic banking models use Islamic financing techniques and terms it is 
better to first have a cursory look at the Islamic financing techniques. 
Financing Techniques of Islamic Banks 
Keeping in view the Shariah considerations, Islamic banks around the 
world have devised many financial techniques that are basically derived from 
Islamic contract of partnerships, exchange, and the loans (Charity). For day-to-
day banking activities. Islamic banks resort to these financial instrumeni.s that 
have been devised to satisfy the Islamic doctrine and provide acceptable 
financial returns to the investors. These are basic techniques, however, a certain 
degree of variance in their practices may be observed from county (o country 
and region-to-region. Some times the same techniques are called, pronounced 
or spelt differently in different regions as they all are derived from the Arabic 
sources. Following section gives a brief account of the Islamic financial 
techniques adopted by the Islamic banks worldwide. These can be grouped 
under tliree broad categories. 
A: Contracts of Partnership 
1. Mudarabah (Capital Financing):Also known as trust financing, 
this is an agreement between two parties one provides the capital and the 
other known as 'Mudarib' uses his entrepreneurial capabilities and 
manages the fund and the project. The profit arising from the project is 
^ Green K. Stephen, 'Challenge.s F-acing Ihe Islamic Financial Industry ' . Islamic Finance Hie TaU 
AIKIKI. Fourth l larvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, CambridiiC, Sepleniber-OcUibcr 2()()(). p 
152. 
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distributed according to a predetermined formula. Any losses accruing 
are born by the provider of the capital. The provider of the capita! has no 
control over the management of the project. 
Under Islamic banking the bank acts as a manager of customers' funds. 
The depositors on the other hand are known as 'Rahh-al-Maf meaning 
the owner of the fund. The bank on its own risk invesls deposits 
accepted on savings under the profit sharing and loss absorbing 
agreement. Customers give authorization to the bank to invest funds and 
share profit or absorb loss on agreed proportions. Account holders o(" 
this type of account are required to maintain a minimum balance in the 
account. 
Capital Trust financing is a contract between at least two parties in 
which the bank as the investor supplies the entire capital of the business 
forming a relationship between the supplier of capital and the user of 
capital. These two parties work together and share profits and bear the 
losses. A notable point of this agreement is attachment of the liability to 
loss to the financier only; the working party i.e. the user of the capital 
bears no part of the loss accruing to the capital extended by the 
financier. His only loss will be his labor, which will get no reward, 
2. Musltarakah (Par tnersh ip) : This technique involves a 
partnership between two parties who both provide capital towards the 
financing of a project, both parties share profit on a pre agreed ratio, but 
losses are shared on the basis of equity participation. The both or any of 
the party may carry management of the project. 
In this case the bank and the customer jointly contribute capital. They 
also contribute managerial expertise and other essential services at 
agreed proportions. Profits are shared according to the contract agreed 
upon while losses will be shared according to capital contribution. An 
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individual partner does not become liable for the losses caused by 
others. 
B: Contracts of Exchange 
1. Murabahah {Cost prorii)'. This is a conlract sale hcUvccn (he 
bank and its client for the sale of goods at a price which includes a profit 
margin agreed by both the parties. As a financing technique il involves 
the purchase of goods by the bank as requested by its client. The goods 
are then resold to the client with a markup usually received in spccificd 
installments. 
2. Ijaralt (Leasing): A contract under which a bank buys and leases out 
for rental fee equipment required by its client. The duration of the lease 
and the rental fees are agreed in advance. Ownership of the equipmcift 
remains with the bank. This is similar to the conventional (easing. 
However, in the conventional leasing system the lessee pays specific 
rentals and a fixed rate of interest over a given period for the use of 
specific asset. But in the Islamic banking system of leasing the risk 
related to leasing has to be shared between the bank and the lessee, in 
case of any damage to the leased assets. 
3. Ijara-wa-iqtina: Very similar to Ijarah except that there is commitment 
form the client to buy the equipment at a pre agreed price at the end of 
the lease. In this case rental also includes the costs of the equipment. 
4. Bay al-Salam: A contract for sale of goods where the price of the 
said item is paid in advance. In this system a buyer pays in advance for a 
specified quantity and quality of a commodity, deliverable on a specific 
date, at an agreed price. This financing technique is similar to a future or 
forward-purchase contract and is particularly applicable to seasonal 
agricultural purchases. Under Islamic banking this technique is generally 
used to buy the goods particularly raw materials in cases where seller 
needs working capital before he could deliver. 
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5. Bay Bithaman AjU {mxy. ms contract refers to the sale of goods on 
deferred payment. In this system the Islamic bani< buys the item 
requested by the client and sales it to the client on pre agreed installment 
including the cost of the equipment and the markup. This is very similar 
to Murabahah except the payment is made in installments some time 
after delivery of the underlying goods. 
6. Istisna: A contract of acquisition of goods by specification or 
order, where the price is paid progressively in accordance with the 
progress of a job completion. This is practiced for purchase of an item 
that is yet to be completed or produced, for example, a house to be 
constructed where payments are made to the developer or the builder 
according to the stage of work completed. Istisna differs from ijara in 
that the manufacturer must procure his own raw materials. Otherwise the 
contract would amount to a hiring of the seller's wage labor as occurs 
under ijara. Istisna also differs from bay salam in a sense that (a) the 
subject matter of the contract is always a made-to-order item, (b) the 
delivery date need not be fixed in advance, (c) full advance payment is 
not required and (d) the Istisna contract can be canceled but only before 
the seller commences manufacture of the agreed item(s). 
C: Contracts of Charity 
1. Qard Hasan (Interest iree \oan): Qard Hasan means an interest-free 
loan, given by the Islamic bank to the needy people in a society. The 
practice of dealing with this sort of investment differs from bank to 
bank. Qard Hasan is normally given to needy students, small producers, 
farmers, entrepreneurs and economically weaker sections of the society, 
who are not in a position to obtain loan or any financial assistance from 
any other institutional sources. The main aim of this loan is to help 
needy people in a society in order to, make them self-sufficient and to 
raise their income and standards of living. 
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This principle is also practiced in case of Islamic banks accepting 
deposits from public. Depositors of this account do not receive any 
return, however, if Islamic bank wishes it might grant some financial or 
non-financial benefits to its depositors. 
2 . Gifts: Actually a form of voluntary charity, encouraged under Islam. In 
Islamic banking this is used to oblige the depositors who have kept their 
money in Islamic bank without hoping any return. These cases are 
especially noticed in Malaysia and Iran where Islamic banks offer some 
gifts to the depositors to compensate for any losses they might have 
incurred by choosing to deposit in an Islamic bank. This is often 
commensurate with the conventional banks' interest rate. In Malaysia, 
for example. "Government Investment Certificates" (GIC's). which do 
not carry any interest to the lender, is compensated by offering gift at the 
end of each loan period. 
Islamic Banking Models 
The idea of Islamic banking is derived from the Islamic legal concept of 
Shirkah (partnership) and Mudarabah (profit-sharing). Islamic bank mobilizes 
savings from the public on the basis of Mudarabah and advances it to the 
entrepreneurs on the same principle.^ 
In this section various models of Islamic banking would be discussed in 
some detail. The models, which are chosen for some detail analysis, include the 
ever-famous Mudarabah and Musharakah model presented by Professor 
Siddiqi. Baqir-al Sadr's views on Islamic banking are also illustrated in some 
detail. Another model to be discussed in some detail is given by Muslehuddin 
who had expressed reservations regarding the practicability of Mudarabah 
model. The fourth model chosen for some detail description is an Islamic 
Siddidi. M.N.. i s l a m i c Approaches to Moncs . Banking and M o n e t a n Polic\ - A R c \ i e \ \ " . in Ar i f f 
M. (ed.) . Monetaiy and Fiscal Economics of Islam. International Centre for Research in Islamic 
Economics . King Abdul Aziz Un i \ e r s i t \ . .leddah. 1982. p. 30. 
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Commercial Banking model given by A.L.M., Abdul Gafoor and the last model 
to be discussed under this category is propounded by Shaikh Mahmood Ahmad 
and is popularly known as TMCL. These models are chosen to represent and 
accommodate various views on the concept of Islamic banking and its 
techniques. 
Before going into some elaborate discussion of Islamic banking models, 
we shall have some passing look at the Islamic banking models in Islamic 
economic literature. The early writings on Islamic economics can be looked 
into two; the early Arabic mainly emerged from Egypt while the non-Arabic 
literature originated mostly Irom the Indian subcontinent. 
Early Arabic literature on Islamic banking has mostly discussed how a 
financial institution could work without interest adopting the contracts 
mentioned in Islamic Fiqh like Mudarabah and Musharkah. It did not deal with 
some of the larger subject of how an entire financial system of a country could 
be converted to Islamic one. It does not mention central banking and does not 
discuss the relationship between the individual Islamic bank and the central 
bank of a country. 
On the other, the literature on Islamic banking originating in the Indiaji 
subcontinent generally addressed itself to the larger issue; Islamization ol" the 
entire financial system.^ 
Islamic economists have presented a number of Islamic banking models. 
The most familiar among them is based on the Mudarabah principles designed 
by Uzair'' in 1955 and elaborated by Siddiqi^(1968) popularly known as two-
tier Mudarabah. Before these two pioneering efforts the early contributions on 
the subject of Islamic banking were somewhat casual in the sense that only 
' S iddiq i . M.N . , i m p a c t of Is lamic M o d e s of F inance on Mone ta ry Expans ion" . Journal of King .ihdiil 
Azi: University Islamic Economics. Vol . 4. 1992, pp. 37-46 . 
'' Uzai r . M u h a m m a d , .4n Outline o f f /nteresllees Banking, Raihan Publ ica t ion . 1955. pp .21. 
' S iddiq i . M.N. , Banking Without Interest, Markazi Mak taba , Delhi . 1979. pp. .207. 
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passing references were made to it in the discussion of wider issues relating to 
the Islamic economic system as a whole. 
Professor Qureshi's attempt in 1945 "Islam and the theory of interest'"\ 
is considered to be the first one by any professional economists. In his book 
'Islam and the Theory of Interest, Qureshi looks upon the banking as a social 
service that should be sponsored by the government like public health and 
education. 
Shaikh Ahmad in his book Economics of Islam (1952)" envisaged the 
establishment of Islamic banks on the basis of joint stock company with limited 
liability; Shaikh Ahmad later on postulated a model called 'Time Multiple 
Counter Loan' (TMCL) which we shall discuss below in some detail. 
Uzair, as mentioned above, systematically invoked Mudarahah as a 
principle tool for Islamic banking in his path-breaking booklet'" '"An mil line of 
Interest-less Banking''. Though the method indicated by Uzair was not very 
comprehensive in its sense, however, it gave a direction of thinking to the later 
scholars like Ai Arabi (1966)" advanced the concept of Islamic banking and 
suggested two what: is now called a two tier Mudarabah^^ On Central Banking 
question Uzair suggests a profit sharing ratio as an alternate of 'bank rate', thus 
credit can be tightened by reducing the share accruing to the businessmen and 
eased by increasing it. Other instruments like 'cash reserves', 'legal reserves', 
'selective credit', and 'moral suasion' may continue in an Islamic economy. He 
also favors central bank acquiring shares in commercial banks to have better 
control and a source of revenue for the central bank to act as a lender of last 
resort. 
' Qureshi , Anwar Iqbal, 'Islam and Theory of Interest'. Sh. Mohammad Ashral", Lahore. 1946. 
' Ahmad , Sheikh Mahmud, 'Economics of lslam\ Shaikh Mohammad Ashraf, Lahore. 1952. 
Uzair. Mohammad , 'An Outline of Interest-less Banking', Raihan Publications. Karachi. 1955. 
" Al-Arabi , Mohammad Abdullah, 'Contemporary Banking Transact ions and Islam's Vic\ss Thereon ' . 
islamic Review, London, May 1966, pp. 10-16. And Islamic Thought, Aligarh. Vol. 11. No.3. .luK 1967. 
pp. 10-43. 
" Ariff , Mohamed , ' Is lamic Banking", Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, Vol. 2. No. 2 (September 
1988), pp. 46-62. 
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Sheikh Irshad in his book '•''Interest Free Banking" 1964'^ also dealt with 
the question of Islamic banking. He envisaged two kinds of deposit accoiinl. 
The first which would be payable on demand the bank would take the 
guarantee of the security of the deposit. However, the deposit would be used by 
the bank on social welfare projects. The depositors would not get any return. 
The second would be the term deposit bank would invest the money in projects 
and at the end of the year share the profit with depositors. The bank would also 
create a reserve fund for meeting losses and contingencies. If losses were not 
covered by the reserve fund then shareholder would bear the remaining losses. 
Forgoing passing references were made by various Islamic economists 
regarding the workability of Islamic banks before the establishment any Islamic 
bank. After establishment of Islamic banks since 1975 a fev/ more models have 
come to the fore, some of them like Chapra and Mohsin tried to refine the 
models presented earlier. These models dealt with some more complex issues 
related to Islamic banking. We shall discuss them in latter part of this chapter. 
First we shall start from the mainstream model. 
Main Stream Model 
This is the classical model of Islamic banking since Islamic economists 
concur that the real alternate to interest lies in PLS (profit and loss) system. 
The Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), Pakistan, in its report on 'Elimination of 
Interest (riba) From the Economy' has emphatically pointed out that the '"ideal 
alternatives to interest in an Islamic economic system are profit and loss 
shari]7g and qard-hasanah"^'' 
As noted above, Uzair first invoked the Mudarabah principle for islmic 
banking in his book ""An Outline of Interest less Banking" in 1955. However, 
Irshad. S.A., Bila Sood Bainkari, Maktaba-Tahi ' ik-e-Masawat. Karachi. 1964. pp. 152. An llnglish 
version o f t h e book, • Interest free banking\ published by Orient press in the same year. 
Sec. Rahman, ul-Tanzil, CII report on Elimination of Interest fi'om the l-conomy. in Ziauddin ct al 
(ed.). Money and Banking in Islam. Institute of Policy Studies. Islamabad, 1083. p. 105. 
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this model was groomed by Siddiqi in his books '\shirkal aur nuiclcirhai kc 
sharai usur (1969) and "Banking Without interest" (1973). 
Siddiqi's model is also called two tier Mudarabah model in which the 
liabilities and the assets both sides of the bank's balance sheet is replaced by 
profit sharing. It is called two tier because the funds raised from the public are 
on the basis of Mudarabah and extended to the borrowers on the same 
principle. 
Siddiqi Model 
Islamic banking is based on two cardinal principles laid down in the 
Shariah prohibition of interest and its replacement by profit sharing.'"' 
Prof Siddiqi made a detail and pioneering attempt in this direction, hi 
his book ''Banking Without Interest''\919,^^'' he postulates a banking model 
based on Mudarabah and Shirkah (partnership). 
The model is based on two-tier Mudarabah contract. A large number ol" 
depositors enter into individual Mudarabah contracts with a banking company 
organized on the basis of share capital, agreeing to share the profits oi" the 
"banking business". The bank under takes two kinds of "business": (a) it offers 
banking services earning fees and commissions, and (b) it assumes the role of 
financier-entrepreneur making judicious selection of the businessmen who seek 
capital from it, stipulating that it shares in the profits of their productive 
enterprises.'^ 
Banking activities are classified into three categories the first based on 
fees, commission and other fixed charges. Second, services based on the basis 
" Siddiqi, M.N. , Issues in Islamic Banking, The Islamic Foundation, Leicester, U.K. 1983, p. 85. 
Siddiqi, M. N., 'Banking Without Interest', Markazi Maktaba Islami, Delhi, 1979. Originally in Urdu 
entitled, -GhairSoodi Bnkan , in 1968. 
' Siddiqi, M.N., Islamic Approach to Money, Banking and Monetary Policy- A Review, in ArilT. M. 
(ed.), Monetaiy and Fiscal Economics of Islam, International Center ibr Research in Islamic 
Economics , Jeddah. 1982, p. 30. 
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Muclarahah, Musharkah and Iiarah and (he third scrviccs provided free ol 
charge. 
The Islamic bank will accept deposit from the public on Mudaruhah 
principle and extend it to the perspective entrepreneurs on the same principles 
i.e. Mudarabah, profit accrued from the business will be first shared between 
the entrepreneur and the bank and then between the bank and the depositors on 
mutually agreed ratio. However, the liability to loss in a Mudarabah contracts 
attaches to the financier only, the working party i.e. the user of the capital beai's 
no part of the Joss accruing to the capital extended by the financier It follows 
that the loss incurred by an individual entrepreneur will be borne by the bank 
Losses incurred on individual advances are likely to get absorbed by some of 
the profits accruing to the bank from the successful entrepreneurs. As long as 
the totality of the profits accruing on banks' advances plus the fees and 
commissions earned by the bank remain a positive quantity, the depositois' 
capital and return on capital are safe. If the total earnings of the banks are 
negative then the losses shall be distributed equally on share capital and 
^Mudarabah' deposits.'^ 
Assumptions: competitive behavior through the Islamic spirit would call 
for cooperation among economic agents for the achievements of common 
goals. Aggregate profits at the macro level are assumed to be always positive as 
the possibilities of losses are at the micro level only. Closed ccononi) is 
another assumption of Siddiqi's model. Profit motive at the private level is also 
allowed, however, in an Islamic society behavior of all economic agent is 
expected to be socially oriented, ready to sacrifice profits for the social good if 
and when the social priorities so require. The Islamic principles of no gam 
without risk or loss is applied to both enterprise as well as capital.''^ 
Banks operate on the basis of fractional reserves subject to regulation by 
a Central Bank. Central Bank is the only source of high-powered money. 
" S i d d i q i . M N , '/ssiies in Islamic Bankiii;/. I s L i m i c r o u i i d c U i o n , 1 c i c c s l c i . U K . 1 1 2 " 
' S\(.\d\q\.M'H. J'isiies in hiaiint Banking. I h e I s l a m i c F o u n d a l i o n , L c i c c s l e i U k . l ' j X " ! p p 9 7 - 1 0 0 
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controller and regulator of the credit, the ratios of profit sharing, besides 
guiding the activities of the banks in the public interest.^" 
Profit Sharing 
Banks are established on the basis of share capital. They accept demand 
deposits on usual terms. They also accept deposits into investments accounts 
entitled to an agreed percentage share of the profit accruing to the banks on the 
profitable employment of these deposits in a pooled manner. These are 
Mudarabah deposits and the percentage of bank profits given to these 
depositors is described as the Depositor's Ratio of Profit-Sharing, abbreviated 
as drp. These depositors are liable to losses, their liability being limited to the 
extent of their deposits. Banks invest their funds (share capital and Mudarahah 
deposit less reserves, and part of the demand deposits) in a variety of ways; 
chief among them is the supply of Modaraba funds to business. These banks 
are entitled to an agreed percentage share in the profits accruing to these funds 
in the business enterprises in which they are invested. This percentage is called 
Banker 's Ratio of Profit-sharing abbreviated as brp. Mudarahah funds invested 
in business enterprises are also liable to losses, liability being limited to the 
extent of funds supplied. 
Siddiqi^' also suggests manipulations in "refinance ratio" to intluencc 
the quantum of short-term credit. He also proposed a "Lending ratio" (the 
proportion of demand deposit that Commercial banks are obliged to lend out as 
interest free loans} that can be adjusted by the central bank according to the 
changing circumstances. 
- " Ib id . , pp. 101-102. 
Siddiqi, M.N. , ' Islamic Approaches to Money, Banking and Monetary Policy; A Review' , in M. Arii'i 
(ed.). Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam, International Centre lor Research in Islamic 
Economics , Jeddah. 1982, pp. 25-38. 
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The Ratios of Profit Sharing" 
drp is the ratio of profit sliared by tiie depositors with the banks, hrp is 
the ratio of profit shared by the banks with the entrepreneurs. Profit accrued to 
the entrepreneurs a r e p ' , which is shared by the bank as brp xp'. The banks in 
their own pass on drp times the profit accruing to them to the depositors. 
Thus the actual rate of return on deposits are equal to drp x hrp x p'. The 
rate of profit earned by the banks as intermediary is {\-drp) x brp x p'. Profit 
earned by entrepreneurs is {\-brp) x p'. 
Given the p' the demand for Mudarabah funds from banks is the inverse 
function of brp, however, banks willingness to supply Mudarabah fund is a 
direct function of brp. 
Given the/7' the supply of Mudarabah fund is the direct function of drp, 
however, the bank's demand for Mudarabah funds is an inverse function of 
drp. The equilibrium level of drp is determined by the supply of and demand 
for the Mudarabah deposits. 
Y D1 
(Effect of change in p on the determination of brp) 
A rise in p' given brp raises the expectation of the entrepreneurs and the 
bank's leading to right ward shift in the demand of Mudarabah funds (Dl -Dl ) . 
" Siddiqi . M.N. , Issues in Islamic Banking. Leicester , U.K., The Is lamic I 'oundat ion . 198.1. pp. 102-
112. 
126 I Models of Islamic Banks 
A rise in brp in turn also raises the supply of Mudarabah funds (S1 -S1) leading 
to a higher level of equilibrium (PI). A iall in p will shift ihc demand for 
Mudarabah funds to the left and so to the lower level of equilibrium. 
Comments on Siddiqi Model 
Shaikh Ahmad, in his book Towards Interest free Banking obser\'cs that 
Muslims have failed to evolve a substitute of interest. He pronounces that 
Islamic banking model based on Mudarabah and Musharakah is pre Islamic 
arrangements and suffer from identical inapplicability on a major part of the 
economy. Shaikh regards the other techniques adopted by the Islamic banks as 
indistinguishable from interest.^^ 
The author is of the view that ''Shirkah and Mudarabah are excellent 
devices to eliminate interest in personal dealings but as soon as one enters the 
realm of institutional credit, the workability of both these concepts contracts, 
while problems connected with their application multiply, rendering both these 
concepts virtually obsolete".''' The author gives three reasons for his alleged 
obsolescence of Mudarabah and Musharkah, 
(1) These techniques cannot be applied to provide resources to the 
government to cover their fiscal deficits. 
(2) They cannot be used in the case of consumption loans. 
(3) Even in the case of productive loans the number of borrowers precludes 
supervisory arrangements under either of these two concepts. 
To Shaikh Mudarabah and Musharakah are unworkable substitute of 
interest in case of productive loans because of the difliculty of making 
supervisory arrangements to cover a large number of borrowers. Another 
Ahmad , Shaikh Mahmood, Towards liileresi free Banking, Institute of islamic Culture, i .ahore. 
1989. p. 15. As quoted by Ziauddin Ahmad in his review of the bool< in Journal of Kin;^ Midnt A:i: 
Universily: Islamic Economics, Vol. 4, 1992. pp. 81-87. 
Ibid., p.44. 
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objection raised by Shikh is the pre-determined condition for profit sharing, 
which to author seems to be unacceptable from Shariah point of view. 
Another reservation regarding vahdity of Mudarabah is raised by 
Muslehuddin.^^ According to him Mudarabah is of limited scope and risky for 
banking. Banks even if they are nationalized, cannot work successfully under 
Mudarabah. Various reasons given for the impracticability of Mudarabah as 
mentioned by Muslehuddin are as follows. 
1. Firstly, Mudarabah is not practicably possible as the bank or the 
financier cannot legally monitor the business, as it would amount to 
interference in the activities of the Mudarib. Even if the bank surmount 
all the difficulties and make profits by way of Mudarabah, the banks, 
then will be more inclined to make advances to Mudarib alone. What 
about the needs of other businessmen and enterprises who require short-
term commercial loans or producer credit.^^ 
2. There are a number of other questions too: will the loan be supported by 
securities, for Mudarib being an agent cannot be expected to offer any 
security? Even if he offers any security it will of no avail to the banker, 
for according to the rules of Mudarabah, loss will always be attributed 
to the principal, i.e. the banlcer and as such he cannot fall back upon the 
security to recover the loss.-^ 
3. Mudarabah is, therefore, impracticable and also risky if the Mudarib 
turns out to be dishonest and of fraudulent disposition. The risk is more 
enhanced if he lands the bank into other encumbrances, for whatever the 
relations between him and the bank, to the out side world he virtually 
embarrasses the character of a partner.^^ 
" See, C o m m e n t s Shaikh Mahmood Ahmad on, CII Report on Elimination of Inlere.sl from the 
Economy, in Ziauddin et al (ed.), Money and Banking in Islam, op. cit., p.250. 
Muslehuddin , M., "Banking and Islamic Law\ Idara Isha' at-e-Diniyat, N e w Delhi. 1996. pp. 174, 
- ' i b i d . , p. 110. 
-®(bid., p. 111. 
" i b i d . , p. 112. 
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Baqir-al Sadr's Model of Islamic Banking 
Iraq's Muhammad Baqir-al Sadr is one of the prominent and earliest 
writers on the Islamic economics, his 'Iqtisaduna' is considered one of the 
masterpieces of the subject. Sadr rejected the conventional form of banking on 
the ground that it is not acceptable to an Islamic society, he was oi' the view 
that "capitalist banking is not in accordance with the relevant Islamic laws. In 
particular, Islamic jurisprudence has established the need to prohibit loans with 
in teresf . His opposition to conventional bank (Sadr calls it capitalist bank) was 
on the ground that these banks serve the interest ol" rich only as against the 
socio economic needs of the masses. May be because of this reason that he 
assigned more roles to Islamic banks, he says, 
• (Islamic) Bank should provide more than commercial banking services, 
receiving charges at rates oriented to cost of services. In the name of 
charging commission, a banking service should not become a cover for 
any capitalistic exploitation. 
• The services of banks, for which they are paid, should not cause any 
damage to the society, who's over all interests they are expected to 
serve. 
• The banking methodology should not in any way contradict the Islamic 
ideology. On the contrary it should conform precisely to Islamic laws. 
• Deposits in Islamic banks will be underwritten by an Islamic 
governments' central bank, and no person or group will be discriminated 
against or exploited. 
• New wealth and power resulting from this activity would not belong to 
any person or group.^^ 
10 
Sadr, al-Baqir, 'An Inlroduclion to Principles of Islamic Banking', (Tr.) by. Rad, Maivaban and 
revised edited by, Aii, K. Muiiammad, Bunyad Betiiet, Tehran, First Edition, 1982, p. 12-15. 
( /)(//)/l'l / Olll 12'' 
Sadr considered banking under Islamic society as an important, legal 
and necessary function of the society, according to him, 'Islamic banks have a 
crucial role to play, in terms of leading, guiding and monitoring socioeconomic 
activities.' 
However, he was of strong opinion that it was not only prohibition of 
riba that is important but Islamic banks do need to rout out the causes of riha 
as well. Therefore, he stressed to suggest that an Islamic bank is not a viable 
proposition in a non-Islamic regime. In other words, an Islamic bank can only 
thrive in an Islamic economy. Sadr says, "The very idea of incorporating in 
secular institutions or banks, any Islamic economic concept would be 
inappropriate. Those who desire interest free bank in non Islamic society would 
not be able to liberate the Muslims from an unlawful economic system".' ' 
Model: An Islamic bank aiuiounces it readiness to accept any amount of 
money or valuables. The basis of acceptance could be safe deposit only. 
Alternatively, the deposits could be credited as loans to the Islamic bank. In 
cither case, no payment of interest is involved. In both eases, the deposits arc 
returnable on demand. To offset any reduction in purchasing power ol' money 
due to inflation or rise in cost of living; the value of deposit can be adjusted on 
the basis of gold. 
Based on deposit, an Islamic bank can extend interest free loans to 
deserving people, including for private use, after obtaining guarantee of refund. 
It can extend the loans to finance productive enterprises conducive to 
legitimate earnings, also with a view to sharing the net profits. Any resultant 
gain will be shared between the depositor and the bank on a mutually agreed 
basis. This bilateral arrangement is called one tier (waaguzari). li', however, the 
bank assigns the plan utilization to another of its customer, the trilateral 
arrangement is called Mudarabah. In that case the profit would be shared by 
the three parties on a mutually agreed basis. If the bank wishes it can opt itself 
out of the deal in that case the bank would be entitled for wages for its efforts 
" Ibid., p. 13. 
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in arranging the deal. Mudarabah agreement will not carry any guarantee for 
Ihc depositors' money, and losses (unintenlional) i fany will have lo hear hy ihc 
depositors.^^ 
Where depositors authorize investment by an Islamic bank, the iattcr's 
role can be either that of an agent or an active participant. As an agent, it can 
bring about partnership between a third party and the depositor (s) in a business 
venture, so that any profit from the same will not be shared with the banks, 
which can claim only 'wages' for its services as intermediary. If the bank uses 
the money in a productive and profitable way, then any resultant prollt can be 
shared between it and the owner of capital.'-^ The deposits with an Islamic bank, 
which are invested in bilateral or trilateral socio economic plans, shall be 
exempted from wealth tax. Sadr emphasizes that the Islamic bank shall provide 
physical and economic security for deposits. The economic security is ensured 
by provision of effective safe guard against inflation, based on gold. 
Comments on Sadr Model 
The major objection raised against this model is absolvement of 
depositors to bear the loss. Once the depositors are guaranteed of their capital 
then they ceased to become capital provider. In such case they cannot be 
entitled to any profit. Besides this some other concessions granted to depositors 
like economic security, exemption from wealth tax raises some pertinent but 
unanswerable questions. 
Muslehuddin's Model 
May also be called a shirkai-al-inan model. As mentioned earlier that 
Mudarabah model was questioned by some scholars on the basis of its 
practicability, Muslehuddin is one among them. He is of the view that the 
'-Ibid., p. 18. 
'' Ibid., p. 19. 
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purpose of Islamic banking can be well suited under shirkal-al-incm or 
partnership whereby two or more persons join in the business, each of them 
being an agent of and for the other. The capital is not necessarily to be equally 
shared and, therefore, the profit be distributed according to the terms agreed 
upon between them, under the principle of what is not forbidden is 
permissible.^'^ An Islamic bank may be a company, an association or a 
concerned owned by an individual.^^ 
Functions: Islamic bank will perform all the functions of a modern 
bank, however, there are certain things that must be distinguishable between 
the Islamic and the other banking. 
Loans and advances: Loans are of two kinds Salafi.Q. loans for a fixed 
time and Qard i.e. loan recoverable immediately or on demand. Islamic bank 
may make all types of advances. In fact deposits to the public itself is a loan to 
the bank. Islamic bank will advance the loan on pledge or security and as a 
pledgee Islamic bank may derive benefits form the security in return for its 
services in maintenance of it.^^ Apart form pledge Islamic bank will have the 
right to retain the property belonging to another until a debt due from the latter 
is paid. Securities can be acceptable under Islamic banking provided unlawful 
elements associated with it are discarded." 
On its advances Islamic bank will levy service charges "The loan that 
draws forth or stipulate profit is Riba as said by the Prophet but service charges 
are not profit and Islamic bank may collect them from the borrowers separately 
or deduct straightaway from the amount payable to them the Central Bank 
shall, after taking into consideration all the relevant facts, fix a certain 
percentage as limit for such charges so that the banks do not overstep i f T h e 
service charges shall also work as deterrent against the violent rush and 
Ibid., p. 135. 
Ibid., p. 136. 
Ibid., p. 146. 
Ibid., p. 155. 
Ibid., p. 157. 
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irresponsible demands for loan, however, service charges may be dispensed 
with if the State participates in the management of the bank and controls major 
holding.^^ The profit earned by Islamic banks through other lawJlil activities 
shall be distributed among shareholders and depositors. 
Central Bank: Muslehuddin emphasizes that the Islamic state 
needs a central bank to control the credit and currency and to act as fiscal agent 
to the state, besides being baiikers' bank. The bank will control the credit by 
acting on the system of special deposits as introduced by the Bank of England, 
(but these deposits will not earn interest for the depositor banks). In Ihc 
capacity of apex bank for the banking system, it may perform all the functions 
of modern Central Bank.''® As a fiscal agent and representative for the Muslim 
state it may be allowed to have interest transactions with non-Muslim 
countries. "Thus the interest earned by the Muslim State is not Riha but tlie 
amount recovered in retaliation.""" 
Comments on Muslehuddin Model 
Professor Siddiqi first takes a strong notice of the rejection of 
Mudarabah model on the ground that it is based on a narrow interpretation of 
the legal text involved. Second criticism is based on the author's failure to 
suggest a viable alternative of the present Mudarabah model. Siddiqi notes that 
the alternative suggested by Muslehuddin will be confined to services 
performed against a fee or commission. "They would lend depositors" money 
for short periods recovering only service charges just sufficient to cover 
administrative costs. This would hardly make his bank a profitable business. 
" Ibid., p. 158. 
' " I b i d . , p. 163. 
Ibid.. Quot ing Siddiqi, Public Finance in Islam, p. xi. 
Siddiqi, M.N., -Islamic Approaches to Money, Banking and Monetary Policv - A Review" in M 
Ariff (ed.), Monetary and Fiscal Economics of Islam, Internationa! Centre Ibr Research in Islamic 
Economics , Jeddah. 1982, p. 35-36. 
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Abdul Gafoor's Islamic Commercial Banking Model 
Propounded by A.L.M., Abdul Gafoor"' in his book 'Inieresl-free 
Commercial Banking'. This is a commercial banking model where depositors 
are insured of the safety of their deposits. Bank, being financial intermediary, is 
a profit making institution. 
The author has not touched the foundation of the present commercial 
banks. Rather he has tried to weed out the interest element of it through some 
modifications. He started from redefining the commercial bank and interest and 
then constructed a model of the cost of borrowing (CoB). According to the 
author it is the cost of borrowing where a bank get involves in interest if it is 
removed then the bank is free from interest. Another notable point raised by the 
author is depositor's insistence of getting some profit/amount for parting his 
money. According to him if depositors do not ask for additional amount for 
their deposit, then any additional amount charged by the bank for lending does 
not come under the purview of interest. The bank being the trustee oi' the 
deposits is obliged to return the deposits in full, however, simultaneously being 
a commercial entity it has to earn profit. The author says "Modern commercial 
bank is a financial intermediary and not a moneylender; and that it is a trusty of 
the depositor's deposit and an agent of a borrower not lender. The real lender is 
the depositor and bank is the trustee of his deposit not agent."-'-' He goes on to 
say that "So long as the depositor does not demand or is paid an additional 
amount over and above his deposit, the bank need not collect the amount from 
the borrower and pass on to depositor, and therefore there is no Riha in the 
whole operation. The bank gets involved in interest only because it facilitates 
this transfer. Thus a bank becomes an interest free bank or not depending 
entirely on whether its depositors demand and receive interest or not.'"-'' 
41 
Gafoor . Abdul . A.L.M., • Interest-free Commercial Banking', Apptec Publications. 'I hc Nether lands 
1995, pp. 3-35. 
Ibid., p. 1 8 & 2 0 . 
' ' i b i d . , p. 19. 
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Cost of Borrowing Model 
While describing the model author explains that the expenditure, which 
the borrower had to bear but none ol" which went to the lenders, is (he overhead 
cost, and not interest. He explains the cost of borrowing as following; 
Cost of Borrowing (CoB) = hiterest 
+ Service cost 
+ Overhead cost 
+ Risk premium 
+ Profit 
+ Compensation for inflation 
Interest: the amount paid by the borrower to the lender, as 
compensation for the latter's parting with his money for the duration of the 
loan. 
Service cost: the cost of providing services for the specific transaction 
like preparation of loan document, evaluation, processing, checking of 
collateral, legal, etc. 
Overheads cost: these include service to the borrower as long as his 
loan remains outstanding, the cost incurred for obtaining the funds foi- loan, 
advertisements, salary, rent, equipment, and the other administrative expenses 
which the bank is to incur during its business. These all are charged Irom the 
borrower as the bank cannot charge all this from depositors. 
Risk Premium: To meet any contingency and to deal with the loan 
defaults, banks charges certain amount of premium from the borrower, this 
goes into a special fund. Any loss the bank incurs due to bad loan is made good 
from this fund. On complete repayment of a loan the borrower will be paid all 
or part of his paid premium, depending on how much defaults were there 
(• 'haplci I •our ' n? 
during the period of his loan/^' The bank may charge dilTcrcnl levels of 
premium from the borrower depending upon the level and the quality of 
collaterals. 
Profit: The bank being a commercial profit making concern should 
receive some profit. This should be chargeds from the borrower. This will be a 
fixed percentage of services and overhead cost to avoid it smacking like 
interest. 
Inflation: in this model inflation is assumed to be zero. However, 
author admits that it does affect the cost of the borrowing and it should be 
adjusted accordingly in the cost of borrowing.'*^ 
Deposits 
Deposits will be accepted in three types of account: current, savings, and 
time deposit accounts, none of these accounts will bear any interest. Capital 
will be guaranteed and bank will be free to charge fee for its services to the 
depositors. 
Current accounts: There are no changes in the current account 
practices of Islamic bank as compared to the conventional banks. 
Savings accounts; All operations of this account will be the same as 
currently practiced in conventional banks except that this account will no 
longer bear any interest. Capital is guaranteed. 
Time deposit accounts: Again the services will be the same like 
conventional bank. There will be no return but the capital will be guaranteed, 
however, there will be certain restriction on minimum period and minimum 
amount to open this account. The advantage to the holder will be in the form of 
Zakah saving. 
" Ibid., p. 8. 
" Ibid., p. 9. 
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Bank Charges 
The Islamic commercial bank will charge its borrower according to the 
above-explained Cost of Borrowing (CoB) model except the interest. 
Loans and Advances 
Temporary overdrafts: Good clients of the bank would be allowed to 
meet their temporary shortfall in cash flow out of the bank's fund maximum up 
to two weeks. Bank will charge normal service charges. Certain overheads 
charge may be added at over and above the certain minimum amount. 
Loans: On loans borrowers will be asked to pay the service charges as 
discussed above 
Inter-bank lending: The same as in conventional banking except the 
inter bank rate would be negotiable, profit rates may also not be charged, 
however, the overheads cost will be charged. 
Services 
All the services of a conventional bank where no bank advances are 
involved will remain the same. In services where bank advances are involved 
like bill of exchange, treasury bills and government bonds, the charges may be 
based on the CoB model as discussed above. 
Central Bank 
All central bank functions supervision, reserve requirements will remain 
same, however, bank rate may be replaced by a panel rate. 
Comments on the Model 
The model is yet to be applied, however, certain obvious questions that 
arise in one's mind are as follows: 
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First of all the model violates the many sets of the Shariah including a 
unanimous alternate suggested by Islamic economists, i.e. PLS. 
If insistence of lender to get more than he lend is the criteria of being 
called interest then none of the present commercial bank are interest 
based banks, as it is not the depositor that asks for higher return but the 
banks themselves offer this return. 
Borrowers had to pay premium for the bad loans. Even after that bank 
may go bankrupt then who will take the guarantee of the deposits the 
Islamic banlc itself, the central bank or the government is not specifically 
mentioned by the author. 
Who will stop the bank to charge exorbitant profit? Moreover, in 
absence of any incentives to the depositors, there are likely chances of 
asset liability mismatch. Deposits will obviously decrease at the same 
time; due to decrease in the cost of borrowing the demand for loan will 
go up, how the bank will cope v>/ith this asset-liability mismatch is not 
clear. 
If third party can profit by lending others money why can first party not 
profit by lending its own money. 
There will be no fundamental changes in the banking system except thai 
the income which banks share with the depositors will stop, this may 
bring more instability to the economy and increase the income gap 
among the people. 
Rich shareholders and promoters of the bank will earn at the cost of poor 
depositors. 
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148 Shaikh Mahmood's Time Multiple Counter Loan Model' 
A Time Multiple Counter Loan (TMCL) is a transaction between two 
parties exchanging two simultaneous interest-free loans as such that the 
multiple of the amount and period of one loan equals the muiliple o(" the 
amount and period of the other loan. It simply facilitates interest-lVee loaning 
of large sums against the counter-loans of smaller sums advanced lor 
proportionately longer periods. For example an entrepreneur requiring a loan of 
$10.0 Million for one year can get interest-free loan for one year by advancing 
an imerest-free counter loan of $1.0 Million to the bank for 10 years. 
Propounded by one of the earliest and prominent Islamic economist 
Shaikh Malimood Ahmad, Time Multiple Counter Loan or TMCL model is 
built on the premise that " time is as much an ingredient of a loan as the loan 
i t se l f author explains this further by stating that "what the lender forgoes and 
the borrower receives is not merely an amount of loan but an amount of a loan 
for a certain period of time" he then sets for a hypotheses "if we multiply the 
amount of a loan by the period for which it is advanced we get the measure of 
deprivation suffered by the lender which is also the measure of gain received 
by the borrower". He gives this magnitude the name of "loan value". He then 
proposes the establishment of an interest free banking system on the principle 
of equality of "loan values". Specifically, what the proposal amounts to is that 
if a person needs loan for any purpose from a bank for a certain period of time 
then he should also give loan to that bank in an amount such that the " values"" 
of the two loans becomes equal."' 
Author proclaims that TMCL can perform all financial intermediation 
functions, which are performed by interest. All loans will be advanced against 
counter-loans and all transactions involving credit will be executed on TMCL 
basis. Banks will continue to receive deposits and issue chequebooks as usual. 
Ahmad , Shaikh Mahmood , 'Towards Inleresl Free Banking'and 'SoocI Ki Mulabudil Asaas' ( l ) idu) . 
Ahmad , Ziauddin in his review of the booi<, 'Toward Interest free Bani<ing" in Journal of King.lhdiil 
Aziz University: Islamic Economics. Vol. 4, 1992, pp. 81-87. 
Chapicr l-<}iii > 
Account holders will have the option to keep their money in investment or 
demand deposit accounts, inveslment account holders will share profil/loss 
with the bank on daily product basis. Banks will earn profits by investing 
counter-loan amounts and surplus deposits in Shariah-compWani modes. 
The borrower will put 110 percent collateral, however, he will have to 
repay only the principal amount of loan on due date or earlier and instead ol 
paying interest. The borrower will advance to the bank a counter-loan of the 
same amount as he took in loan and for the same period for which he availed 
the loan. Alternatively the bank and the borrower may mutually agree to a 
different amount of counter-loan for proportionately longer or shorter period on 
T M C L basis. Interest-bearing bills and bonds will be en cashed at their face 
value and the holders will receive appropriate counter-loan on T M C L basis 
from the issuer.^" 
The Central Bank will set up a framework of a Central Depository-cum-
lender of last resort for mobilizing surplus funds of banks and federal and 
provincial governments and autonomous bodies and advancing interest-free 
loans to them in times of need. The Central Depository will receive deposits 
and advance interest-free loans on TMCL basis. For example, if a bank has a 
surplus of Rs. 5.0M for 1 month, it may deposit this sum for 1 month with the 
Central Depository and obtain an interest-free loan of Rs. 0.5M for 10 months. 
If a bank is short of liquidity and requires Rs. lO.OM for 1 week, it will obtain 
from the Central Depository an interest-free loan of Rs. lO.OM for I week by 
depositing Rs. l.OM with the Central Depository for 10 weeks. Central 
Depository will also earn profits by investing surplus funds in Shariah 
compliant businesses. 
Banks will deposit 20% of each counter-loan amount with the Central 
Depository for 10 years against which Central Depository will allow banks to 
draw 200% of counter-loan amount for 1 year. This will provide 20% liquidity 
See Cor details, Waood, Abdul, -Methodfor Starling Jnleres! Free Banking . (np.. nd. n \ . ) pp. 38-42. 
author can be contacted at: aw khanfahotmai l . com 
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for the banks. Additional 2% liquidity will be obtained by keeping 20% of 
counter-loan amount as till money is in the bank. Thus total liquidity achieved 
by the banking sector will be 22%. The time-multiple ratio for TMCL can be 
raised or lowered to affect the money supply or the credit availability in the 
market. 
Benefits of TMCL 
Adoption of TMCL as loaning instrument by Islamic banks will bring 
the following benefits to Islamic banks and the Muslim Ummah as a whole. 
1. It will open for Islamic banks the vast field of loaning to reliable and 
capable cost conscious entrepreneurs who want to remain independent 
and in full control of their enterprises and do not accept any sharing of 
profit or outside interference. Without providing loans to this big class 
of loan seekers, Islamic banks will not be able to compete with western 
banks who have started capturing business in Islamic investment field, 
2. It will facilitate inter-bank interest-free loan transactions and Islamic 
banks will not have to turn to western banks for meeting their short-term 
needs of liquidity. 
3. It will facilitate setting up of a central depository for mobilizing surplus 
funds of Islamic banks and governments on TMCL basis and advancing 
to them in times of need TMCL based interest-free loans. 
4. It will facilitate utilization of the financial resources of the Muslim 
Ummah in developing Muslim countries through the Central Depository, 
instead of being diverted to western financial markets. ' ' 
Akram Khan in his book 'Islamic Banking in Pakistan: the Future Path' 
reiterates that "The financial institutions have not explored fully the potential 
SI 
Khan, Abdul Wadood. op. cit., pp. 43-58. and from his unpublished paper on I 'MCL 
Chapter Four 1141 
of TMCL concept.,., the concept is loaded with infinite possibilities of 
application in interest free finance".^^ 
Comments on TMCL 
The first and the foremost comment against the TMCL is rejection by its 
propounder to all the other permissible modes of finance. It seems to be more 
aggressive than it should have been. Various scholars have expressed their 
apprehension of the workability of the TMCL and also criticized the model on 
Shariah ground. The legitimacy of this method (TMCL) is often questioned on 
the ground that it puts condition of loan against loan, which to many is not 
allowed under Shariah, however, there is yet to come any verdict, which 
discard TMCL as illegal or un-lslamic. It is also mentionable that majority of 
the Islamic economists including the blueprint brought out by the Council of 
Islamic Ideology CIl""'^  (the highest religious advisoiy body of the Government 
of Pakistan) for Islamization of economy of Pakistan have rejected the idea of 
TMCL as a complete alternate of the interest. 
The extent of application is also doubted by none other than Chapra who 
says, "The method of Time Multiple Counter Loans could be adopted for 
small-scale financing particularly within the framework of co-operative 
institutions. For commercial banks, it would be of limited applicability"".^' At 
other place Chapra insists that "it is not possible to rely on one mode of finance 
to run a modern financial system. It is necessary to have all [miiJarhah. 
Miisharakah, shares of joint stock companies, murabahah, hay muajjai, JJarah. 
Ijarah wa iqtina, salam and islisna ) the modes to suit different needs and 
circumstances. When the Shariah has permitted all these modes, there is no 
Khan. M u h a m m a d Akram, Islamic Banking in Pakistan: The Future Path. All I'akislun Islamic 
Educat ion Congress , Lahore, 1992, p.33, 
' For details see; Ahmad, Khurshid, 'Elimination of Riba from Economy', Institute of Policy Studies. 
Islamabad, Pakistan, 1995. 
Chapra . M. Umer , 'Towards a Just Monetary System', Leicester, U.K.. The Islamic I 'oundalion 
1985, p. 172. 
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need to reject them and make the Islamic financial system unable to cope with 
the challenges it faces"." 
The blue-prim of Islamic financial system including strategy lor 
elimination of Riha' published by the International Institute of Islamic 
Economics, International Islamic University, Islamabad includes a short 
comment on TMCL; "One may argue that TMCL instrument offers an 
ingenious solution to the problems Riba, Gharar and having two mutually 
exclusive conditions in one contract. But its viability is questionable for several 
reasons. Some of these are as follows. Counter loans would be liability of the 
banks. Therefore, while the sum generated might be used to meet their 
operating expenses it would not be distributable as profits among their 
shareholders or depositors who provide funds on partnership basis. This will 
compel the banks to turn to trading, leasing and other profitable options. It is 
also possible that clients may use loans from banks, whether directly or 
indirectly, to give, the counter-loans. This, in turn, casts further doubts on the 
usefulness of the TMCL option. Last but not the least, a recourse to TMCL is 
not advisable because the ensuing credit expansion is likely to fuel inflation." 
Some of other reluctances include that the availability of bank loans at 
zero rate of interest will result in steep rise in the demand for the bank loans. 
Another comment is that since the loans will be provided at 110 percent 
collaterals apart from the counter loan, this will be offered to those who have 
the capability to produce such collaterals; this means the loan will circulate 
among the riches only, therefore, TMCL instead of reducing will ultimately 
aggravate the inequalities of income and wealth besides the depositors would 
not get any return on their deposits while borrowers will not have to part with 
any part of their profit. 
Mohamed Elgari, a Professor of Economics at King Abdul Aziz 
University, while commenting on the Shariah aspects says, "Classical Shariah 
" Wadood , Abdul , op. cit. p. 113. 
('litiplri I oiii 1 N'! 
scholars are almost unanimous on the prohibition of such arrangement. This is 
because Riba need not be monetary (i.e. percentage increase), llencc benelll 
acruing to the creditor, made a condition in the contract of loan, is at least 
suspicious, if not straight usury. A very limited number of schoalrs permitted 
this arrangement but only in cases where other means of finances arc not 
possible".'^ 
Fahim Khan in his comments on 'CII Report on Elimination of Interst 
From Economy' observes that TMCL seems to be quite expliotative and 
therefore should not be considered as an alternate to interest.^^ 
Later Developments in Islamic Banking Models 
In the foregoing sections we have discussed some of the earliest models 
of Islamic banking. After the start of Islamic banking followed by subsequent 
difficulties faced during the early operations Islamic banking practices have 
deviated from their paradigm version. Coping with the challenges Islamic 
economists have tried to improve the models presented during early periods. 
Munawar Iqbal et al in this regard rightly note that these (early) developments 
led to the emergence of different models of Islamic banking where the 
relationship between savers and the bank is organized on the basis of 
Mudarabah. However, on the assets side the bank uses a number of other 
modes of finance permissible under Shariah. This system is called one tier 
Mudarabah with combined with multiple investment tools. 
Some of the later refined models though based on Mudarabah. centered 
on the role of artificial purchasing power through credit creations. Chapra/''^ for 
Wadood , Abdul , op. cit. p. 116. 
' ' Klian M. Fahim, Comment ing on 'CII report on Elimination of Interest f rom the l i c o n o n i } i n 
Ziauddin et al (ed.) . Money and Banking in Islam, Institute of Policy Studies, Is lamabad. 1983, p.245. 
M u n w a r Iqbal et al, 'Challenges Facing Islamic Banking', IDB/ lRTl , Occasional Paper No . 2. 1998. 
p. 14-15. 
Chapra , M. Umer, 'Money and banking in an Islamic economy' in M. ArilT (ed.). Monetary and 
Fiscal Economics of Islam. International Centre for Research in Islamic Economics , .leddah. 1982. pp. 
145-176. Also see, Chapra . M.U.. "Towards a .lust Monetary System", op. cit. chapter. 6. 
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example, suggests that 'seigniorage' should be transferred to public exchequer 
for the sake of equity and justice. He also favored medium sized banks to avoid 
polarizations of power in case the bank being veiy large and also uneconomical 
for its small size. Chapra like Muhammad Baqir al Sadr and Irshad vouched lor 
loss compensating reserves and loss absorbing insurance facilities. He also, like 
Sadr, calls for deposits guarantee. Regarding statutory reserves, Chapra 
contends that in the Islamic system Mudarabah deposits are treated like bank 
equity and, since there is no statutory reserve requirement against other forms 
of equity, there is no reason why Mudarabah should be subjects to reserve 
requirements.^" 
Based on profit sharing among depositors, bank, and its employees, 
Mohsin's^' model is a detailed and elaborated presentation of an Islamic 
banking framework. His model incorporates the characteristics of commercial, 
merchant and development banks. He also added various non-banking services 
such as trust business, factoring real estate and consultancy perhaps to increase 
the non-interest income component of the banks. Mohsin says; "A model ol~ 
Riba-fvee banks (RFB) must, however, meet two basic requirements. First it 
should be based on Islamic Shariah, and second it must meet al! the 
requirements of sound banking"^^ to meet the Shariah requirements, banking 
will be based on the principles of Mudarabah or 'mutual funds ' where 
shareholders, depositors, investors, borrowers and employees will share the 
fruit and bear the burnt. RFB will charge the commission and fee for the 
banking and non-banking services on actual cost basis. Various non-banking 
and non-fmancial activities shall also be exploited to increase the banks' 
earning. Various schemes for the benefits of employees like pension plan and 
profit sharing plan paid in cash or at the time of retirement is an issue raised 
Chapra , M. Umer , 'Towards a Jusi Monetary System', The Islamic FounduVion. U.K. 19K5. p. l^H-
99. 
''' Mohsin, iVl., 'Profile of Riba-free Banlcing', in M. Ariff (ed.), Monetary and Fiscal Economics of 
Islam. Internationa! Centre for Research in Islamic Economics , Jeddah. 1982, p. 187-203. 
' - I b i d . , p. 187. 
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first time in Islamic banking model. Mohsin recommends no reserves for 
investment deposits. 
As regards the demand deposits most of the writers recommend fractional 
reserve system while some like Al-Jarhi®^ favors a 100% reserve requirement of 
commercial banks. Regarding statutory reserve there are differing opinion among the 
islamic economists. Ariff, proposes for an Islamic bank that would work on 
cooperatives principle where depositors become co-owners of the bank, sharing profit 
and the losses. Credit is also extended on the same principles. 
As far the implementation of Islamic banking is concern three distinct 
models have come to be noticed; firstly, the economy wise implementation 
model followed by Pakistan, Iran and Sudan, secondly, individual initiatives 
mostiy adopted in middle eastern countries and thirdly, dual banking system 
followed by Malaysia where Islamic banking is not only allowed but 
encouraged at government levels besides not prohibiting any of the 
conventional banking practices. 
In the first case not only the banking but also the whole structure of the 
economy is transformed to conform to Shariah. Though any substantial gain is 
yet to be observed but the effort itself is no less encouraging as far the Islamic 
economics is concern. 
Under the second model, which to date is the most succcssliil. 
government grants permission to one or more Islamic bank to llinction under 
the existing laws or through a special charter. These individual Islamic banks 
have succeeded in raising the tempo of Islamic banks. 
Malaysian model is yet to be replicated in any other country but it has already 
shown its potential. During the last couple of years Malaysia has witnessed 
tremendous growth in Islamic banking and finance. 
Al-.larhi, Ma'bid Ali, 'A monetai-y and financial structure ibr an interest- irec cconom\ ' . institutions, 
mechan i sm and policy', in Ziauddin, Ahmad et al. (eds.), Money and Banking in Islam, International 
Centre for Research in Islamic Economics, Jeddah, 1983. pp. 
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Conclusion 
The banking models presented by Islamic economists are discussed in 
this chapter. The first and the foremost model of Islamic banking, which was 
accepted by the majority of the Islamic economists, is Mudarahah model on 
the ground that the real alternate to interest lies in the Profit and Loss Sharing 
(PLS). Some other models on the basis of Musharakah, shirkcU-e-inan and 
Time Multiple Counter Loan are also suggested. 
It is observed during the past about three decades of practices of Islamic 
banks that Islamic banks have been facing difficulties in following the 
Mudarabah principle in their actual practices, especially when they are faced 
with stiff competition form their conventional counterparts. Several writers 
have argued that this model is ideally suited for the Islamic society whose 
absence is the major cause of the difficulties facing these institutions. Several 
proposals have come forward for the refinement of these models. One of such 
proposal has come from none other than Professor M. N. Siddiqi who points 
out that a financial institutions are not fully equipped to handle the businesses 
directly, therefore, there is need for establishing a whole range of specialized 
companies: Murabaha companies, Salam/Istisna companies, Leasing 
companies, etc. so that finance is channeled from Islamic banks to those 
actually engaged in production of wealth. At other place Siddiqi explains the 
reason, "Trading in goods and services was not what Islamic banks were 
conceived for. Rather they were expected to supply Muslims with the same 
services that conventional banks were supplying, so that Muslims could avoid 
paying or receiving interest and still be able,to earn profits on their savings or 
get finance for their business etc."^"^ 
On the question of basis of these companies, Siddiqi answers; "In my 
opinion the most appropriate form will be Mudarabah or profit sharing. Islamic 
banks accepting people's savings in their investment accounts on the basis ol" 
Siddiqi, M. Nejatul lah. "Islamic Banks; Conccpt , Pcrccpl and Prospccls ' . Rcrie)\ of hliiiniL 
Economics, The Islamic Foundation, Lciccslcr, UK. No. 9. 2000. p,22. 
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Mudarabah would be giving that money out on the basis of Mudarahah. This 
conforms to the earHest form of financial intermediation discussed in Islamic 
jurisprudence, 'al mudarib yudarib' (One taking other person's money on the 
basis of Mudarabah giving that money to yet another person on 
Mudarabahy!'^ 
Elaborating the benefits of it Siddiqi opines that this will relieve the 
Islamic financial institutions from the need to reduce risk by making their 
contracts look like payment of less money now in exchange of more money to 
be received in future. The risks involved will be financial risks which financial 
intermediaries have learnt, and continue learning, how to handle. Business risks 
will become the concerns of business houses closer to those who buy and sell, 
even produce and import/export, or build and lease, hire and sublet, etc. There 
will be no need to twist and turn a trade deal to make it serve the purposes of a 
financial intermediary".^'^' 
Siddiqi, M. Nejatul lah, "Comparative Advantages of Islamic Banking and Finance", i^resenlcd at the 
Fifth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, Islamic Finance: Dynamics and Development. 6 
April 2002. 
ibid. 
CHAPTER-5 
ISLAMIC AND CONVENTIONAL BANKING: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Almost all the serious studies on Islamic banking have indicated that, 
this important aspect of Islamic economics system is still at its ' infancy stage' 
of development.' It has a practical experience of about four decades and it 
would be unjustified comparing Islamic banking with conventional banking 
which is more than three centuries old. 
In addition Islamic banks have their own conceptual mainspring, 
defining objectives, procedures and practices in which they are involved and 
there is hardly any collision with hundreds of non-Islamic banks who co-exist 
with them. However, there are factors that make a distinction between the two 
systems of banking. As a matter of fact, unlike the Islamic banks, the existing 
conventional banks originally germinated in Europe. With the prime concern to 
gain control over resources and livelihood of people, through the utilization of 
funds. Hence, the realization of these two factors justified the adoption of any 
means or method available. Islamic economists give much emphasis on the 
objective side of the Islamic banks. That is, unlike the western commercial 
banking system, Islamic banks are "governed by controls derived from Allah's 
course", while conventional banks are controlled only by hard competition. In 
this regard one writer argues that Islamic banks constitute an integral part of 
' Iqbul Munawai ' et al, 'Chalkngas Facing Islamic Banking', Occasional Paper No, 2. IIO i / lDB. 
.leddah. 1998, p. I I . And Green K. Stephen, •Challenges Facing ihe Islamic Finance Indusl : )" . l-onilh 
Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, Islamic Finance The Task Ahead. Cambi idgc . Octobei 
2002 , p. 152. 
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society, in harmony with its other constituents; on the march towards 
achieving 'Allah's course' while commercial banks are not related to their 
own society except through profit making. In practice. Islamic banks work in 
the field of investment as they hold to the belief that money is but a means to 
an end. Hence they do not trade in it. Conventional banks works in buying and 
selling money, which they treat as a commodity and not a medium of 
exchange. This gap between the two broadens dramatically when it causes to 
their objectives. 
In this chapter an attempt is made to analyze the Islamic banking vis-a-
vis conventional banking from the point of view of efficiency, stability, growth 
and justice. The theme of the chapter revolves around these concepts; however, 
in later part an empirical analysis of both the system is presented. 
Efficiency is considered the primary criteria by economists; therefore, 
we would like to start our discussion from efficiency, which system is more 
efficient in the task it is assigned to. In the case of banks their primary business 
is financial intermediation. It would be discussed whether the system Islamic or 
the conventional performs this function more efficiently. Another very 
important aspect from the economic point of view is stability. Which system is 
more stable shall also be looked upon. Which system leads to growth, as it is 
the objective of all concerned, shall be our third point of discussion. .Justice is 
the goal for which we all strive for, which system is more justifiable, is also our 
concern. I have put it as the last point of my discussion, however, in no way 
our ptirpose is to demean its importance. It is one of the most important aspects 
of one's life especially when it comes to public life. However, only for 
economic reasons we shall try to attempt this issue a little later. In the end we 
shall present an empirical picture of both the banking systems. There is a lack 
of comprehensive study mainly due to Islamic banking being a relatively new 
phenomenon and also due to the fact that conventional economists have still 
not taken Islamic banking as seriously as they should have. There may be many 
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reasons to it which we shall try to highlight in the course of this chapter. 
Hovs'ever, first we shall begin from the issue of efficiency. 
Efficiency in Banking Sector 
The issue of bank efficiency is important at macro as well micro levels. 
At the macroeconomic level, bank efficiency is a socially optimal target since it 
reduces the average cost of financial transactions and therefore enhances the 
societies welfare. The issue of banking efficiency is important for various 
reasons few of them are as follows. 
The financial sector is a major player in modern economies, as a 
producer of financial services and as an employer. Banking system fulfils 
essential functions in intermediating between the savers and investors, 
financing private sector trade and investment and helping to ensure that the 
economy's financial resources are allocated effectively. 
The measurement of financial efficiency is important to all parties that 
participate in the banking industry. Assessing bank's performance through 
measuring efficiency helps bank management to improve managerial 
performance. It assists investors in making investment decisions whether to 
participate in financial activities. Regulators are also interested in banking 
efficiency since the performance of the banking sector has significant impact 
on other parts of economy. Al-Jarhi, a senior economist at the IDB/IRTL 
observes that "Banks in Islamic economics system operate on the bases of 
universal banking, i.e., they can take equity and provide credit finance 
simultaneously to the same enterprises. The practice of universal banking in a 
word of asymmetric information is known to reduce the cost of monitoring 
borrowers. This means that the transaction costs of credit finance provided by 
banks to enterprises in which they take stock would be lower with universal 
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rather than commercial banking. This in turn would imply lower transactions 
costs of providing credit purchase to enterprises in which banks have s take" . ' 
The Efficiency 
Islamic economics researches and their practical application have shown 
that the economic system can function without interest. A system using prolll-
shaving n:\odes where possible and trade based modes, e.g. Murabahah, leasing, 
etc. where necessary, will be more equitable, more efficient and more stable 
than the current interest based system. 
Islamic economists in their researches have shown that interest has had 
bad consequences for the economy. As it results in ineJIicient allocatio/i of 
society's resources, it contributes to the instability of the system and also il 
increases the inequality in the distribution of income and wealth. As Professor 
Siddiqi rightly points out it that the interest based system "guarantees a 
continuous increase in the monies lent out, mostly by the wealthy, and puts the 
burden of bearing the losses on entrepreneurs and, through loss of Jobs of the 
workers".^ 
On the contrary, Islamic modes of finance not only expose the money 
owner to some risk but also bring him opportunity for higher returns. And so it 
is fair to the entrepreneur, as it does not oblige him/her to bear losses occurring 
despite good, and honest management. It is better for the society since it 
allocates financial resources on the basis of expected profits which rellect 
productivity. In the conventional finance funds are allocated on the basis of 
creditworthiness of borrowers, which may not reflect his/her productivity. In 
Islamic finance the project financed have the advantage of being double-
checked, once by the fund seeker and secondly by the fund supplier, since 
both's returns depend on the actual outcome of the project. 
' Al- . larhi . M. Ali , ' A C o m p a r i s o n of Transac t ions in Convent iona l and i s lamic i x o n o m i c s " . I 'ourih 
Harvard Univers i ty Fo rum on Is lamic Finance , Islamic Finance: The Task Ahead, C a m b r i d g e . Oc tobe r 
2002 , p. 30 . 
S iddiq i , M.N . , Paper Presented at La Riba annual mee t at Los Ange les . C A , on 30 March 2002 . 
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Another aspect of this argument is raised by Chapra who is of the view 
that the resources of the financial institution come from a wide cross section of 
the population; they must be utilized for the well being of all the sections of the 
population. The financial resources are extremely scarce, therefore it needs to 
be used with optimum equity and efficiency, which according to Chapra can be 
done only when finance goes to (a) the optimum number of enterprises and (b) 
the production, import and distribution of goods and services needed lor Ihc 
need satisfaction of all the members of the society. Chapra points out that the 
conventional interest based financial system is not capable of helping realize 
either of these two goals. It leads to both inequity and inefficiency in the use of 
resources.'* 
The inequitable allocation of financing in the conventional banking 
system is now widely recognized by Western scholars also. According to Arne 
Bigsten, "the distribution of capital is even more unequal than thai of land" and 
"the banking system tends to reinforce the unequal distribution of capital".^ 
The point behind Chapra's argument is that the present interest based banking 
system is inherently biased in favor of rich as they are the people who could 
offer sufficient collateral required for finances. Has this not been the case 
finances would have gone on the merit of the project, which would have been 
more equitable and just for the society as a whole. To stress his point Chapra 
quotes some other western economists and Morgan Guarantee Trust of the US, 
which admitted that the present banking system has failed to "finance either 
maturing smaller companies or venture capitalist"'' 
Western scholars on the other blame that in Islamic finance too the most 
practiced form of financing {Murabahah) is based on fixed return, which is 
hardly distinguishable with interest based finance. Islamic economics, in reply, 
Chapia , M. Umer, 'Islam and the Economic Challenge', The Islamic rounda t ion . l.ciccstci' UK 
1995. p 327-328. 
' Arnc. Bigsten. 'Poverty, inequality and Development ' in Gemmei . Siirve>s in Dcvelopmcni 
l -conomics, 1987, p. 156. as cited by Chapra. op.cit. p.328. 
'' Chapra, M. Umer, 'Islam and the Economic Challengeop. cit. 
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contend that Murabahah and other trade-based modes of Islamic fmance may 
create debts. But these debts cannot be traded except at par vahic which 
prevents them from ballooning into several times their original volume. Sincc 
they arise in the process of supplying real goods and services, they do not have 
much expansionary effect on the system. This is quite unlike interest-based 
finance in which debts are created on the basis of creditworthiness of borrowers 
and they are traded like any other commodity. This kind of financial sector 
acquires a life of its own independent of and only tenuously linked with the real 
sector of the economy. This makes it vulnerable to speculation bordering on 
gambling in which risks are created for the purpose of taking risk, with no 
relation to the production of wealth.' 
Another notable feature of Murabahah finance as pointed out by Islamic 
economists is that any change in spending pattern is automatically reflected in 
change in demand and supply of goods and services. Islamic economists 
concede that modern economy cannot function without credit. But the way 
credit is created in the absence of interest rules out the possibility of excessive 
debt creation or its continued accumulation at an accelerated rate because the 
price to be paid in future for goods and services supplied in the present once 
determined cannot be increased. No debt crisis can take place in a system 
without interest in which all debt is for goods and services supplied and. most 
likely, against collateral.^ 
At other place Siddiqi recalls, "You exchange money either for goods 
and services, or for money or for debt. In the Islamic framework we have no 
problems with the first, the second, exchange of money for money is severely 
constrained, and the third is almost eliminated. Islamic law allows cash for debt 
only at par, which leaves no room for a market in which debt could be sold for 
^ See Siddiqi, M.N. at wwvv.siddiqi.com/mn 
® Ibid. 
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cash It aJso allows exchange of debt for debt at par and with fujthei 
restrictions".^ 
On the charges of separating financial economy from the real one and 
banking from the commerce Patrikis argues that, this pohcy of sepaiating 
banking and commerce is grounded upon a mixture of safety and soundness 
concerns and a broader pubhc policy concern about fair and equal access to 
credit and control over society's resources by banks".'" On the other Islamic 
economists charge that separation of commerce and banking is the result ol 
interest mechanism which in turn has been responsible for disproportionate and 
independent growth of financial economy to such a state where these debt 
instruments are themselves treated and traded like a commodity 
The Stability 
Several researchers have compared both the banking systems in order to 
assess their implications for the stability of the banking system In this regard 
Mohsin Khan (1986)" and Abbas Mirakhor (1987)'^ of IMF have proved that 
banking contracts as found in Islamic form of banking are more stable than the 
contracts found in conventional banking. United Nation Development Report, 
describes the implication of conventional contracts in these woids, "When the 
market goes too far in dominating social and political outcomes, the 
opportunities and rewards of globalization spread unequally and inequitably 
concentrating power and wealth in a select group of people, nations and 
corporations, marginalizing the others When the market gets out of hand, the 
" Siddiqi, M N , Islamic Finance and Beyond Piemises and Piomises ol Islamic I conomics in 
Pioceedings of the Thud Hanaid Univei sily Fonim on Islamic Finance Local Challenges Global 
Oppoiiiinilies, Haivaid Univeisity, Cambi idge , Octobei , 1999, p 50 
Einesl T Patiikis, Fust Vice Piesident. Fedeial Reseive Bank ot N e w Yoik i s l a m i c 1 inancc in the 
United S t a t e s - - T h e Regulatoi) Fiamewoik" Islamic Finance and investment Conlc icncc New Yoik 
Ma) 21. 1996 
" See Khan, S Mohsin "Islamit. Inteicst -Fiec Banking A Ihcoictical Analysis Inieindiioiial 
\f<)iielaiy TiindStaff Papei s Maich 1986 
Sec Khan, S Mohsin and Miiakhoi Abbas (ed ) 'Iheoielical Studies in Islanin Hankin<j; and 
/ inance . The Institute loi Rcseaich n Islamic Studies. 1987, pp 245 
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instabilities sliow up in boom and bust economies as in the financial crisis in 
East Asia and its worldwide repercussions, cutting global output by an 
estimated $ 2 trillion in 1998-2000. When the profit motives of market players 
get out of hand, they challenge people's ethics and sacrifice respect for Justice 
and human rights".'"' 
For Islamic economists profit-sharing finance synchronizes payment 
obligations of firms with its revenue accruals, thus removing a great source of 
instability in the system. On the other, interest based finance subjects the firm 
to a rigid schedule in which the amounts due for payment as well as the dates 
payment is due does not take the current project status into account. This may 
oblige the firm either to borrow (usually at a higher interest rate) or to sell its 
products at a lower than expected price in order to meet its contractual payment 
obligations. The third alternative is default which sends shock waves through 
the system.'"' 
The IMF has also put its weight in favor of equity financing by arguing 
that "Foreign Direct Investment, in contrast to debt creating inflows, is often 
regarded as providing a safer and more stable way to finance development 
because it refers to ownership and control of plant, equipment and 
infrastructure and therefore funds the growth creating capacity of an cconom}'. 
whereas short term foreign borrowing is more likely to be used to fmancc 
consumption. Further more in event of a crisis, while investors can divest 
themselves of domestic securities and bank can refuse to roll over loans, 
owners of physical capital cannot find buyers so easily".'""* 
Islamic economists quoting Western scholars argue that interest is one 
of the most destabilizing factor in the economy. Milton Friedman has 
considered erratic behavior in interest as one of the most disturbing phenomena 
T h e Uni ted Na t ions D e v e l o p m e n t P r o g r a m m e . Human Deveiopmen/ Report 1999. New Delhi . 
O x l b r d Univers i ty Press 1999, p.2 
S iddiq i , M.N. , Paper Presented at La Riba annual meet at Los Ange les . C A . on 30 M a r c h 2002 . See 
w w w . s i d d i q i . c o m / m n 
IMF. "WorldEconomic Out Look", May 1998, p. 82. 
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while Mr. lacocoa, the chairmen of the Chrysler Corporation, observes thai 
interest rates have been so volatile that no one can plan for the lutiire."' In fael 
the erratic behavior in interest rates has largely been responsible lor crralic 
movement of financial resources between the savers and the users which has 
brought a high level of instability in the financial market. According to Chapra. 
"The high degree of interest rate volatility has injected great uncertainty into 
the investment market which has had the effect of driving borrowers and 
lenders alike from the longer end of the debt market into the shorter end, thus 
fundamentally altering the investment decisions of businessmen".'^ 
In contrast to this the equity based Islamic financial system is not prone 
to such vulnerability as the resultant profit is based on the actual outcome of 
the business. This is also more equitable in the sense that no participants of an 
economic activity are ensured of any fixed return in advance of the business 
result. Several of the Western economists too have endorsed the view that 
equity based system is more stable as compared to the interest based and 
blamed interest for their economic woes.'^ As Sundarrajan and Luca have 
pointed out in their very recent study that owing to the structure of their 
balance sheet and the use of profit and loss arrangements, Islamic banks are 
better poised than conventional banks to absorb external shocks. Solvency risks 
are typically lower in Islamic banks than in conventional banks. 
Bolh quoted by Chapra . M. Umcr, 'Towards a Just Monetary System'. The Islamic l-'oundation. 
Leicester. 1985, p. 117. 
" Chapra , M. Umer, 'Towards a Just Monetaty System', The Islamic Foundation. Leicester . 1995. p. 
117. 
For more detail please see, Henry, Simons, 'Economic Policy for a Free Society. Chicago. tJniversii\ 
of Chicago Press, 1948, p. 320. And also see, Hymen, Minsky, 'John Maynard Keynes'. Columbia 
Universi ty Press. 
" Sundarrajan, V. and Luca Errico, ' i s lamic Financial Institutions and Products in the (l lobal Tinancial 
System: Key Issues in Risk Management and Challenges Ahead", IMF Working Paper. WP/()2/192. 
Washington DC, September 2002. p. 25. 
('iKiplCI I l\L' I l^i? 
The Justice 
As mentioned earlier that conventional banks lend money to earn 
interest while Islamic banks provide finance to share profit. This fundamental 
difference leads to many other important differences between the functioning 
of the both. 
Interest of the conventional banks lie in ensuring that the loan is paid 
back together with interest. Naturally the conventional banks, therefore, are not 
much interested in the kind of economic activity, or the profitability of the 
projects financed or any other moral concern, for which the loan is sought. 
Thus, the conventional bank grants higher preference to the credit 
worthiness of the borrowers than the viability of the project to be financed or 
the ability or the idea of the entrepreneur. Islamic economists argue that this 
method of financing is the primary cause of miss allocation of the economy's 
resources. 
Efficient entrepreneurs who are unable to provide collaterals are fail to 
get credit at the cost of relatively rich entrepreneurs who are granted credit. 
Since those who are granted credit have to pay a fixed interest irrespective of 
the actual out come of the project. Since there is no monitoring of the funds 
available to the entrepreneurs there are very likely chances that, to ensure their 
own profit plus the cost to be paid to the bank, many a times entrepreneurs 
would try to adopt various methods that are actually not in conformity with the 
societal objectives and lead to various speculative and other harmful activities. 
Professor Siddiqi in his recent address at the Harvard has rightly pointed out, 
"At the top of the list is the opportunity the current {Conventumul) system 
provides for money to be exchanged for more money, making the moneyed 
richer. Next in importance is the immense scope for gambling-like speculation 
provided by the huge volumes of debt-based securities in a system that permits 
sales on margin, short selling and other exotic money games. Last but not the 
least is the philosophy that regards profit maximization as the only Icgitimalc 
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concern of the investment managers to the neglect of all the other ingredients 
of human weal."^" 
Various researches have shown that even if the funds are used in proper 
economic activities, the cost of the items produced has risen significantly. This 
has had harmful effects on the consumers of those produced item as well on the 
employment in that sector due to predetermined high cost of the capital. Many 
a time it is observed that the increased cost of product is borne by the poor and 
it is again the poor who is to suffer if the increasing costs lead to low demand 
resulting in lower production and employment. Interest based financing by the 
conventional banks and the production result in two other side effects that leads 
to high instability in the economy. 
• Firstly, under this method of finance only those who are rich enough gel 
finance and so the profit, thereby rich getting richer. In the long run this 
result in transfer of funds from poor to the rich. 
« Secondly, since most of the industrial activities are financed through 
banks, the costs of industrial products, therefore, perpetually become 
higher as compared to the production of other sectors of the economy 
like agriculture. This also leads in transferring of funds from non-
industrialist to the industrialist sector. And thereby making one sector of 
the economy richer at the cost of other. 
The Growth 
Islamic bank, which has to share the profit, due to Islamic prohibition of 
ex ante price of the capital, is always more interested in the beauty and viability 
of the project as compared to the face or wealth of the borrowers. Islamic bank 
is naturally more concerned about the entrepreneurial capabilities, honesty, and 
truth fullness of the borrowers. Islamic bank will provide capital to those who 
"" Siddiqi, Mohammad Nejatul lah. 'Comparative Advantages of Islamic Banking and Finance'. 
Prcscnled at the Fifth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Financc. 6 April 2002. 
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are known for their entrepreneurial capabilities rather than those who aic 
lamous for the assets of their fathers, hibuilt monitoring coupled with olhci 
Islamic prohibitions like speculation, gamble and other kinds of irauds 
(Gharar) and cheating ensure that the funds of Islamic banks are utilized for 
the overall benefit of the community. Unlike the conventional banks where 
absence of monitoring may leads to private profit but at the social cost. 
Under Islamic system of banking projects with low expected proilt may 
also be undertaken as there is no ex ante cost involved to the capital. This will 
enhance the entrepreneurial capabilities of the society as a whole and led to 
overall growth of the economy unlike the commercial way of financing, which 
helps in producing a class of elites out of the funds of the masses. Islamic 
economists affirm that the projects that are chosen for their viability will 
naturally be more growth oriented than those that are chosen because they are 
propose by rich borrowers. 
Justifying the rationale of Islamic banking. Professor Khurshid notes, 
"The central issue is that the contemporary financial system is exploitative, 
unjust, discriminatory, unstable and crises generating. There is no denying the 
fact some positive contributions that have been made by the banking and 
financial system towards the promotion of economics development and global 
capjtalism. But when a balance sheet of achievements and failures is made, its 
failures outweigh and outnumber".-' He further says that in Islamic system of 
banking money does not beget money rather used as a facilitator for the greater 
production of goods and services, resulting not merely in increasing the number 
of billionaires but producing real well-being for the people. 
In Islamic finance money is no more than a servant and used no more 
than a medium and measure, on the other in conventional finance money itseli' 
becomes a commodity and object. Thus the historical role of money an 
intermediary for exchange (commodity-money-commodity, C-M-C) gets 
Ahiiuid. Khui ih id . "Islamic I'liiiiiicc and Biinking- Ihc Chiillciigcs and IVo.spccls". AVivcn «/ Z^/t/m/c 
Li oiioiii/ci, No. 9.2000. p 65. 
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transformed into money-commodity-money (M-C-M) and uilimaleiy ends up 
into M-M-M. According to Professor Kiiurshid derivatives trade al the rale of 
1.2 trillion a day is almost 50 times more than the daily physical international 
trade in goods and services. The balloon of the financial economy is expanding 
at an alarming pace via speculation, while the real economy is only crawling." 
For Islamic economists the real economic progress and development consist in 
the expansion of the physical and human aggregates of the economy via the 
creation of assets, products and services, and not merely in the form ol~ 
fiduciary expansion.^^ 
Convergence of Islamic and Conventional Banks 
Several of the scholars, however, are of the view that the comparative 
advantage of conventional western banks over Islamic banks in terms ol" ihcir 
systems, management experience, and techniques of product innovations are 
expected to bring competition, resulting in the sharpening of icchniquc.s ;md 
procedures of Islamic banking modes. In the process, profitability rather than 
profit constraints is gaining dominance in Islamic banks" operations. The 
western conventional banks that have Islamic windows lack an understanding 
of the ethical and moral foundation of Islamic finance. The Islamic banks in the 
corporate sector are running the risk of being submerged^'* in the wave of 
market economy and marginalizing the social and ethical elements of Islamic 
finance.'^ While this point of convergence may bring efficiency to their 
operations, it is expected to bring following dilemmas for Islamic banks in the 
corporate sector: 
-- Ibid. p. 68. 
" ibid, p. 61. 
See. Vogel, E. Frank and Hayes, L. Samuel 111, ' I s lamic Law and Finance; Religion. Ri.sk. and 
Return ' . Kluwer Law International. The Hague. 1998, p. 292. 
Mannan, M.A., ' N e w Frontiers oi" Islamic Banking in the 21" Century with Special rerercncc to 
Inibrmal and Voluntary Sector Banking ' , Second Harvard Univer.sity Forum on Islamic Finance. 
Islamic Finance into the 21" Cenliiry, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachuset ts . October 1998. 
pp. 275-289. 
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1. An increasing concentration of ownership and beneficiaries of Islamic 
banking and finance having hnks to the global elite and its network of 
reciprocal obligations; 
2. The crucial neglect of the vast masses of people in Muslim countries 
incapable of entering the market; 
3. An increasing trend toward the secularization of Islamic economics, 
banking, and finance; 
4. The marginalization of the social, ethical, and moral ingredient of 
Islamic modes of financing; and 
5. A developing barrier to the growth of perpetual social capital, which 
expresses the shared values of a society, reinforces them, and stimulates 
the growth oi'the caring society.^'' 
Several attempts are being made to highlight the differences and 
similarities between Islamic and conventional banking. A brief review of those 
attempts is given in the following section. 
Similarities Between Islamic and Conventional Banks 
There are many similarities between Islamic and conventional financc. 
since both deal with a common set of operating business realities. In most 
cases, Islamic and conventional finance simply travel different paths toward the 
same goal. For example; most business need long term financing, in 
conventional finance, this is accomplished through some mix of long term debt 
and owners' capital. In the Islamic finance, passive partners contract for a 
certain share going to the entrepreneurs who manage the business. 
Another operational similarity between Islamic and conventional 
banking is their common requirements for inventory financing. An Islamic 
business in need of short term inventory financing can purchase the inventory 
on credit that credit being supplied either by the inventoiy supplier or a bank. 
Ibid. 
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Many businesses find it necessary to supply credit to their customers 
through accounts receivable. An Islamic business can do this but is not 
pennitted - as in conventional finance- to refinance by pledging or selling 
those receivables because they are not real assets.-'' 
Few Western scholars think that Islamic banking is more like mutual 
fund institutions or like venture capital funds. For example, Sundarrajan and 
Errico of IMF point out that Islamic banks show an operational similarity with 
conventional investment companies, including mutual funds owing to the fact 
that they do not guarantee either capital value of or the return on investment 
deposits and that they basically pool depositors' funds to provide depositors 
with professional investment management.^^ 
Warren Edwardes, a venture capitalist, observes about Islamic finance in 
these words, "What I, as a non-Islamic observer would call "pure" Islamic 
banking, seems to be structurally very similar to venture capital finance, non-
recourse project finance or ordinary equity investment. The investor takes a 
share in the profits, if any, of the venture and is liable to lose his capital. It 
involves investing but not lending and therefore on a systemic basis is similar 
to the German, Japanese and Spanish banking systems rather than the British or 
American systems".^'^ 
Some other major similarities between the Islamic and conventional 
banks are given below; 
1) Both are governed by the general rules of the regulatory authority 
covering establishment, control and general operations. 
2) Both the system operate within the context of professional efficiency, 
cost effectiveness and cost / benefits. 
Vogel . E. Frank and Hayes. L. Samuel III, "Islamic Law and Financc: Religion. Risk, and Reliirn". 
Kluwcr Law International, The Hague, 1998, p. 3. 
Sundarra jan, V. and Luca Errico, ' I s lamic Financial Institutions and Products in the Global Financial 
System: Key Issues in Risk Management and Challenges Ahead ' . IMF i4''orking Paper. W P / 0 2 / r ) 2 . 
Washington DC, September 2002. p. 25. 
ht tp: / /www.plannedsavings.com/index.html. 4 A p r i l 2000. 
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3) Both are directed towards useful employment of resources ibr the 
society. 
4) Both are usually established as shareholding companies. '" 
Differences Between Islamic and Conventional Banks 
As mentioned earlier Islamic and conventional banking are totally at 
different footings. One treats its depositor like equity holders and therefore 
provides no guarantee of even the principal amount, while the other treats its 
deposits like safekeeping. It not only guarantees deposits but also some returns. 
There are some big differences in both the systems both at the macro as well as 
micro levels. These differences are in approach, in concepts, and in the 
resulting behavior. The first and foremost difference that lie between Islamic 
and conventional banking begins with the prohibition of interest (riha) that 
basically emanates from the Islamic Shariah which controls and guide the 
Islamic banks in all its operations while there is no such religious prescription 
for conventional banks. Conventional banks are free to choose any business 
and activity they like unless they are contravening the regulatory guidelines of 
the country in which they are functioning. Conventional banks, in this regard, 
have a free ride unlike Islamic banks which are twice regulated. First, under the 
regulatory supervision of the country where they are functioning and secondly 
under the Shariah guidelines. Some times for Islamic banks later {Shariah) 
becomes more important than the former in the sense that Shariah guidelines 
are not bounded by time and space. Regulatory guidelines on the other is 
relatively easy to follow which very often may differ from county to country 
and time to time. Some times large conventional banks succeed in not allowing 
the regulatory authority to bring a change that is not liked by the conventional 
banks or goes against the interest of the promoters of the banks. This is never 
possible in case of Shariah guidelines controlling Islamic banks. 
Tamini , al- Younes, Practical Requirements Ibr Establishing an Islamic Bank", in M. l a h i m Klian 
( E d . ) . Islamic Financial hislihilions, IRTl / lDB, .leddah. Saudi Arabia. 1995. p.47. 
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Some other differences between both the banking systems stem from the 
nature of their operation. For example, Islamic banks by default are laced with 
more risks as compared to their counterpart. Though, Islamic banks just like 
conventional one analyze their r i s k s . H o w e v e r , Islamic banks are faced with 
more risk as they are more exposed to business and trade as compared to the 
conventional banks. Fuad and Abdel Haq summarize the potential risks of the 
Islamic banks in the following table. (5.1) 
As can be seen in the following table that Islamic banks are 
comparatively at high risk than their conventional counterparts. For example, 
credit, maturity mismatch, and liquidity risks in Islamic banking are high as 
compared to these risks in conventional banks. Islamic banks are not faced with 
interest risk instead they are more exposed to trade and investment risk which 
is not confronted by conventional banks at all. 
Table No. 5.1 
Risk Faced by Islamic and Conventional Banks 
Types of Risk Conventional Banks Islamic Banks 
Credit risk A A (High) 
Maturity Mismatch A A (High) 
Currency Risk A A 
Interest rate Risk A NA 
Risk of Trade and Investment 
Transaction 
NA A 
Liquidity Risk A A (High) 
Source Omar, a! Fuad and Abdel Haq. op oil p 105 
Another notable difference between Islamic and conventional banking 
and finance lie in the focus on financial accounting and information. The 
" Cicdi t risk, capital adequacy, liabilities and assets matching risks, currenc) nuctudtion and liquKlit_\ 
1 isk ctc. 
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conventional banks put more emphasis on interest rate spread, provision oi" 
loan portfolios and maturities of the liabihties, while in Islamic banks the 
emphasis is more on assets allocation and return from investment and trade.' ' 
Some other mentionable differences between Islamic and conventional banks 
are as follows: 
1) Islamic banks would concentrate more on public welfare as compared to 
the conventional banks.^^ 
2) Islamic banks are more like universal and multi purpose as compared to 
the conventional banks.^"* 
3) Islamic banks would have to make more careful evaluation ol" 
applications for equity oriented financing. As they are naturally more 
exposed to risks. 
4) Profit and loss sharing tends to foster closer relations between Islamic 
banks and the entrepreneurs. This opportunity is not available to 
conventional banks. 
5) In case of emergency access to money market is not an option Ibr 
Islamic banks.^ ""* 
6) Islamic banks have different moral basis, i.e. Jurisprudence (Shariah). 
1) Islamic banks are universal "Comprehensive" whereas in conventional 
framework there are commercial investments, merchant or specialized 
banks. 
8) Structures of Assets and liabilities i.e. sources and uses of fund are 
different and consequently the earnings and expenditure structures ar<2 
different. 
Omar , al- Fuad and Haq, A. Mohammad , 'Islamic Banking: Theory, Practice ami Challenges'. 
Oxford University press, Karacini, Pakistan. 1996, p. 105. 
" For details see. Chapra M. U., "Towards a Just Monetary System'. The Islamic Foundalioii . 
Leicester . 1985. 
See. Al-.larhi. M. Aii, "A Comparison ol 'Transact ions in Conventional and Islamic 1-xonomics ' . op. 
cit. 
Chapra , M. U., 'Towards a Just Monetaiy System'. The Islamic Foundation. Leicester. UK. 1995. p. 
155-56 
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9) Because of Shariah guidelines relationship of Islamic banks with 
regulatory authority is totally diflcrciit. 
10)Target customers are partly different.^'' 
Table No. 5. 2 
Synoptic Comparison Between Islamic and Conventional Banking 
Features Islamic Banking Conventional 
Banking 
Guarantee of the Capital 
Demand Deposits 
Investment Deposits 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Rate of Return on Deposits 
Uncertain, not guaranteed 
for investment Deposits. 
Demand Deposits are 
never remunerated 
Certain and 
guaranteed 
Mechanism to regulate final 
returns on deposits 
Depending on bank 
performance/profit from 
investment 
Irrespective of bank 
performance/profit 
from investment 
Profit and Loss principle applies Yes No 
Use of Islamic modes of 
financing: 
PLS and non PLS modes 
Yes Non Applicable 
Use of Discretion by banks with 
regard to collateral 
Generally not allowed to 
reduce credit risk in PLS 
modes. By way of 
exception, may be allowed 
to lessen moral hazard in 
PLS modes. 
Allowed in non-PLS 
modes. 
Yes Always 
Sundarrajan, V and Luca Ernco, 'Islamic Financial Insliltilions and Prodiicls in the Global I inane lal 
System Key Issues in Risk Management and Challenges Ahead', op cit p 24 
' T a m i n i , a l - Younes, 'Practical Requirements for Establishing an Islamic Bank', o p c i t . p 4 7 - 4 8 
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Sundarrajan and Errico, two IMF researchers, have given a synoptic 
comparison of Islamic and conventional banking (Table 5.2). They state thai 
there is a fundamental conceptual difference between the two which lies in the 
fact that investment companies {conventional) sell their capital to the public, 
while Islamic banks accept deposits from the public"." 
As Sundarrajan and Errico illustrate that the only similarity between 
both the banking system is the guarantee of the capital put under demand 
deposit. For investment deposit Islamic banking provides no guarantee of the 
principal while conventional banking provides guarantee of the capital as well 
as some returns. It is the case with return on deposits. Under Islamic banking, 
according to authors, it is uncertain and not guaranteed for investment deposits 
while in conventional banks this is certain and guaranteed. 
Final returns to deposit in Islamic banking depends upon bank's 
performance and profit from investments. While in conventional banking the 
final returns on deposits are irrespective of bank's performance and profit from 
investments. Another important difference between both the systems lies in 
their requirements for collaterals. For Islamic banks, according to author, it is 
generally not allowed except in rare cases to lessen the moral hazard. On the 
other hand, in conventional banking it is always required. 
Comparative Analysis of the Financial Statements of Islamic 
and Conventional Banks 
Islamic and conventional banks assigned certain risk-associated weights 
to both side of their balance sheet. (Assets and Liabilities). Following table 5 2 
Simdana ian , V and l.uca E m c o , 'Islanuc Financial Instilulions and Piodutls in llw Cilobal 
/•inancial System Key Issues m Risk hdanagemen! and Challenges Ahead', op cit p 25 (l.mphasn 
added) 
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gives a comparative pickire of bolh Ihe banking systems I he llnanci.il 
statement of bank represents in numerical form its assets and liabilities 
Table No. 5.3 
C o m p o n e n t s of f inancial s ta tements and their respect ive w e i g h t in 
Islamic and convent ional banking (%) 
Islamic Banks Respective 
weights 
Conventional Banks Respective 
weights 
Assets Assets 
Liquid Assets 25 Liquid Assets 21 
Receivables 
Murabahah and others 
35 Investments and Deposits " " 23 ^ 
Investment 24 Loans 52 
Fixed and other Assets 16 Fixed and other Assets 4 
Liabilities and Equities Liabilities and Equities 
Current and investment Accounts 78 Deposits 90 
Deposits 14 
Other liabilities 2 Borrowing Other liabilities 0 5 
Depositors share of profit 2 
Shareholder's equity 4 Shareholder's equity 9 
Source Fuadand Abde! Haq op cil p 107 
It can be seen from the table (5.3) that on assets side Islamic banks give 
most weight (35%) to receivables. Second in order for Islamic bank is liquid 
assets (25%) followed by investments (24%)). On the other hand conventional 
banks, on their assets side give maximum weight to loans (52%)). Even 
investment weight for Islamic and conventional banks is almost same {24% & 
23%) respectively).^® Conventional banks give less weight to liquidity and fixed 
assets as compared to Islamic banks. 
Omai, al- Fuad and Haq, A Mohammad, 'hianuc Banking Theoiy, Piaclice and Challenges' 
0 \ l o i d Univeisity press, Kaiachi, Pakistan, 1996, p 105 
''' I his shows heavy reliance of Islamic banks on non-inveslment modes ol linantc, ihcsc aspccts aic 
discussed in chaptei six in detail 
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On the liability and equity side, Islamic banks give most weightage to 
their current and investment accounts (78%) followed by 14% and 4% for 
deposits and shareholders' equity respectively. Conventional banks on the other 
give most weight to their deposits 90% followed by 9 %> to shareholders' 
equity. 
Islamic and Conventional Banks: An empirical comparative 
study 
Munawar Iqbal, the Chief of IDB/IRTI research division, has conducted 
a comparative study of 12 conventional banks vis-a-vis Islamic banks to 
evaluate their performance. These banks are selected Irom the same country 
where from Islamic banks are. Size of the selected banks from both the 
category is also the same. Results found are summarized in the following tables 
(5.3 & 5.4). 
T a b l e N o . 5 .4 
C o m p a r a t i v e a n n u a l G r o w t h R a t e s (%) of I s l a m i c a n d C o n v e n t i o n a l 
B a n k s in t h e 1 9 9 0 s 
Year 
Total Equity Total Deposits 
Total 
Investments 
Total Assets 
Islamic 
Banks 
Comm 
Banks 
Islamic 
Banks 
Comm 
Banks 
Islamic 
Banks 
Comm 
Banks 
Islamic 
Banks 
Comm 
Banks 
1990-94 7.9 6.4 9.3 3.1 11.3 -0.8 9.3 4.8 
1994-97 10.5 4.7 6.1 7.2 7.3 9.1 6.8 6.6 
190-97 9.0 5.6 7.9 4.8 9.6 3.3 8.2 5.6 
Source, Iqbal h4iwawai\ 'Islamic and Conventional Banking in the Nineties A comparatn e 
Study'. Islamic Economic Studies, Vol, 8 No 2, April 200!, IRTI/fDB, Jeddah, p 20 
It can be noted from the table that Islamic banks have performed better 
than their counterpart conventional banks. The rate of growth of total equity foi" 
Islamic banks during 1990-97 was substantially higher 9.0 percent as compared 
to the conventional bank, which was 5.6 percent during the same period. 
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Though conventional banks achieved higher growth (7.2 percent) in deposit 
during 1994-97 as compared to the Islamic banks (6.1 percent). However, the 
gap was not only covered up but Islamic banks registered higher growth in 
deposits as well if one compares the data from the period 1990-97. As for the 
total investments are concerned Islamic banks during 1994-97 registered low 
growth (7.3) as compared to conventional banks (9.1). However, on an 
aggregate level, during 1990-1997, the former outperformed conventional bank 
in this sphere also. And almost similar is the scenario for growth in total assets 
for Islamic as well as conventional banking, where Islamic banks have 
maintained their lead by a fair margin except during 1994-97. 
As for the ratios are concerned here too Islamic banks seem to have 
performed better as compared to the conventional banks. However, we shall 
begin our analysis only after defining these ratios. 
The Capital Asset Ratio: This is one of the most imporiant ratios to 
measure the health of any financial concern. Higher capital/asset ratio shows 
better health of the financial concern. Almost all the regulatory authorities of 
the world prescribe certain minimum capital asset ratio for a financial concern. 
However, some times the definition of capital differs from region to region. In 
this present analysis the author has taken capital as the sum of paid up capital, 
reserves and undistributed profits. 
The Liquidity Ratio: This ratio measures the ability of a firm ti) meet its 
current liabilifies and is calculated as following; 
Liquidity Ratio = Cash and Accounts with Banks/ Total Deposits 
Deployment Ratio: This is another aspect of performance evaluaiion. In 
the present analysis it is further subdivided as Deployment Ratio 1 & 2. 
Deployment Ratio 1 = Total Investment/ Total Equity + Total Deposits 
Deployment Ratio 2 == Total Investment/ Total Liabilities. 
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Iqbal in his study found that the Capital Asset Ratio (CAR) for Islamic 
banks, during 1990-97, was higher 9.6% as compared to conventional banks 
9.0% during the same period. 
While the Liquidity Ratio (LR) for Islamic bank 18.5%) was found much 
lower than their counterpart conventional banks 31.9%. Iqbal in this regard 
emphasizes that his findings rejccl the hypothesis that Islamic banks arc facing 
excess liquidity problem. (See, chapter six, Problem of Islamic Banking) 
As far the Deployment Ratios (DR) are concerned. Iqbal Ibiind that 
Islamic banks (93.7 & 82.0) have used their funds better as compared to the 
conventional banks (73.7 & 68.9). Iqbal, further, mentions that in terms of cost 
effectiveness also Islamic banks as a group have performed much better than 
the conventional banks. 
T a b l e N o . 5 .5 
C o m p a r a t i v e R a t i o s (%) of I s lamic a n d C o n v e n t i o n a l B a n k s 
R a t i o 
Islamic Banks and Conventional Banks (1990-1997) 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Capital Assets Ratio 96 90 
Liquidity Ratio 1 8 5 31 9 
Deployment Ratio 1 93.7 73 7 
Deployment Ratio 2 82.0 68 9 
Source, Iqbal Munawar, 'l.slamic and Convenlional Banking in the Ninclics I coiiipaialnc 
Sfuc/y', op cU p 22 
In conclusion Iqbal writes that Islamic banks have done fairly well as 
compared to the conventional banks during the period of study. In his own 
words, "Islamic banks as a group out performed (conventional banks) in almost 
all areas and in almost all years".'*" Moreover, according to him, several of the 
iqbal Munawar, 'Islamic and Conventional Baniving ni tlie Nineties: A compaia t i \ e S tud ) ' . hlcimiL 
Economic Studies, Vol, 8 No. 2. April 2001. IR'WIDB. Jeddah, p. 25 
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common perceptions like excess liquidity in Islamic banks have been found 
untenable in this s tudy/ ' 
The above analysis, though, projects a good picture of Islamic banks in 
comparison to the conventional banks. Few doubts can be raised about the 
study which includes the author's choice of using secondary data in case of 
conventional banks'^^ especially when these data are more easily available as 
compared to the Islamic banks. Another shortcoming, which limits the scope of 
present study, is the choice of country. Three countries, which are highly 
acclaimed for their efforts in Islamizing the economy, did not get a place in 
Iqbal's sample. On the other some of the Middle Eastern countries, which have 
few of the largest Islamic banks, were over represented in the sample. 
One of the most striking points of this study is that its findings are 
almost in contradiction to a similar study conducted"^^ by Fuad and Abdel Haq 
who had made a comparative analysis of three banks in Kuwait and came to 
conclude that Islamic banks are under capitalized and Islamic banks are faced 
with huge excess liquidity problems, almost double of their counterpart."^"* 
Iqbal's study is important in respect that it has covered more banks as 
compared to the earlier studies and also the time span under analysis is larger 
as compared to the study done by Fuad and Abdel Haq. 
As the age of Islamic banks grow one only hopes that many moi-e 
studies would come to make the people aware about the strengths and 
weaknesses of both the systems. These studies will also enhance (he 
competitiveness and performance of both the banking systems. 
Ibid, 
Ibid., p. 2. 
• " T h i s study was conductcd in 1993, which is also the period of study for Iqbal who luid covcrcd 1990-
97. This study, however, covered only three banks, two conventional and one Islamic. 
Omar , al- Fuad and Haq, A. Mohammad , •Islamic Banking Theory, Praclice and Cluilkngi's'. 
O.xford University press, Karachi, Pakistan. 1996, p. 105-6. 
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One more comparative analysis jointly conducted by Munawar Iqbal, 
Ausaf Ahmad and Tariqullah Khan has compared the key financial indicators 
of the top ten banks of several groups table (5.5). 
One can easily deduce form the above table that the peribrmance of 
Islamic banks in comparison to few of the topmost conventional banks is much 
better on all fronts i.e. capital assets ratio which for the topmost ten banks of 
the world was 4.8 as against 9.7 for the Islamic banks. The same ratio ibr top 
ten Asian and Middle Eastern bank was 4.2 and 7.6 respectively. As (or the 
profit on capital is concerned here too the Islamic banks have performed better 
than their fellow conventional banks. The figure for profit on capital for 
Islamic banks was 21.8 as against the 16.1 for top ten of the world, 17.2 for the 
top ten of Asia and 16.3 for the top ten of Middle East. The Assets of Islamic 
banks are more profitable i.e. 1.4% as against the Assets of other conventional 
banks like top ten of the world 0.9%, tope ten of Asia 1.1%, and top ten oi" 
Middle East 1.5%. 
Table No. 5.6 
Key Financial Indicators: Islamic Banks vis-a-vis Conventional Banks 
(1996, figures are in percentage) 
Indicator 
Top 10 of the 
World 
Top 10 of the 
Asia 
Top 10 of the 
Middle Eastern 
Countries 
Top 10 
Islamic 
Banks 
Capital Asset Ratio 4.8 4.2 7.6 9.7 
Profit on Capital 16.1 17.2 16.3 21.8 
Profit on Assets 0.9 1.1 1.5 1.4 
Source: Iqbal, Munawar, el al, 'Challenges Facing Islamic Banking', IRTI/IDB Occasional Paper No 
2, 1998, p.
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Conclusion 
In the present chapter a comparative analysis of both the system is 
presented. An attempt has been made to analyze both the banking systems 
under efficiency, stability, growth and justice criteria. Some important 
differences, similarities and converging points of both the systems are also 
described. In the study it has been found that the first and foremost differences 
between the Islamic and conventional form of banking is the prohibition of 
interest in Islamic form of banking. Actually the basic idea behind Islamic 
banking is the prohibition of interest, which led the Islamic economists to 
search for a different banking model. The alternate searched by the Islamic 
economists lay in participatory principle, which eventually became the 
founding principle of Islamic banking. Hence the principal differences between 
Islamic banks and conventional banks arises from the fact that the Islamic 
banks are based upon participation principles where depositors cannot be sure 
of their principal amount while conventional banlcs' deposits are protected 
through explicit or implicit guarantee of the government. 
However, as widely perceived this is not the only between Islamic and 
the conventional form of banking. There are many other subtle differences 
between Islamic and conventional banking ranging from their philosophical 
background, worldview, objectives to their operations. Islamic banks are totally 
on different footings as compared to the conventional banks in spite of the fact 
that both are engaged in financial intermediation and also are working in the 
same kind of legal, operational, and economic environment. As Islamic 
banking matures it is expected that the differences will further increase. 
Professor Khurshid, in this regard highlights that "In the Western banking 
system, because of collateral, the banker moves only when he smells prospects 
of bankruptcy. In an Islamic system, as the bank is also an investor it remains 
an active participant throughout. As such, the bank is concerned with and 
responds to early warning signals if things start going wrong. In this way 
mistakes can be set right before the rot goes too far. Further more the system is 
Ciniplci I i\c I 17-
more stable and transparent. In such a system there is an automatic 
adjustments of real assets and their financial counterparts. In the conventional 
banking system there is no such mechanism for adjustment. It is, therefore, 
hoped that banking that operates on Islamic principles will ensure growth with 
financial stability, equity and distributive justice. It can be sustainable both 
horizontally, that is at a particular time, and vertically, deep into the future. The 
ecological dimensions and the needs of the future generations would equally be 
taken care o f 
Professor Samuel on the other points out, "there are important 
differences, even if they might not be obvious to some Western observers 
Islamic Finance has to be rational and reasonable to Muslims, and as long as 
that is the case, it does not matter if some academic has done a study of the 
Murabahah contract and concluded that it is a carbon copy of short term bank 
lending in the western sense. The subtle differences are meaningful to 
Muslims".'^ 
The focus of the present chapter has been to put both the banking 
systems face to face. In the coming chapter, however, we would specifically 
focus on the problems faced by Islamic banking in their operations. 
* * * * 
Ahmad . Khurshid, 'Islamic Finance and Banking The Challenges and I'nnpecis'. op o i l . p 75 
Samuel L. Hayes, 111, "Foreword". Fouith Harvaid University Forum on Islamic 1 mancc. hlaiiiK 
hi nance The Task Ahead. Cambi idge, October 2002. p. \ v i 
CHAPTER-6 
PROBLEMS OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
Introduction 
In its short history, persons involved in this field have studied the 
experiences of Islamic banks. In this chapter, the main focus would be on the 
problems and obstacles that Islamic banks are facing in various ways; the 
ideological, theoretical as well as the practical. These difficulties mainly stem 
from the circumstances created by their existence in places and regions where 
they operate in an economic, legal, administrative, cultural and social 
atmosphere of hostile or indifferent regimes.' There are number of researches 
which show that Islamic banks are faced with problems such as environmental, 
conceptual, legal, institutional, and others depending upon country-to-counlry 
and place-to-pJace. Islamic banks are operating in various countries with 
different social, religious, and other heterogeneous conditions. Some times in 
the same country different governments can pose different set of challenges for 
Islamic banks. 
Islamic banking is not only engaged in trade financing as presumed but 
in many of the Muslim countries they offer most of the services of a 
conventional banlc like savings account, current account, special deposit 
account and money transfer through drafts, cheques, letters of credit and 
guarantee etc. apart from offering financial instruments ranging from interest 
free loans, venture capital, leasing and joint ventures to partnerships all under 
Shariah principle. However, it is stressed that it needs to develop a more 
professional organizational network and a wider client base. One of the earliest 
propounder of Islamic banking Dr. Ahmad Al-Najjar, some twenty years ago. 
' Ahmad . Ausaf , DevelopmenI and Problems of Islamic Banks, .leddah, Saudi Arabia. )KTI/ID)5. 19X7. 
also by the same author, •Contemporary Experiences of Islamic Banks: A Survey", .lournal ol Obiect ivc 
Studies, N e w Delhi, Vol. 4. No. 1, .luly 1992. pp.66-107. 
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mentioned major problems confronting Islamic banking, many of them arc slill 
valid.^ 
• Islamic banks perform their duties in economic administrative, legal, 
cultural and social situation where non-Islamic features prevail in one 
form or the other. 
• Islamic banks follow a system, a philosophy and practice that do not 
meet with nor parallel to the system and practice of hundreds of other 
banks neighboring them and living with them in the same community. 
• The legal problems, laws of countries where Islamic banks operate 
require that banking should not be subject to any risks. These laws 
stipulate certain restrictions which do not conform to Shariah. 
• There are some juridical issues where opinions diverge and unanimity is 
difficult to obtain, there is little coordination among Islamic banks in 
this respect. 
• There is problem of seeking fast investment of liquid cash where 
available and the prompt arrangement when needed, as the work of 
Islamic bank is based on investment through partnership and requires a 
certain period of time for the study of the project to be financed. 
Some significant problems, mentioned by various scholars are 
summarized by Fuad and Abdel Haq in their book Islamic Banking: Theory, 
Practice & Challenges. To them these problems are basically arisen because of 
Islamic finance being a new discipline.^ 
• It has certain boundaries and lacks the conceptual and analytical 
sophistication of conventional economics. 
' A h m a d Al Naj jar , 'Islamic Banks, Achievements & Problems', in papers on Islamic Banking. New 
Century Publication, London, 1984, p. 67-72. 
' O m a r . al-Fuad and Abdel Haq. Mohammed, Islamic Banking: Theory. Praclice Challenges. 
Karachi. Oxford University Press. 1996, p.22. 
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• Islamic economics has only recently come to be used as a rationale for 
determining policy objectives and implementation; consequently the 
data available for analysis are relatively limited. 
• There is shortage of scholars sufficiently qualified in the relevant 
disciplines, Islamic jurisprudence and conventional finance. 
• As a result of shortage of relevant data and qualilled personnel there is a 
retardation of the theoretical development of the discipline. 
• There has been a failure to establish modes of reasoning which will 
allow for a particular problem, the relevance of arguments from the fiqh 
or from conventional economics to be determined. 
• The lack of criteria for determining whether a whole theory of all 
possible economic relations or transactions are needed, or if Islamic 
economics could or should confine itself to particular sectors of the 
economy or to particular sort of transaction. 
A Germen economist Dr. Volker Nienhaus'' observes that Islamic banks 
are facing mainly three sets of problems. 
1. Negative image of Islamic banking in Western Countries and by and 
large hostile or at least non-supporting role of the government. 
2. Underdeveloped Islamic money market. 
3. Islamic banks as practiced have reduced to just of legal alternative to the 
conventional Banks. 
At present, in most of the Muslim countries there are some forms of 
Islamic banking or financial institutions which have been established since the 
second half of the 1970s. This development has basically taken two forms. The 
first has been an attempt to establish Islamic financial institutions side by side 
Nienhaus , Volker "Conceptual and Economic Foundations of Islamic Banking" Thotighis on 
Economics, 1994, Vol. 4, No. 3 & 4, p. 1-37. 
( haplcr Six | 1T) 
with traditional banking.' In such attempts two types of institutions have 
evolved; Islamic financial institutions and commercial banks established 
mostly in Muslim countries, and Islamic investment and holding companies 
operating in some Muslim, as well as non-Muslim countries.'' These institutions 
compete with conventional banks to attract deposits from Muslims who wish to 
avoid interest and invest their funds on Islamic principles. The majority of later 
types of institutions are established through private initiatives. However, the 
earlier form has involved an attempt to restructure the entire financial system ol' 
the economy in accordance with the Islamic percepts. 
For a comprehensive interaction of Islamic financial institutions in fully-
fledged Islamic environment, it is stressed that even if the Islamic bank is 
functioning on the national level and in a completely Islamic environment, its 
transactions with non-Islamic economy cannot be a simple closed one. To 
achieve this idea of Islamization, the Islamic banks should go hand in hand 
with an overall Islamization process. This is the only guarantee for the 
efficiency and viability of Islamic banking models.' 
Vogel and Hayes,'^ two Harvard University Professors, Iiave classified 
the government stances on Islamic banking under the following categories: 
1. Those that transformed their entire internal financial system to an 
Islamic form (Iran, Pakistan and Sudan)." 
^ Throughout this study, the word traditional banking, conventional banking and the western bankina 
will be used interchangeably and mean to express the form of banking other than those of Islaniit 
banking. The commercial banks will also express the same meaning unless speci l lcal l) mentioned 
Islamic commercia l banks. 
'' In both cases, by and large the banking operations of Islamic banks are subject to the speciHc 
regulat ions that apply to all banks. Few examples of the first category are Faisal Islamic banks in I vgypi 
and Sudan, the Dubai Islamic Bank, and the .lordan Islamic Bank. Examples of the sccond that is. 
inves tment holding companies having either a national or international character like the Dar-al Mao) 
Al-Islami (Geneva) , the Islamic Investment Company (Bangladesh), and the Bahrain Islamic 
Investment Company etc. 
' Nabi l . Nassief , 'Revival of Islamic Economics; Operational F.xpericnce of Faisal Islamic Bank of 
Bahrain", Islamic Financial Inslilulions. in Khan, M. Fahim (ed.). .leddah. IRTl/IJ)l i . Seminar 
proceedings series no. 27, 1995 p. It 2-114. 
** Vogel . Frank, E., and Samuel, L. Hayes III. "Islamic Law and Finance Religion. Risl< and Reliirn. 
London, Kluwer Law International, 1998, p. 11. 
" At tempt has been made by some countries to Islamize whole of their economy, howcxcr . the degree 
of successes of these attempts are yet to be observed. 
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2. Those that embrace Islamic banking as a national policy while 
supporting dual banking tracks (Bahrain, Brunei, Kuwait. Malaysia, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates). 
3. Those that neither support nor oppose Islamic banking within then-
jurisdiction (Egypt, Yemen, Singapore and possibly Indonesia). 
4. Those that actively discourage a separate Islamic banking presence 
(Saudi Arabia & Oman)."' 
Mahmood El-Gamal, a professor of economics at the Rice University, 
Houston, sums up the problems faced by Islamic banks in these words, "The 
recent history of Islamic economics is riddled with a number of paradoxes 
First there is a great rift between the economic literature on Islamic finance, 
and the practical approaches taken by financial experts and practitioners in the 
area. Second, despite two or more decades of rhetoric regarding the 
development of uniform standards for Islamic finance, the market remains 
largely segmented. Third, despite the many juristic questions that are being 
raised by financial experts and practitioners, very few active jurists operate in 
the area. Fourth while those jurists have approved a number of new financial 
contracts that are extensively use in the Islamic finance industry, those same 
lurist have consistently criticized the overuse of those same contracts that lhe> 
have declared to be Islamically permissible."" 
Jassar al Jassar in Islamic finance Success, Prospects and Nc^lecicil 
Areas, identified that the key weaknesses to Islamic finance are lack of 
uniform regulatory and supervisory regime; absence of consensus on legal 
Ihc Kingdom ot Saudi Aiabia is only late cntiant of the commcicia l loim ol Islamic banking I hcic 
IS no sign of Saudi governments ' opposition to the Islamie banking as a eoncept in lact the fiisl 
Islamic bank i e Islamic Development Bank was established at the Saudi soil 
" Ll-CjcUnal, A Mahmood . ' I he Lconomics ol 2 r ' Centui> Islamic lui ispi udence ' l o u i t h l l a i \ a i t l 
( . 'ni \eisi iy Foium on Islamic Tinance. Islamic I'lnance ihe Fask Ahead. Cambi idue . Ot tobe i 2002 p 
7 
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rulings; inadequate transparency; and failure to develop standardized contracts, 
short term liquidity and investment instruments.'^ 
For Ibraim Warde, Islamic finance has not yet fulfilled its original 
objective of becoming an original and innovative system based on risk sharing 
that brings social and economic benefits to the Islamic world. Islamic moral 
hazard is also mentioned by the author, which suggest that very introduction of 
religion into finance can foster unscrupulous behavior.'^ 
Divergence Between Theory and Practice 
Various studies conducted on the practices of Islamic banks have found 
a big gap between theory and practices of the Islamic banks. Almost all 
theoretical models of Islamic banking are either based on Mudarahah or 
Musharakah or both but to date actual practices of Islamic banking is far from 
these models. Nearly all Islamic banks, investment companies and investments 
funds offer trade and projects fund on markup {Murabahah, and Bui-Muajjul). 
Istisna or leasing bases. Profit and loss (PLS) features marginally in the 
practice of the Islamic banking and finance'^ Two IMF fellows while studying 
the Islamic banking practices found varying degree of shift from the paradigm. 
They concluded that Islamic banking in actual practice diverges markedly from 
its paradigm ifiqhi) version and is carried out in a variety of ways that lie 
somewhere in between the benchmark ifiqhi) case and conventional (rihawi) 
banking. According to them the degree of divergence from the benchmark 
differs from country to country and at the end of the spectrum, Islamic banking 
' " S e e . .lassar al Jassar, "Islamic finance: Success, Prospects and Neglected Areas", l-ourlh l l a iva id 
Universi ty Forum on Islamic Finance, Islamic Finance The Task Ahead, Cambr idge . Oclobcr 2002. p 
173-77. 
" Waide . Ibrahim, ' Is lamic Finance: A Quarter Century Assessment". Fourth l l a i \ a r d Umsc i s i i ) 
Forum on Islamic Finance. Islamic Finance The Task Ahead. Cambridge, Octobci 2002. p. 201 
Dar. A. Humayun, (et al), 'Size Profilabilily and Agency m Profit and Loss-Shanng m hlamit 
Banking and Finance', Proceedings of the Second Harvard University Foium on Islamic I inancc 
Islamic Finance into the 21" Century, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts . Ociobci 199X 
pp 51-62. 
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may coincide with conventional {ribawi) banking except for the terminology.' 
Following table shows the crux of their findings. 
Table No. 6.1 
Is lamic Banking in Practice: Shift in the Focus of Bank ing Superv is ion 
Issue 
Parad igm Vers ion of 
Islamic Banking 
Islamic Banking in 
Pract ice 
Robustness to absorb 
external Shocks 
Higher Lower 
1 Liquidity Risk Less Likely More Likely 
2 Insolvency Risks Less Likely More Likely 
Assessment and 
Management of Operational 
Risks 
1 Reliance on 
appropriate procedure and 
adequate infrastructure, 
2 Reliance on human 
technical expertise 
Higher 
Higher 
Lower 
Lower 
Prudential Standards 
Relevant to be assessed on 
a bank by bank and country 
by country basis 
Crucial 
Information Disclosure 
requirements 
Higher Lower 
In no Luca and Faiahhaksh Milia hiamic Banking Issues in PiiicJenlial Rcgiilalions (iml 
Siipei \ ision op cil p 210 
It is often observed that Islamic banks do not write down the vahic ol 
their deposits even when they are faced with crisis or have to write down then 
assets values. For example, when Kuwait Finance House (KFH) declared a net 
loss in early 1990s, it did not write down the value of deposits. When Qatai 
Islamic Bank had to write down loans that it had made to the Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International, it did not write down the value of deposits Nor 
Liiici). Luca and Faiahbaksh. Mitia. 'Islamic Banking Issues in Piiideniial Reguiahons anil 
Siipei vision', Proceedings ot the Second llaivaid Univeisity Foium on islamic 1 inance islamic 
I inance into the 21" Centuiy, Haivaid Univeisity, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Octobei 1998 pp !95-
2 i4 
('lui/)lci Si\ ) ISI 
did the Dubai Islamic Bank, when in 1998 its assets were written down 
substantially.'^ 
Samuel Hayes and Frank Vogel in their book Islamic Law and Finance. 
Religion, Risk, and Return, concludes that "regardless of the theory. Islamic 
banks have found that their competitive and regulatory context compels them 
to mimic conventional banks... pushing them into short term, low risk 
investments in an effort to offer their depositors returns similar in quantity and 
risk to those obtained by conventional depositors".'^ 
Problems in Islamizatlon of Economy 
At the macro level one of the important operational challenges of 
Islamic banking is its system wide implementation. Many Islamic countries, at 
present, suffer from financial disequilibria that frustrate attempt at wholesale 
adoption of Islamic banking. Financial imbalances in fiscal, monetary and 
external sectors of these economies cannot provide a fertile ground for the 
efficient operation of Islamic banking. In most of the Islamic countries fiscal 
deficits are financed through the banking system. To lower the costs of this 
financing, the financial system is repressed by artificially maintaining limits on 
bank rates. Thus financial repressing is a form of taxation that provides 
government with substantial revenues. Massive involvement of government in 
the economy makes it difficult for them to reduce their expenditure. Raising tax 
is considered a difficult option, thus, imposing controls on domestic financial 
markets become inevitable for raising revenues. These constraints make it very 
difficult for Islamic banks and other financial institutions to realize their full 
potentials. Zamir Iqbal, of the World Bank, concedes that the countries having 
higher fiscal deficits have faced daunting task in Islamizing their economy. In 
" ' C u n n i n g h a m , Andrew, •Culture or Accounting- Wliat are Real Constraints loi l.slamic I niancc in a 
Riba Based Global Economy?", Fourth Harvard University Forum on Islamic l-inance: lUainic 
Finance The Task Ahead. Harvard Univcisity. Cambridge, Massachusetts , Oclobcr 2000. p 144. (Foot 
note 4). 
" Hayes, L. Samuel and Vogel, Frank. 'Islamic Law and h'lnance Religion Ri.sk and Reliiin . Kluwci 
Law International, The Hague, 1998. p 292 
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his own words, "State-sponsored implementation of Islamic banking has been 
troublesome mainly because of significant fiscal deficits and balance ol" 
payment disequilibria which does not leave much option for the government 
whose citizen may wish to practice Islamic banking but the economic lealitics 
are not very favorable" 
Three countries, Pakistan, Iran, and Sudan are leportcd to be in the 
process of Islamizing their economy." Governments in these countries have 
taken initiatives to transform the whole economy on Islamic economic 
principles. However, this has not been an easy task especially when these 
motives, in certain section of the people, are taken merely as political gimmick 
Economic and social conditions of these countries are such that hoping any 
positive gain in the near future would be no less than a miracle. Political 
turmoil, economic dependency and moral degradation are rampant"" One can 
never be sure if any good can be done to Islamic banking by these countries In 
the present era of global finance repressive economic system with heavy 
dependence upon foreign aid cannot serve the purpose and interest of Islamic 
banking. 
The researches suggest-' that after the official declaration of Islamization 
the banks in these countries are complacent regarding their customers as they 
think that customers have no other option to turn to, secondly, banks have not 
attempted to market their own Islamic identity. One of the reasons mentioned 
about banks' unwillingness to not to market their Islamic identity is the 
possible fear of loss of profitability of these banks due to increasing base of 
Iqbdl, Zami i , ' I s lamic Banking at the Ciossioads" in Islamic Economics Biilklin Aligaih India Vol 
12 N o 4 .luly-August 2002. p 4 
' ' ' f o i some detail discussion of Islami/at ion pioccsses in these counti ies Please sec Chapia M U 
I he riiliiie of Economics 4n Islamic Pei speclne'. Leicestei, U K . The Islamic I oundat ion. 20()() pp 
279-95 
0 1 them, one is among the topmost coi iupt counti ies in the woild with moie than •)2% of its total 
population earns less than Rs 650 pei month and moie than 70% ot its total lexenue goes loi inteiest 
payment only. (See, Khan, Husain, - B u d g e t - l M r Fiiendly. Pooi Un l i i endh" Impact Inlcinaiiondl 
Vol 32. N o 9, Septeinbei 2002, p 3 9 ) , aiiothei one is among the most isolated liom the lest ol the 
woi Id and the thud is one among the pooiest ol the woild 
Wilson. Rodney, ' Competi t ion in Islamic banking", in Islamic nnancial Mai huts (cd ) Wilson 
R o d n e \ , Routledge, London 1990 p 24 
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underprivileged customers. Tiiird, banks try to externali/e the cost 
Islamization by not putting their own effort to educate the people concerning 
Islamic principles. Professor Wilson calls it an abnegation of responsibility by 
institutions supposedly have become Islamic." In the coming paragraphs the 
Islamization of Pakistan economy is taken for some detail description for the 
sake of proper understanding of Islamic banking problems. 
Islamic Banking Problems in Pakistan" 
The process of Islamisation started since July 1979 when the operations 
of Investment Corporation of Pakistan, National Investment Trust and House 
Building Corporation were remodeled on Islamic lines. Profit and loss sharing 
on the accounts of commercial banks was introduced with effect from T' 
January 1981. Since 1985, the commercial banks claimed to have switched 
over to PLS banking. However, the issue of Islamisation resurfaced in 1991 
when the Federal Shariah Court (FSC) confirmed in its judgment that 
switchover to Islamic banking had not taken place. The Federal Shariah Court 
in 1992, declared all forms of interest-based banking un-Islamic. The Shariat 
Appellate Bench (SAB) of the Supreme Court on December 23, 1999,-'' upheld 
the judgment and directed the government to eliminate all forms of interest 
based banking by June 30, 2001. 
United Bank Ltd. (UBL), a state-owned bank, filed a review petition 
against this FSC-SAB ruling in the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP). The 
government of Pakistan supported the UBL review petition against the ban on 
interest-based banking. In its defense the government maintained that 
- Ibid. 
Pakis tan occup ies high rank a m o n g the top mos t corrupt count r ies in the wor ld . A cor rupt ion i n d c \ 
p repared by Lambsdro tT hav ing scores be tween zero for most cor rup t to ten for most c ican s h o w s the 
real p ic ture o f m a n y Mus l im countr ies including Pakis tan , which obta ined 1.00 in the index. In the 
s a m e index I r an ' s score was 1.89. For detail see; .lohn, G. LambsdrotT. 'Empi r i ca l Inves t iga t ions o f 
Br ibery in Internat ional Trade" , The European Journal of Development Research. Vol . 10. N o . 1. ,lune 
1998. 
The N e w s Internat ional , Friday, D e c e m b e r 24, 1999, websi te : w w w . j a n g . c o m . p k / t h e n e \ \ s / i n d e \ . h t m 
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implementation of the FSC-SAB judgment will create enormous problems for 
the domestic, western-style banking and the economy, as well as Pakistan's 
official and private business and financial dealings with the outside world. 
Taking notice, the Supreme Court of Pakistan, extended the deadline by one 
year to June 2002. 
Yet in another turn the Supreme Court of Pakistan (SCP) has now-
revoked the proposed ban that was to become effective from .kmc 30. 2002. 
and has now sent the case back to the FSC and directed review all mailers of 
the present banking and financial system. In its present judgment, selling aside 
the 1991 and 1999 rulings, the SCP said the case has been made by UBL, the 
government and those appealing against these orders because "there arc errors 
lloating on the surface of record".-' 
The bench headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan further observed in 
its ruling, "We are of the considered view that the issues involved in the matter 
require to be determined after thorough and elaborate research and comparative 
study of the financial systems which are prevalent in the contemporary Muslim 
countries of the world".-" 
The Supreme Court also said that Justice Dr. Tanzilur Rehman, the then 
chief just ice of FSC that gave the 1991 ruling had "delivered Ihc judgment willi 
a pre-determined mind, and had relied on views he himself had expressed in his 
own books and writings on interest-based banking and economy. Justice 
Rehman had also ignored opinions of globally known Islamic scholars and 
jurists including Sheikh Mohammad Abduhu, Sheikh Rashid Rida, Abdul 
Razzak Sanhuri, Sheikh Mahmood Shaltut the former rector ol" Al-Azhar 
University at Cairo, and the present rector of the university Dr. Muhammad 
Sayyid Tantawi".-' 
I he S u p r e m e C o u r t ' s rcccnt rul ings received througli e-mai l : abdu i r^noord .ba r .n l 
ibid. 
A l t ab , M u i i a m m a d , ' L a n d m a r k rul ing lo impact the banking sector" / I /V /J /Vt'iiw .lune 2002. Ru l ing 
rece ived at the d iscuss ion fo rum o r i b f n e t @ v a h o o g r o u p s . c o m 
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The government of Pakistan removed Justice Taqi Usmani, who had 
been sitting on the Shariat Appellate Bench for the last two decades and had 
been instrumental in the process of Islamisation in the country.-'' 
In their review petition the UBL and others put following challenging 
and pertinent questions that are albeit necessary to make one ponder upon; 
1. Is there any single bank in the Islamic or Non-Islamic world, which is 
truly run on an interest-free basis? 
2. Can a Central Bank conduct its monetary policy without a norm of 
interest? 
3. Are not the practices of Islamic banks a queer blend of interest-based 
modes of finance carrying a facade of Islamic names? 
4. What are exactly the Islamic compliant instruments of finance? Can 
these instruments meet the myriad and diverse needs of modern trade, 
finance and banking? 
5. When and where have these instruments been applied and with what 
degree of success? 
6. Does the Islamic Development Bank as the model Islamic bank operate 
on interest-free basis? If that is the case why did it olTer to extend a loan 
to the government of Pakistan after nuclear detonation at an interest rale 
of 5% above LIBOR? 
7. By what mechanism can Islamic banks undertake financial 
intermediation, which is the primary function of all commercial banks 
throughout the world? 
Above-mentioned questions are very important and serious not only in 
the context of Pakistan but to the Islamic banking industry as a whole? Because 
of certain obvious reasons people are forced to think Islamic banking merely a 
window dressing of interest based conventional banking. 
Ali. R a f a q a t , The Dawn .lunc 07. 2002. 
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Chapra, one of the senior Islamic economists acknowledges thai 
Pakistan has done much less in terms of providing the necessary legal and 
institutional underpinnings needed to make the system work honestly and 
efficiently than what has been done in a number of industrial and developing 
countries where the conventional financial system prevails. Chapra also 
admits that Pakistan does not serve a worthy example of Islamization. It seems 
to be gradually moving away from the socio economic goals of Islam in spite 
of the great deal of lip service being paid to it by the government.'" 
A case study of h'an and Pakistan banking system conducted by two 
IMF staff mention three major issues behind the problems faced by Islamic 
banking in these countries, which are firstly, legal framework; these countries 
lack the well defined legal system, specifying the domain and limitations oJ~ 
property rights and contracts that fully correspond to the established banking 
system and the Islamic law." 
Secondly, fiscal policy objectives and Instruments; the government of 
these countries have been unable to formulate non-interest based instruments 
for financing budget deficits, 'thus the government, which is the major 
exponent of the implementation of the Islamic system, is forced to raise funds 
tln'ough borrowing on the basis of a fixed rate of return'. " 
Thirdly, inadequate financial infrastructure; this has two dimensions one 
the general and the other specific. The earlier one relates to the lack of 
familiarity with the requisites of Islamic business ethics emanated from lack of 
knowledge regarding Islamic ethical rules. The latter relates to the long-
standing problem of inadequate education and training on the part of staff and 
persomiel within the banking system." 
Chapra , M. Umer, 'The Future of Economics An Islamic Perspective'. Leicester. U.K.. I he Ishiinie 
Foundat ion, 2000, p. 282. 
Ibid., p. 283. 
" iqbal. Zubair & Mirakhor . Abbas, -Islamic Banking". lh4F Occasional Paper 49. 19H7. p. 26 
Ibid. p. 26. 
" ibid. p. 27. 
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Another study by a senior economist of Pakistan specified three main 
reasons for the failure of Islamic banking institutions to effectively abolish 
interest from the operations of financial institutions that are: 
a) Lack of political will. 
b) Absence of awareness about the potentials of Islamic banking. 
c) Inexperience of the banking sector.'" 
Another Pakistani economist in his essay Islamic banking as practiced 
now in the world has given some detail account of the failures of Islamic 
banking in Pakistan. " He observes that very little has been done to attract 
deposits from the public. 
Criticizing the Islamic banking movement in Pakistan, Muhammad 
Anwar Asi in his article^" Towards Islamic banking system, by fits and starts 
says, "The movement for Islamisation gets a big boost when staunch religious 
elements are in ascendancy. This happened during partition of the country 
when the urge to adopt Islamic way of life was still strong. General Zia-ul-Haq 
got involved with the process in view of the strength of 1977 Nizam-e-Mustafa 
movement. In the recent years, the matter came to prominence due to rising 
fundamentalism in the country. On the other hand, only lip service is 
considered sufficient and the issue is put on the back burner when religious 
elements slow their efforts to press the point and push their agenda". 
Siddiqi, in this regard, opines that the problems of Islamic finance has 
only compounded when politicians of the country, riding high on the emotions 
of the public, have used this issue as the springboard for their power. The 
moment they succeeded the issue reached at the backburner. This has resulted 
in highly polluting the environment of the Islamic banking, commitment of the 
Khan. M. Akram, ' Is lamic Banking in I'akislan; The i-'ulurc Path". Ml Pakistan Islamic l-.ducalion 
Congress , Lahore. 1992, pp. 16-25. 
' ' Khan. M. Fahim i s l a m i c Banking as Practiced now in the World" in Ahmad Ziaiiddin el a! (cd.). 
Money and Banking in Islam. Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad, Pakistan. 1983. pp. 259-275. 
"' Published in, www.brecorder.coni. nd, 2002 
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practitioners, frustration of" the public and cnliiusiasm o(" Ihc Islamic 
economists. Professor Siddiqi voicing his concern of the polilicization of 
Islamization remarks that "Nation states tend to use everything, inchiding 
religion in general and Islamic llnance in particular, as instruments of national 
policy for promoting their strategic interests and hidden agendas. In case of 
authoritarian regimes. Islamic Finance has often been used as a tool tor 
consolidation of authority and for ensuring political legitimacy. Priorities 
dictated by economics have been forsaken in favor of those dictated by political 
expediency."" 
Macro Level Problems of Islamic Banks 
Macro levels problems are those that are related with Islamic banking as 
an industry. The major problems confronting Islamic banking as a v^/hole 
includes problems of Islamization of economy, which has not been 
encouraging yet. It may be pointed out that almost 20 years has passed since 
the beginning of Islamization of economy in few noted countries. 
Unfortunately these efforts have been sacrificed at the altar of politics. (See the 
above section of the Islamization of economy). 
Another major macro level problem faced by Islamic banking is the 
agency problems i.e. moral hazard and adverse selection. Though this is a 
universal problem not specifically linked to Islamic banking but it becomes 
more pertinent for Islamic banking when it is characterized that Islamic 
economic system is more value oriented. Several of the problems faced by 
Islamic banks are originates from this agency problem. Especially heavy 
reliance of Islamic banks in short-term assets structure and resorting to 
financing techniques that are more close to conventional financing. A visible 
' ' Siddiqi. M. Nejatul lah. - Towards a Grass-Rools Based Islamic Finance for all'. Keynote Addrc.sscd 
111 the 8"' Annual International Conference on Lariba Islamic Banking, l.os Angeles. 16''' .lune 201)1. 
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shift of Islamic banks from paradigm version is also the result of economic and 
social environment that is not conducive as far the Islamic values are concern. 
Some of the ideological, theological and theoretical .issues still haunt 
Islamic banking, in this regard current researches have specially focussed on 
Shariah standardization, financial engineering and secondary markets. These 
problems are further aggravated by the relative deficiency of Muslim countries 
in education, growth and development. Most of the Islamic countries lacked 
democratic system of governance and are marked with very high corruption in 
their public life. This has resulted in politicization of the Islamization. 
Another major problem confronted by Islamic banks is the small size of 
iheir operation. Most of the Islamic banks are under capitalized and cannot 
enjoy the economies of scale. This problem stems from the fact that most of the 
Islamic banks are the product of individual initiatives (especially wealthy 
individuals of Middle East). Islamic banking in spite of generating all the 
euphoria is yet to become a mass movement. As yet Islamic banking has 
succeeded in select pockets only unless it reaches to the masses it will remain 
undersized, undercapitalized. 
Islamic banking as a whole must be ready to face some of the harsh 
realities of the time. In fact Islamic banking is already faced with some of those 
difficulties. Islamic banking willy-nilly is compared with other Islamic 
movement of the time and is very often projected as manifestation of the so-
called 'Pan Islamizm'. Islamic banking as an industry cannot do much about it 
except to face the reality as boldly as possible. 
Entry of western multinational financial institutions into Islamic banking 
arena has not helped the cause. It has hastened the competition forcing Islamic 
banks to follow a quick-buck psychosis. It is a well-known fact that 
conventional institutions are more keen to follow letter than s p r i t . I n these 
situations Islamic banks are left with vety narrow set of choices. If the Islamic 
Iqtial. Munawar , er a! Challenges Faeing Islamic Banking", Occasional Paper No. 2. IRl ' l / IDB. 
1998. p. 57. 
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banks are to compete in the market they must follow the convenlional 
institutions who naturally are far more efficient in their operations as compared 
to their Islamic counterparts. 
In this regard Islamic economists must think of establishing an 
organization like that of Bank for International Settlements (BIS) which can 
look into the over all affairs of the Islamic banking. This organization shall be 
assigned to harmonize the Islamic banking practices, will ensure the healthy 
competition, will issue Shariah guidelines and will also be authorized to issue 
and revoke licenses of the financial institutions claiming to follow the Islamic 
principles. The Islamic economists, bankers and the Shariah experts can 
discuss modalities since the issue is important enough to warrant immediate 
attention. If the bank for international Settlement (BIS) can issue and impose 
regulations to bring harmony into world commercial banking system why not 
an Islamic agency. Some major problems faced by Islamic banks are described 
below. 
Islamic Banking as Industry 
Extra Management: Islamic banking as industry faces various 
challenges. These problems are basically the result of the functions adopied by 
Islamic banks. One of such problems faced by Islamic banks is the e.xlra 
wamgement burden with regard to monitor and evaluation of the pi-oject 
financed by these banks. This in fact, puts Islamic banks at disadvantageous 
position vis-a-vis to conventional banks. The problem is further compounded 
by mal accounting practices adopted by entrepreneurs. Every cost incurred, 
raises the cost of the banks and lowers the profit of the depositors. 
Consumption Loans: A big amount of loans arc demanded for 
consumption or for non-productive purposes. How to finance these are big 
question before Islamic banks. Since profit cannot be charged on these loans. 
('haplcr SL\ j I '•)?< 
Islamic banks have little incentives to finance these kinds of demand, which 
further pushes people away from Islamic banks. Some camouflaged practices 
under the name of Murabaha might be the outcome of these compulsions. 
Research and Training: Teaching, training and researches are the 
wherewithal for the development of any discipline. Since Islamic banking is 
still in its nascent stage it becomes even more indispensable for Islamic 
banking. There are several aspects to this point; one of that is Islamic banking 
requires Shariah experts who are well versed in the financial aspects as well. 
Apart from this basic requirements Islamic banks also have to have financial 
engineers who could develop new products for the Islamic banks to keep them 
in competifion with the conventional banks. Islamic banks need to train their 
staff who mostly have come from the conventional background. To acquaint 
them with the Islamic percept of banking there is need for training centers that 
could supply fresh graduates to this highly growing industry. In countries 
where whole economy is under transformation, a quality research becomes 
even more pivotal. Some long pending theoretical issues like determination of 
service charges, the maximum permissible margin of profit, the rent of physical 
capital etc. needs immediate attention of the researchers; earlier they are solved 
the better it is for the industry. In this regard, various Islamic economists have 
raised concern to ask whether service charges can be levied on pure Joans. If 
yes, then how it is to be calculated? How to envisage the costs in future without 
involving the element of interest? How to decide a margin of profit? And how 
should the rent of physical capital be calculated, so that it does not include 
interest element?^' 
See Khan, M. Fahim, op. cit., pp. 274-275. And Abdullah, Fuad and Iqbal, Munawar . -Chal lenges 
Facing Islamic Banking in the 2 ! " Century ' , Second Harvard University Forum on Islamic I ' inancc. 
Islamic Finance into the 21" Century', Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachuset ts . October 
1998.p. 247.4 
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Small Size of Islamic Banks: Size is another important issue, which 
determines efficiency and the profit. Larger the size higher the economy of 
scale enjoyed by the industry higher the profit and so higher returns to public. 
Islamic banks are expected to perform all the services of the conventional 
banks at lower cost and also expected to provide higher returns to the public as 
compare to the conventional banks. However, this is not possible as long as 
Islamic banks do not enjoy considerable economy of scale. Following table 
shows average assets size of the seventy-eight Islamic banks during the period 
of 1996. Researches have shown that Islamic banks hardly arrive at the 
minimum required size to benefit from their size. One such study by Fuad and 
Iqbal"" has found that minimum required size for full efficiency is US$ 500 
million in assets. However, the available data indicates that Islamic banks are 
significantly below optimal size. It can be pointed out that by 1996 only ten 
Islamic Banks were of the optimal size and the rests were far behind the 
required size to enjoy the economy of scale. 
Table No. 6.2 
Islamic Financial Institutions by Size of Assets (1996) 
A s s e t s (US$ Mi l l ions) F requency Dis t r ibut ion 
0-50 39 
51-100 13 
101-200 4 
201-300 3 
301-400 8 
401-500 1 1 
>500 10 
Total 78 
(.Source: Directory of Islamic Banks and Financial Insiiiiilions. 1996.as quoted by Fuad and Iqbal.) 
' Abdul lah. Fuad and Iqbal. Munawar . op. cit. p.245.3 
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The Financial Engineering: The challenges are to introduce new 
Shariah compatible products to enhance liquidity in the market and to oiTer 
tools to manage risk and diversify portfolios. The contemporary Muslim 
economists, in various conferences and seminars have now discusscd that 
financial engineering in Islamic finance will have to focus on new financial 
innovations'" that are able to satisfy the needs of the market on two ends of the 
maturity structure i.e. extremely short term money market and long term. 
Money markets that our Shariah compatible do not exist at present and there is 
no equivalent of an Islamic inter-bank market where bank could play over nighi 
funds or where they borrow to satisfy temporary liquidity needs. Infact as yet 
Islamic banks have so far mostly served as intermediaries between Muslim 
financial resources and major commercial banks in the west. iilTorts should be 
made to reverse this one-way relationship. There is an urgent need to develop 
marketable Shariah based instruments by which asset portfolios gcneralcd in 
Muslim countries can be marketed in the west. 
Operational Challenges: This can be looked upon at micro as \^'cll as 
the macro level. Micro level; means setting up the financial institution on a 
profit loss sharing principles. Macro level; means economy wide 
implementation of an Islamic financial system. 
In presence of asymmetric information due to market inefficiency 
Islamic banks have found it difficult to develop a strong asset portfolio on the 
basis of (PLS). It has resulted in costly monitoring and preference for short-
term trade related transactions. Moreover, lack of legal and institutional 
framework that may help in facilitating appropriate contracts has increased the 
problems of Islamic banks. Islamic banks are faced with the non-availability of 
equity-based benchmark a reference rate that reflects the rate of return on real 
sector. In such situation the common practice to evaluate the portfolio 
"" For the detail discussion on the issue, see Ausaf Ahmad , Towards an Islamic l-'inaiu lal Market. 
•ieddah IRTi / IDB. 1997. 81pp. And also in Askari, Hossein and Zamir Iqbal. -Opportuni t ies in 
l-jnerging Islamie Finaneial Markets," Banca Naziona/e Del Lavoro Quarterly R e \ i e \ \ . 194. 
.September, 1995, pp. 255-282. 
196 I PI oblems of Islamic Banking 
performance or comparing various investment alternatives for Islamic banks 
has been the London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) as the proxy 
Shariah Standardization: Since Islamic banks have to accept the 
Shanah compatible investment portfolios; they have to clear their projects by 
the Shariah board. In the light of this the standardization of introducing new 
product has been another operational problem faced by Islamic banks. At 
present each bank keeps its own Shariah board for examining and evaluating 
each new product without coordinating the efforts among other banks. In many 
cases each religious board has its own preference or adherence to a particular 
school of thought. This process should be streamlined and standardized to 
minimize time, effort and confusion.''^ 
Shanah and Investments Concerns; Because of the religious 
dimensions of the Islamic banks new products and instruments cannot be 
introduced unless ratified by the supervisory Shariah board. Almost all the 
major Islamic banks have got their own Shariah Board whose members are 
though trained in the Shariah aspects but they lack even a formal training in 
modern finance. This seriously constrains the Shariah scholars' ability to issue 
well-informed rulings on financial products and activities.''"* 
Similar problems relating to legal framework and religious 
jurisprudence arise due the divergence of views and opinions, resulting in 
difficulty or even impossibility of achieving a consensus. In this respect, co-
ordination of Islamic banks meets with several problems. Some Shariah related 
" M o h a m e d . Ismail Hasan. "The islamic rmanc ia l Maiket Mobil iz ing and IJlil i / ing I unds m 
Ijuvtlopedia of Islamic Banking and Insiiiance. i .ondon. Institute ol Islamic Hanking and insuiancc 
1995. pp 129-136 
"" Wilson. Rodney. 'Ma ike t ing Stiategies loi Islamic Financial Products ' . /Veii' I lot con. London. Ma) 
1995. pp 7-9 
" '"Abdullah, Fuad and Iqbal, Munawai . •Some Stiatcgic Suggest ions )oi islamic Banking in the 21" 
C e n t u i ) R e v i e w of Islamic economics, Islamic Foundation, U K., No. 9. 2000, p 51 
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issues are required to be elaborated again to make it easy in understanding and 
in implementation. There are still various issues that are cumbersome, 
confusing and inconsistent while applying, primarily not because ot 
inconsistency in its principles but in its interpretations. This also sends wrong 
signal to the practitioners. The judgment of Shariah scholar is neithei absolute 
nor uniform. Various schools of Islamic jurisprudence apply Islamic teachings 
to business and finance m different ways. Disagreement on specific issues 
frequently occurs between and among them. Many times Shanah scholai 
changes their minds reversing earlier decisions."^ 
Liquidity Concerns: In some of the studies by western scholars, 
liquidity concerns has been projected as a big problem for Islamic banks, one 
such study mentions that " . . .among the most obvious impediments to the 
future growth of Islamic banking and finance are lack of liquidity, a limited set 
of approved instruments, cumbersome transactional arrangements, and no 
ready provisions for risk management."^" Two of the problems i.e. 'liquidity' 
and limited sets of 'approved instruments' are refuted by Islamic economists 
One such study by Iqbal has categorically disproved this charge As far the 
limited sets of so-called 'approved instruments', are concerned the currcnt 
researches has shown that Islamic finance has sufficient number oi" requiied 
financial instruments. 
Some times either due to shortage of readily available projects or due to 
delay in assessing the viability of particular projects Islamic banks are found 
with surplus liquid funds which has been a cause of concerns for Islamic 
Mousta ta , Mohammad I l o s n e y , ' The Role ol Religious Boaids ' , in Encyclopedia of I\I(II)IIL Bankuiii 
and Finance, Institute ot Islamic banking and r inanee . London. 1995. pp 95-104 And also 1 i i ico 
Luea and Farahbaksh, Mitia, 'Islamic Banking Issues in Piudeniial Regiilalions and Siipennion 
Pioceedings of the Second Harvaid Univeisity Foium on Islamic Finance Islamic 1 inancc nilo the 2 P ' 
C e n t u i ) . Ha iva id Univeisi ty, Cambi idge . Massachusetts . Octobei 1998 p 196 
1 lank. E , Vogel and Samuel . L Hayes III Islamic Law and l-inance Religion Risk and Reiiiin 
Kluwei Law International, London, 1998, p 13 
" Iqbal. Munawvvar, ' Is lamic and Conventional Banking m the Nineties A C o m p a i a t i \ c S i iah 
Islamic Economic Studies, leddah, IRFl / lDB, Vol 8 N o 2. Apiil 2001 
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economists who now are discussing how to channel these surplus funds to 
deficient Islamic banks in most profitable and mutually beneficent ways. 
Further more, how could such banks facing excess liquidity initiate contacts 
with potential investors and provide them with necessary finance. There are 
also suggestions that Islamic bank should develop new financial instrument to 
help mobilize medium and long-term savings to bring them into line with 
medium and long-term investment. The bank could also promote small and 
medium sized projects to encourage mass involvement and to share in the 
economic development of Muslim countries. 
Environmental Problems for Islamic Banks 
In most countries of the world the system of banking prevalent is 
designed by the western and so the laws regulating it. In fact the present 
banking system is introduced by the colonial rulers to their subjects. Most of 
the banking laws were also designed by the western and after the independence 
most of the countries followed the same pattern of banking with minor changes 
in the banking regulations. Some of the problems faced by the Islamic banks 
emanate from these banking regulations. This is not to say that Western 
banking is by default against Islamic banking but it grew and prospered in such 
a way and its legal system evolved as such that it does not conforms to the sprit 
and objectives of Islamic banking. For example, legal reserve requirements 
were introduced for deposits safety and to curtail the credit creating capacity of 
the bank but at present it has become one of the biggest hurdle since Islamic 
banks are by nature investment banking and if a good amount of their deposits 
are held up in legal requirements then it will naturally reduce the profitability 
of Islamic banks. Another example is the divorce of commercial banking with 
actual business involvement;"^ this again was done keeping in view the 
There are certain western banks in Germany and France that do not distinguish between commerc ia l 
and investment banicing. But these are exceptions, by and large there is clear-cut distinction b c h \ c e n 
the banking activities and the investment activities where banking activities denotes linancial 
intermediation only. 
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depositors interest as well as to avoid concentrating power into the hands of 
few. Those controlling the industry should not control banks and those ru/ining 
the banks should not engage in business activities, so that depositors are not 
risked and power is not concentrated into the hands of few. Wherever Western 
banking principles are followed, whether in the Western countries itself or in 
the Far East, Islamic banks are faced with certain basic problems that are direct 
consequence of inherent contradiction with Islamic banking principles. Two 
major such problems as pointed out by a prominent Western Islamic economist 
are;^" 
• Banking regulations in western countries stipulate detail reserve 
requirement for all licensed banks and deposit takers. The ruling that the 
sole liquid asset must be cash or interest bearing treasury bills, does not 
confirm with the Islamic principles. 
• The second problem is the relationship between Islamic banks and 
conventional western banks both in terms of participation in clearing 
arrangements and dealing in the inter bank market. If an Islamic bank 
arranges currency swaps with western banks, or even arranges 
acceptance of cheques drawn on other banks, it becomes involved with 
institution which profits from interest transaction and it may even end up 
holding interest-bearing assets itself. 
A point, in this regard is raised by the Governor of the Bank ol" England 
is that, "It is important not to risk misleading and confusing the general public 
by allowing two essentially different banking systems to operate in parallel. A 
central feature of the banking system of the United Kingdom (and most of its 
previous colonies) as enshrined in the legal framework is capital certainty for 
depositors. It is the most important feature which distinguishes the banking 
sector from the other segments of the financial systems. Islamic banking is 
perfectly acceptable mode of financing but it does not fall within the definition 
Wilson. R o d n e y , ' Islamic Business", The Economist, Pub. London. 1984. pp. 45-46. 
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of what constitute banking in tlie U.K. Tiie Bank of England is not legally able 
to authorize under the Banking Act, an institution which does not take deposits 
as defined under that Act".^" 
The Director of International Islamic Bank of Denmark mentions 
another point that originates from the accounting procedure, "The tax laws are 
against the Islamic philosophy and pose the greatest difficulty, hi most OECD 
countries Mudarabah is constrained by fiscal acts which define profit as an 
after tax item for the profit creator and a fully taxable item Ibr the prodl 
receiver".^' 
Some of the problems of Islamic banks emerge from the fad thai 
Islamic financing techniques are difficult to define and explain under western 
terms. Wilson makes a point, "There is failure to explain (he methods of 
Islamic finance in western terms and this tend to alienate the client. Second, for 
the client with minimal financial knowledge and little or no experience of 
banks, the literature is unnecessarily complicated and legalistic".'-Some other 
concerning issues raised by professor Wilson are, the lack of documentation on 
actual practices of Islamic banks and the lack of Islamic accounting standard. 
He says, " there is no practical guide to Islamic financial instruments, and no 
universally acknowledged standard reference manual for Islamic bankers to 
follow".^^ About accounting practices Wilson writes, "most Islamic banks arc 
subject to conventional audits", and these audits are usually checked by the 
Shcii'iah supervisors who "have legal rather than accountancy qualifications, 
and may not be able to fully understand the accounting procedures. Further 
more they are paid a fee for their services, and have an interest in being 
Pember lon, Sir Leigh, line Governor ol" the Bank of England, from a specch given to the Arab 
Bankers" Associat ion, MEED. 5 October, 1984. p.2. As quoted in Gafoor . A.L.M. Abdul . Interest I'rec 
commerc ia l banking, Apptec. 1995. p.61. 
" Kir.stcn. Ingo, ' Is lam and financial intermediation". IMFSlaffpapers. 1982. p. 120, 
Wilson. Rodney. ' Competi t ion in Islamic banking", in Islamic Financial Maikcis (ed.). Wilson 
R o d n e ) . Routledge, London, 1990. p.24. 
" Wilson, Rodney, " Retail development and wholesale possibilities", in Islamic l-inancuil \laikeh 
(ed,). Wilson Rodney, Routledge. London. 1990. pp. 12-13. 
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retained". In these conditions a question of impartiality of the Shariah 
supervisors are natural to arise. 
In some secular countries where socialist idea of banking is ibilowed 
Islamic banks are forced in "credit rationing'." While in other countries like 
India where mixed economy^'' pattern is followed Islamic kind of banking is not 
possible under the current legal setup where apart from the stipulatory "reserve 
requirements', 'credit rationing' is also required. A former officer at (he Indian 
Central Bank (Reserve Bank of India) and the Managing Director of India's 
reputed Islamic financial institution Bait-un-Nasr mentions following, 
including other, factors obstructing the growth of Islamic banking in a country 
like India. 
• Lack of availability of investment avenues, which can truly be 
considered to conform to the principles of investment of Shariah and 
also ensure safety, liquidity and reasonable returns. 
• Institutional borrowing facilities in case of need (dearth of availability of 
liquid funds in case of emergency). 
• The prevailing atmosphere of crises of confidence created by failures of 
organizations which had a tag of conducting their business on Islamic 
lines. 
• Flashing of red signals by a couple of commercial banks. 
• Absence of means for transferring surplus funds to the areas of needs." 
While mentioning some legal difficulties, Dalvi has also touched one 
important aspect from Shariah point of view. He says, "Islamic banks arc nol 
'' lhid.,p.\3 
In this case , a certain proport ion of the total deposi ts are directed by the legal author i l ies to SOIDC 
spcc i l l ed sectors , def ined as "priority sector lending ' for lending at low rate of interest. 
Unde r this, e c o n o m i c policy combin ing features of both the capitalist as well as socialist is adopted 
as g o v e r n m e n t policy. This was largely fo l lowed by N o n Aligned M o v e m e n t ( N A M ) countr ies . 
' ' Dalvi . M. Abdul Wahab . " R a n d o m Thoughts on S o m e Economic and Legal Cha l lenges to Is lamic 
Bank ing Sys t em" , Paper presented at the National con le rcncc on Islamic Ixoiunuiv Issues and 
Challenges, Organ ized by the Indian Associat ion For Is lamic Economics (lAI-IE). N e w Delhi . Oc tobe r . 
2-3. 1999. p.1-2. 
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allowed to build up their own reserves out of the cost to be recovered on the 
basis of loan" moreover, in India all such reserves of whatever size are not 
allowed to be invested by the law of the country in any manner other than the 
prescribed one i.e. in interest bearing instruments.^^ 
Islamic Finance: Western Misgivings 
It is more than three decades since Islamic banking and finance has been 
in practice. Yet Islamic finance is still in its infancy as compared to western 
conventional finance. It has been, however, developing with remarkable pace 
even during the current recessionary period. It was a general view at the 
beginning that Islamic finance is byproduct of the so called "oil boom". Few of 
the writers often try to impress that fundamentally there is no difference 
between Islamic and conventional finance and whatever remains is largely due 
to fundamentalist (backward looking) approach of a few Muslim zealots who 
always want to go back and stick to the fourteen centuries old principles. 
One of the misgivings, spread by some western scholars, is that Islamic 
banking is a product of the oil boom. Though some Muslim scholars have tried 
to dispel this proposition, detailed statistical data are still needed to establish 
the truth. It would be pertinent to pose the following counter questions belbrc 
the western writers. 
> Presently the Islamic finance industry, even with a fair amount of 
exaggeration, is not worth more than US $ 300 billion. Is not this 
amount too meager to be worth comparison with the oil boom, which 
runs into tens of thousands of billion dollars? What about the report 
published in the Financial Times April 11, 1996 that states that western 
banks and financial institutions have $ 670 billons Muslims money in 
Ibid., p.4. 
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their coffers? A study conducted by Merrill Lynch in 1996"'cstimalcd 
that Middle East private investors are worth US$ 800 billion, oi' which 
about half is Saudi individuals. Where this money gone; hito Islamic 
banking? 
> Saudi Arabia, one of the largest beneficiaries of the oil boom has still 
got the fewest Islamic banks in comparison to many other Muslim 
countries. And what about the above mentioned study, which puts Saudi 
high net worth individuals US$ 400 billion. Where this money is 
invested? Vogel and Hayes of Harvard have actually put Saudi Arabia in 
the group of countries that discourages Islamic Banking.'^'" 
> A 1995 study/survey of global private wealth produced by Oliver, 
Wyman & Company placed the number of high net worth individuals at 
2,550,000, with 3% coming from the Middle East. The worldwide assets 
of these individuals were estimated to be $l l ,500bn, with 4% coming 
from the Middle East.'"' (The figures conies to $ 460 billion) 
> Personal Finance magazine states that more than US$5 trillion is 
estimated to be looking for global wealth management and further refers 
to a study performed by Gemini Consultants and Merrill Lynch that 
estimates wealth held by high net worth individuals in the Middle East 
at US$1 trillion.'^^ 
> How many countries playing pioneering roles in the endeavors to 
Islamize their whole economy are beneficiaries of the 'oil boom"? 
50 M E E D , 16, January, 1998 as quoted in Ritai, al-Tariq, "The Realities and Challenges l-acing Islamic 
Equity Funds: Islamic Bankers are missing the Point ' , 'Second Harvard Universily Fontm on Islamic-
Finance: Islamic Finance into the 21" Century'. Harvard University, Cambridge. Massachuset ts . 
October 1998.pp. 255-257. 
Vogel , Frank, E., and Samuel , L. Hayes 111. "Islamic La\v and Finance Religion. Risk iitui Return. 
op. cit. p. 11. 
''' As quoted by Gainor, Thomas , 'Islamic Private Banking - Now and in the Future'. Paper presented 
at AiC Wor ldwide Limited Conference, Islamic Investment ' 99 17''' September 1999. Author can be 
contacted at, Tom@gainor la \v .com 
Personal Finance Middle East. "Product ol"Change ' . May 12-19, 1998. 
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r Do those writers wish to claim that Islamic rcvoliilion in hiiii was a 
product of the oil boom'^ 
> Were the experiences of Mit Ghamr and Nasir Social Bank in 1963 & 
1971 an outcome of the oil revenues? 
> Before establishment of the Dubai Islamic Bank and Islamic 
Development Bank in 1974 & 1975 respectively, hundreds' oi endeavors 
can be found m establishing interest free institutions in several countries 
like India, Pakistan, and Malaysia, etc How many of these countiies 
were beneficiaries of o iP 
> Muslim economists had been writing about Islamic banking since 40 
years prior the establishment of the first Islamic bank Were they writmg 
m the hope of oil revenue? 
These are a few questions that must be addressed by opponents of 
Islamic banking before they can claim authentically of their point. They should 
also answer convincingly the questions raised by Muslim economists regarding 
some inherent fundamental weaknesses of the present day banking systems A 
few of them are as follows, 
Why are such banking crises theie frequently*^ What puipose does it 
serve the United States Government to pay billions of its dollais out ol 
taxpayers' money to keep Mexico pay interest? (Mostly due to the US banks) 
Why are most industrialized countries always willing to lend to the poorest 
ones, even when they are aware of the paying capacity of the recipient 
countries? Are these debts out of love and human concern? One should not 
At piesent , in India alone theie aie moie than 200 such financial institutions hkc M u s h m I unds 
Baiiiil Maals, Coopeia t ive Ciedit Societies and other uniegistered phi lanlhiopi t o igan i /a t ions which 
we ie pi imari ly established keeping in view Musl ims inhibition against inteicst Many mo ic such 
oiganizat ions has come to gi ief due to vai ious leasons, hovvevei, the fact lemains that Musl ims a lways 
felt d iscomfor t deal ing with inteiest based oiganizat ions This can also be consl iucd liom the lact thai 
Musl ims pioport ion in banking sei vices is lowest in compa ie to othei government |obs 
( haplLi S/\ I 2()t 
forget that the third world countries have paid more than three times then debt 
to the donor countries as inteiest only 
Muslim economists have argued yeais ago that the piesent banking 
system is inherently biased in favor of the rich against the pooi What is the 
leply to this charge*^ Would the iich countries oblige by giving the details oi 
'petrodollars' invested in their own countries'^ Was not the collapse oi many 
financial institutions m the U S during the 1970s due to the feai of massive 
capital flight caused by the establishment of the Islamic banks'^'' 
One of the pioneers of Islamic banking, m his recent address, at the Fifth 
Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance Information Progiamme 
(HIFIP), has charged against the current financial system in these woids, 
"Theie is a widely shared peiception that there is much moie inequality in the 
distiibution of income and wealth today than at any other time in the entiie past 
of mankind This applies to the distribution within nations as well as between 
nations Worse still, inequality is giowing and there is nothing on the hoiizon 
to indicate a reversal in this tiend It is iightfully legaided as a potential thieal 
to peace and a phenomenon unbecoming of human fraternity"" It is not as if 
only Islamic economists are in search ot some value-based system ot economy 
A good number of western economists too are not satisfied with the anient 
allaiis of the world economy 
Why do many western wiiters give the example ot Bank ol Ciedil 
Commerce International (BCCI) as a failure of Islamic banking'^ Do they need 
to be informed that Islamic banks aie those which do not deal with inteicst at 
least on paper"^ Was BCCI qualified on that merit'^ 
A 1990 data s h o w s thai out ol the $ 1200 billion owed b) the Ih i id Woi ld counti iLs to i h t h is t OIIL 
onl \ $ 4 0 0 bi lhon const i tuted the oiiginal bo i iowing The rest const i tuted the acc iued intLicst iind 
tapiUil l iabil i t ies See A h m a d Khuish id IslamiL Finance and Bank ing Mu Cha l l enges and 
P iospec t s , / ?ewei i of Islamic Economics i s lamic Foundat ion U K N o 9 2000 p 71 
" I 01 detail see Edwa id 1 Al tman and Arnold W Sametz , (ed ), Financial C iiscs- Insiiliilioin and 
Maikels m a Fragile Cnviionment lohn Will) &. Sons Inc , N e w Yoik , 1977 pp 288 
Siddiqi M N , Compai a t i \ e Advan tages of Islamic Banking and Financc Pi tsLnlcd at l l a i x a i d 
U n i \ e i s i l y F o r u m on Is lamic F inance 6 Apiil 2002 , ht tp / / w w w siddiqi c o m / m n s 
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The number of" failures of Islamic banks is miniscule compaicci to llic 
number of failures of western banks. Bank failures, in U.S., in one year alone 
are more in numbers than failures of Islamic banks in the last thnty years 
together. In the US during 1990s only around 900 thrifts collapsed costing the 
msurer US $ 300 billion and the taxpayer US $150 billion", bank failures, 
which averaged six (mostly small banks) per year from 1946 to 1980, have also 
risen exponentially, averaging 104 per year during the 1980s''\ As against this, 
hovv' many Islamic banks have collapsed since the first Islamic bank the Mil 
Ghamr? Every body knows that this bank was closed, after successful operation 
of four years, due to political exigencies of the socialist government. Even if 
we include Mit Ghamr as a failure the only other bank, which can be declared 
as a failure, is the cooperative Islamic bank in Pakistan during late 1950s. How 
many other Islamic banks have failed? Or the government was forced to close 
after a run on it, which has become a common feature of the present day 
conventional banking. Even in a country where depositors are explicitly 
insured of the safety of their deposit by the government, bank run is not very 
uncommon. If certain Islamic finance companies in India, Egypt and some 
other countries can be construed as a failure of Islamic finance, then the picture 
IS grimmer of the conventional finance. In India alone more than 30.000 
finance companies had run away during the last couple of years" ' More so if 
the failure of some company can be declared as the failure of a particular 
system, then the US financial system is more worthy of being called a failure 
than any other. What could be the best example than the very recent (Enron. 
WorldCom, Xerox, US Airlines and many others) accounting frauds and 
corporate failures in the U.S? 
Benston, G .1 and Kaufman , G G . T D I C I A Altci Fi\'c Yca\s\ Joinnal of rxononiiL I'ei spcclnes 11. 
1997. p p 139-58. 
Goi Ion and Rosen 1995. As quoted by A|il, D , 'A Case lor Risk Based Deposit Insuiancc S \ s l e m in 
India" Resen'e Bank of India Occasional Paper. September 1998 (http://rbi o ig in/sec7/5182 pdl) 
Resei ve Bank ot India, Report on Ti end and Pi ogress of Banking in India ' Mumbai 2000 
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Why do Western economists, when faced with a crisis, talk oi' low 
interest? Are they not shy of calling for zero interest? (Is not it because this 
would mean indirect support to Islamic banking). 
Here, one need not intend to condone the failures of Islamic banks, 
which of course are a challenge to Islamic economists who need to work very 
hard to meet the expectations of the people. 
Depositors in the Islamic banking system are in a more vulnerable 
position compared to the depositors of the conventional banking. By agreeing 
to share the risks they have reposed faith in the system at the cost of their own 
insured return. On the other hand the Islamic banks, which should have been 
happy due to their risk being shared with the depositors, have 1 ailed in 
delivering on the expectations. Islamic financial industry as a whole has 
woefully failed to develop an equity culture in its operations. One of the 
pioneers of Islamic banking, Professor Siddiqi is not very content with the 
current state of the Islamic banking, though, he is quite hopeful with the 
potentials of Islamic banking, according to him, "Not all Muslims are fully 
satisfied by the character and performance of the existing Islamic financial 
institutions. Barring the small minority who sees no need for them, most 
express dissatisfaction either on the ground that they are not Islamic enough or 
because they are inefficient as compared to their conventional counterparts. Bui 
all agree that these deficiencies could be remedied overtime and there is 
nothing to justify aborting the experiment. There must be some reason for this 
resilience".™ 
The onus now lies on Islamic financial institufions to capitalize on this 
resilience to develop and evolve Islamic way of business. Some of the 
apprehensions of Islamic financial institutions are genuine that the present 
accounting procedures along with moral hazards conditions make it difficult for 
Siddiqi, M.N. , 'Compara t ive Advantages of Islamic Banking and Finance", i 'rescnted at the i 'ilih 
1 larvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, 'Islamic Finance' Dynamics and Ocvclapmcnr. 6 April 
2002, ht tp: / /ww\v.siddiqi .com/mns 
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them to offer Islamic financial instruments. But therein lies the actual challenge 
for the Islamic financial institutions. 
Islamic Banking Problems with Central Bank 
Since the central bank plays a key role in supervising and overseeing tlie 
commercial banking sector, therefore, a close relationship is considered to be 
vital for the promotion of the Islamic financial system. Although Islamic banks 
are in the operation for more than three and half decades they are not yet 
directly related to the concerned central bank in matter of policy framevvoi-k. In 
most of Muslim countries the banking, licensing and regulatory laws arc 
modeled on western system designed to regulate interest-based banks. I l iese 
laws and regulation have been formulated to supervise and control the 
traditional banks whose objectives and functions are basically different from 
the Islamic banks. Thus, the contractual relationship between an Islamic bank 
and its clients, and the types of assets held by it makes it practically impossible 
to totally abide by the central bank's legal requirements. Therefore, exemption 
as amendments to the existing central banking regulations are called for which 
would enable the Islamic banks to fulfill the statutory requirements. Since the 
Islamic banks based on Shariah principles need extra help and assistance from 
the central banks in areas such as mobilization of deposits, financial assistance 
and liquidity support it is necessary for the central bank to make legal and 
financial provisions for rendering assistance to Islamic banks. 
There has been put more emphasis on the role of central bank lor the 
control of Islamic banks in order to protect the depositors as well as for the 
regulating all its activities. There have also been suggestion to establish a kind 
of self-control in the form of internal regulations, control mechanism, and 
cooperation between Islamic bank in this respect and an exchange of 
experience among them especially between the newly established ones and the 
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older ones, so that this control system may develop in a way suitable to the 
nature of Islamic banking and the environment in which it is implemented. 
Moreover, it is argued that Islamic bar\ks must be allowed to borrow 
from the central banks against their deposit on an interest-free basis; till the 
banking system in Muslim country is Islamized completely, the Islamic banks 
and interest-based banks would continue to exist simultaneously. So long as the 
Islamic banking sector constitutes a rather small part of the total banking 
sector, the central bank's credit control tools are expected to be the same what 
they are at present. However, if the Islamic banking sector grows and becomes 
a significant portion of banking sector in the national economy, central banks 
shall be compelled to take Islamic bank into account and develop new 
techniques of credit control to deal with them. However, the central banks must 
make legal and financial provisions for Islamic banks, including the fostering 
of interest-free financial instruments, to enable them to function successfully 
with the existing international banking system. However, the role and ilinctions 
of the central banks vis-a-vis the Islamic bank would have to be substantially 
different in areas of banking promotion, lender of last-resort, credit control and 
regulations. The central banks needs to accord at least equal treatment of 
Islamic banks so far as the fulfillment of the requirements, voting rights, 
licensing and establishment of new branches of Islamic banks, to enable them 
to meet the statutory liquidity requirement of the central banks, as well as to 
place excess liquidity in profitable avenues." Such rules are stressed because 
the promotional aspect of the central banks role in the Islamic banking 
development is extremely important in mutual sharing of experiences and 
know-how of central banking and Islamic banking operations, and setting up of 
specialized departments in central banks. These steps are considered necessary 
because the progress of the Islamic banking system will depend on the help and 
support that government and their central banking authorities are prepared to 
See. l .H. Qarni, ' Regulatory Control of Islamic Banks by Centrl Bank ' , in Encyclopedia of Islamic 
Banking and Finance, Institute of Islamic banking and Finance, London, 1995, pp. 211 -215. 
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provide these facilities. Moreover, in order to develop a market for interest free 
tlnancial instruments, the central banks may explore various possibilities, these 
may include; allowing the Islamic banks to invest funds in instruments which 
may be issued by government coiporations and agencies Islamically on a 
dividend basis and to treat such investments for statutory reserve requirements. 
Opening Islamic investment accounts in the books of the central banks and 
paying profits to the Islamic banks for investment made by them in these 
accounts. Issuing participation term certificates which would be yet another 
avenue for Islamic banks to invest on Shariah principles, purchasing from the 
Islamic bank some obligation such as Murabaha of customers of the Islamic 
bank and the profits accrued through such purchase can go to the central bank, 
participating in profit/lose sharing accounts of Islamic bank through investment 
in these accounts.'" 
Islamic economists also suggest that the central banks may promote 
development of money markets to the needs of the Islamic banks where these 
banks can place their surplus funds. Particularly, in the areas of cash reserves 
and liquidity ratios, the regulatory measures by the central bank vis-a-vis 
Islamic banks need special treatment. But in the cases where the central bank 
pays interest on cash reserves, the ratios for Islamic banks need to suitably 
reduce to compensate them. Thus, a dialogue between the central banks and 
Islamic banks is an ongoing process. On behalf of the Islamic banking system 
the International Association of Islamic Banks in Egypt has already stepped 
into establishing and coordinating contacts with the central banks to enable the 
establishment and functioning of Islamic banks. Given the circumstances under 
which Islamic bank works, we find them at a considerable disadvantage 
compared with conventional banks. The Islamic financial system needs to be 
supported initially by well developed and sophisticated Islamic substitutes for 
the classical monetary regulations set by central banks. 
Sec. Frah, Fudil. 'Central Banks and Islamic Banking ' . N e w Horizon. London, Ma> 1995. pp. 10-12. 
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Since Islamic banks cannot have access to money markets whether 
nationally or internationally, whereas conventional bank can easily resort to the 
central bank or other banks in case of a liquidity crisis, therefore, the centra) 
bank is needed to make provision, in its regulations to extend assistance to 
Islamic banks on basis of Shariah. This will enable Islamic banks to make 
profitable use of funds they place with the Central Bank to meet statutory 
liquidity requirements. Solutions to these problems require a through 
understanding of the workings, technique and philosophy of Islamic banks by 
the monetary authorities. It has been suggested that a special organ in the 
central bank should be created to look after Islamic banks. This could provide a 
forum for exchange of views and experiences, which could better place Islamic 
banks in their societies to play their role in full. 
In fact the severe international economic recession of the early 1980s 
passed a big test to the viability of the Islamic banks, which had grown under 
the favorable economic conditions of the early decade. With the economic 
recession the Islamic banks came under pressure from two sides. Firstly, 
recession at home led to a squeeze on their source of finance. This was partially 
the case for the large multinational banks whose main source of finance, both 
share capital and the deposits, came from the surplus oil economies of the 
Middle East. The second source of pressure was the squeeze on the profit 
resulting from the surplus in the world trade and the decline in the rclurn on 
real investment, which comprised the main sphere of activity of Islamic banks. 
To pass through the recession of the early 1980s many of the Islamic banks had 
to undertake major restructuring measures. If the 1970s was the decade ol" 
youthful growth and multiplication, the 1980s was one of maturity and 
consolidation for the Islamic banking movements. An important factor, which 
can help the future progress of Islamic banking is to build upon the 
accumulated experience of the past. 
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Problems with Financing Techniques and Market 
When Islamic economics was introduced it was claimed that it is an 
alternate to interest based economy. It was contended that Islamic economics is 
contrary to the fixed pay off system of interest-ridden economy and drives its 
strength from profit and loss sharing (PLS). Therefore, all the banking models 
derived under Islamic framework were based on PLS principles. More than two 
and half decades of Islamic banking have proved that Islamic banking is far 
from those enshrined objectives and methods. Most of the Islamic banking 
practices still revolve around fixed pay system that too keeping in view interest 
as the benchmark. Even the Islamic Development Bank has failed to follow 
PLS principles in its business transactions.^^ Where is the mistake? Islamic 
economists at various forums and seminars frequently raise the point. Is the 
mistake in model itself, or in the practices adopted by the Islamic bankers or 
with the public which is not ready to accept this system? 
Two financing techniques, which have drawn a lot of controversy and 
criticism in this regard, are Murabahah and Bay Muajjal. 
Murabahah: Keeping in view the contemporary practices, it is often 
pointed out whether Islamic banks are finding it practical to eliminate interest. 
The issue becomes even more debatable when Islamic finance practitioners try 
to legitimize variety of practices in Islamic banking that amount to interest in 
disguise. One of such controversial instruments widely practiced is 
Murabahah. It has often been observed that in many cases of Murabahah 
transactions Islamic banks do not actually buy or sell but they simply provide 
" See Wadood Abdul . 'Basic Deficiency and Defects in Islamic Banks and the Rented}'. a commentan 
on IDB- lRTl occasional paper no. 4 "Islamic Banking: Answers to some frequentl \ asked questions" 
authored by Munawar Iqbal. Mabid All Al-Jarhi and M. Umer Chapra. This hand' out is distributed 
through electronic mail. A survey of Islamic Development Bank financing shows that more than 70% 
of the IDB financing to its forty-eight member countries was under non-PLS mode, see Errico. Luca 
and Farahbaksh. Mitra. 'Islamic Banking: Issues in Prudential Regulations and Super\-ision'. 
Proceedings of the Second Harvard Uni\ ersit\ Forum on Islamic Finance: Islamic Finance into the 21" 
Century. Har\ 'ard University. Cambridge, Massachuset ts . October 1998. p. 209. 
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finance to buyers in a round about manner through proxy buying and selling 
and use this mode only to legitimize fixed-return on capital. 
Alierio Ibrahim puts the blame on Islamic economists, he says, "The 
Islamic economists, in their urgent need for a financial system that conforms to 
Shariah and in the absence of an Islamic blueprint, try to replicate the western 
banking system by mechanically substituting the interest system chielly with 
Miirahahah"'''^ In fact a major portion of the Islamic banks assets are in 
markup (Murabahah) form, which ensures the bank a predetermined profit. 
Arshad and Asad put this in another way, "Thus in principle interest-based 
transactions have been replaced by those based on Murabaha, leasing and some 
Musharkah, all of which are permissible under Shariah. Appearances are 
deceiving, however, and only the form of the transactions have changed with 
no change in the underlying transactions".^^ 
Bay Muajjal: It is a variant of Murabahah and one of the most 
controversial financing techniques adopted by Islamic banks. Bay muajjal is 
defined as differed payment with markup which is intended for short-term 
loans to individuals, industrialists, farmers and traders. Very often this markup 
for differed payment is linked with time value. One of the pioneers of Islamic 
banking in this respect observes; ". . . with respect to bay muajjal a variant of 
Murabahah, I would prefer that bay muajjal is removed from the list of 
permissible methods altogether. Even if we concede its permissibility in the 
legal form we have the over riding legal maxim 'any thing leading to 
something prohibited stands prohibited'. It is advisable to apply this maxim to 
hay muajjal in order to save interest free banking from being sabotaged from 
within". ^ ^ 
M i c r o . Ibrahim Hussaini, "Is lamic Banking and the Problems ol" Financing Small-.Scale linlerpriscs: 
A Critical Review", Islamic Culture, Hyderabad, India, Vol. LXXVI, No. 3. .luly 2002. p. 35. 
Zaman . Arshad and Zaman, Asad, ' Interest and the Modern Economy ' , Islamic Economic Studies 
Vol . 8 No . 2, April 2001, p. 63. 
Siddiqi, M, N., Issues in Islamic Banking. The Islamic Foundation, Leicester. U.K.. 1983 p. 139. 
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Another very senior Islamic economist Professor Khurshid Ahmad says; 
"Murabahah (cost plus financing) and bay mmjjal (sale with differed payment) 
are permitted in the Shariah under certain conditions. Technically it is not a 
form of financial mediation but a kind of business participation. The Shariah 
assumes that the financier actually buys the goods and then sells them to the 
client. Unfortunately, the current practice of "buy back on markup" is not in 
keeping with the conditions on which Murabahah or bay muajjal are permitted. 
What is being done is the fictitious deal, which ensures a predetermined profit 
to the bank without actually dealing in goods or sharing any real risk. This is 
against the letter and sprit of the Shariah injunctions".^^ 
Hasanuz Zaman, a senior Islamic economist, objects to the practices of 
Islamic banks in these words, ". . . many techniques that the interest free banks 
are practicing are not either in full conformity with the sprit of the Shariah or 
practicable in the case of large banks or the entire banking system. Moreover, 
they (Islamic banks) have failed to do away with undesirable aspects ol~ 
interest. Thus, they have retained what an Islamic bank should eliminate."^'^ 
Zaman becomes more scathing and observes, " It seems that in large number of 
cases the ghost of interest is haunting them to calculate a fixed rate percent per 
annum even in Musharakah, Mudarabah, Ijarah (leasing), hire purchase, rent 
sharing, Murabahah, bay muajjal. Participation Term Certificate (PTC), Term 
Finance Cerfificate (TFC) etc, the sprit behind all these contracts seems to 
make a sure earning comparable with the prevalent rate of interest and, as far as 
possible, avoid losses which other wise could occur".^^ 
There are certain obvious and genuine reasons behind the failure oJ' 
Islamic banks to follow an ideal system of an ideal society. Those include 
moral hazard, high expectations in terms of returns and services, high 
" A h m a d . Khurshid, 'El imination of Riba: Concepts and Problems (Response to the Supreme Court 
Ques t ionnai re) ' , in Ahmad. Khurshid (ed.) Eliminolion of Riba from the Economy. Islamabad. Institute 
of Policy Studies, 1994, p, 46-47. 
Hasanuz-Zaman, S.M. -. 'Practical Options for Central and Commercial Banking, in FJiminalinn of 
Riba from the Economy, Islamabad, Institute of Policy Studies, 1994. p 212. 
" Ibid. p. 203. 
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monitoring and transaction cost involved in PLS financing, inadcqualc legal 
backing in case of litigation, fraud, biased accounting practices and policies, 
adverse monetary and fiscal policies and the most importantly inability of the 
financial intermediaries to deal with actual businesses. 
Many a times it has been observed that entrepreneurs with good pro lit 
expectations prefer a financing of their projects on the basis of fixed cost of 
funds (Interest, Markup, Leasing etc.), so that they do not have to share the 
profit with some one else.^^ Another issue that compels Islamic banks to adopt 
quick and fixed return practices is high transaction costs involved in PLS 
modes which require highly qualified and costly personnel. In addition, 
supervision of long-term project also adds to the cost, thereby reducing the 
profit margin or increasing the risk. One more problem for Islamic banks is the 
short-term nature of their fund which is very risky to invest in long-term 
projects. Since most of the executive and managers of the Islamic banks come 
from conventional financial institutions they are not fully committed and 
sincere in following Islamic banking principles and those little serious are not 
well versed in Islamic banking principles. 
Some of the problems faced by Islamic banks stem from the lack of a 
well defined legal system, specifying the domain and limitation of propcrt) 
rights and of contracts, that fully corresponds to the established banking 
environment of uncertainty, limited long term investment have forced the 
banking system to concentrate its asset portfolios in short term transactions." 
Lack of Secondary Market: Secondary markets in Islamic financial 
markets are shallow, under developed, and inefficient. Lack of efficienl 
" It has also been obse i \ed that cnliepiencuis with high-expected piofit, il not able to get l inante 
Ihiough Islamic fixed letiiin modes, lesoit to con\cntional finance On the contiai_\ those eni iepieneuis 
with low expected piofit oi high iisk pielei Islamic banks leaving Islamic banks eithci with high iisk oi 
low piollt portfolio 
Sec. Aggregate Balance Sheets piepaied by Inteinational Association ol Islamic Banks lAlB 
Bahiain 1988, quoted in Ausat Ahmad, Contemporary expeiiences ot Islamic banks A sui\e_\. in 
rJimiiHilion of Ribofrom the Economy, Islamabad. Institute of Policy Studies. 1994 pp '569-'>9') 
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secondary markets and liquidity in the Islamic financial markets has indirectly 
limited the range of maturity structure available to the investor. Due to absence 
of liquidity, Islamic bankers cannot easily expand portfolio across capital 
markets and are restricted to limited opportunities for portfolio diversification.'-
Available data of three years portfolio structure shows that over a period of 
time from 1988 to 1990 the structure of Islamic bank in short-term portfolio 
has increased from 68 percent to 75 percent. While medium and long term 
investments structure reduced from 9 percent to 6 percent during the same 
period. Portfolio structures of Islamic banks during the period 1988-1990 are as 
follows. 
Tab le No. 6.3 
Port fol io Distr ibut ion of Is lamic B a n k s 
T y p e s of Inves tment / Year 1988 (%) 1989 (%) 1990 (%) 
Short term 68.4 75.4 75.6 
Real Estate 20.9 15.4 15 5 
Social lending 00.9 03 03 
Medium and long term 09.8 07 4 06 7 
Source Inlernalional Assncialion of Islamic Banks' 
Researchers have given several explanations for the failure of Islamic 
banking in adhering to the principles of profit and loss. Few of them are as 
follows. 84 
Iqbal. Zamir , 'Financial Engineering in Islamic Finance", 'Second Harvard i/niveisii) I orum on 
Islamic Finance Islamic Finance into the 21" Cenluiy'. Haivard IJnivcisi l ) . Cambi idge . 
Massachuset ts , October 1998.pp. 229-238 
figui-cs of 1989 and 1990 are taken from Iqbal Zamir , Ibid., p. 230. Figures of 1988 aic taken i iom 
A h m a d , Ausaf , 'Contemporary Experiences of Islamic banks: A Survey ' , in Eliminalion of Riha fiom 
(he Economy, Institute of Policy Studies. Islamabad, Pakistan. 1995, p. 383. 
"" Dar I lumayon , Harvey. I David and Presley, R. .lohn, 'S ize , Profitability, and Agenc) m Piolit and 
Loss-Sharing in Islamic Banking and Finance", 'Second Hairard University Fonm on Islamic 
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• Capitalists' unwillingness to bear risk and entrepreneurs' tendency to 
exclude others from sharing profits. 
• Islamic banks in the wake of severe competition from conventional 
banks are forced to offer relatively less risky modes of investments. 
• Non-participatory role of investors in the management makes it less 
attractive. 
• Equity financing is not feasible in short-term projects due to ensuing 
high degree of risk. 
• Unfair treatment of equity in taxation also makes it less lucrative. 
• Non-existent secondary market for Islamic financial tools. 
Inter-Bank Co-Operation among Islamic Banks 
After the experience of Islamic banks at the national and international 
levels, there has arisen much concern on the cooperation among them in 
various ways, i.e. financing, deposit changing, investing strategies, and 
innovating modes of financial instruments to suit the contemporary needs. 
One positive aspect in this regard is that the conventional banks are 
becoming increasingly interested in relationship with Islamic institutions and a 
number of them have set up units which specializes in providing investment 
and correspondent banking services, Islamic bankers have yet to show that they 
can develop from this success at the gross-roots level into breaking the mould 
of traditional banking on an international scale. A positive step often suggested 
is the creation of an international Islamic banking society to enable Islamic 
financial institution to exchange information and get over their suspicions of 
one another. 
In fact, the cooperation with the central banks in Islamic countries and 
other countries is still non-existent. Almost all the Islamic banks are working 
Finance: Islamic Finance into the 21" Centwy\ Harvard Univei-sity. Canibi'idgc. Massacluisctls. 
October 1998.pp. 51-62. 
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under special decrees and are thus obliged lo operate under these I'ulcs and 
regulation. The dialogue between Islamic banks and central banks has not 
developed at mature level. Islamic banking is also seen as an international 
banks, which means it will cooperate with the local Islamic banks by olTering 
international banking services which of course include interest-free loans 
international investment, technology transfer, trade, commodity and currency 
trade, besides this development funding - all based on Shariah principle. But 
how to utilize its collective investment talents and professional expertise to 
strive for goals. Up till now. Islamic banks have been viewed skeptically in 
western banking circles. But as the movement gains momentous and 
respectability cooperation between Islamic and conventional bank is expected 
to induce the latter to develop special tools to help the Islamic banks at the time 
of their liquidity need that will further enhance the Islamicity of Islamic banks. 
Cooperation between Islamic and conventional and among Islamic 
banks is also needed for inter bank transaction. There are many who fee! that 
the case of Islamic banking camiot be advanced unless a strong system of inter-
bank transactions based on Islamic principles is developed. The lack of such a 
system forces the Islamic banks to turn to the conventional banks for their 
short-term needs of liquidity which the conventional banks do not provide 
without either an open or camouflaged interest." Now, most of the Islamic 
bankers have found in their experiences that competition with conventional 
bank will be healthy attitude, but cooperation between Islamic banks should 
also be strengthened. This might help banks deal with the problems of liquidity 
shortages and surplus, for which adequate instruments have not yet been 
developed. This can be manifested specially in the direct trade relations 
between Islamic countries. 
In various conferences among the bankers and financial analysts, it has 
been proposed that investment and merchant banks could act as financial 
Usmani , M., Taqi, 'An Inlroduclion To Islamic Finance', Idaratul Ma'aril ' , Karachi. I 'akistan, i99S. 
pp. 246. 
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advisers, defining projects, analyzing costs and benefit and advising on 
economic life of projects. In return they would receive funding and 
management fees. One of the important ways in which western and Islamic 
institutions could work together is in devising new banking instruments that 
conform to Islamic principles. 
Conclusion 
Islamic banks have been facing a number of problems which can be 
evaluated on various grounds. Some of the problems faced by Islamic banks 
stem from the nature of their businesses. Another kinds of problems can be 
evaluated from the point of the view of the treatment Islamic banks receive 
from various governments, Muslims as well as non-Muslims. A set of problems 
is specifically associated with the institutions concerned. Several problems 
faced by the Islamic banks have been overcome by their past experience while 
new problems are still hindering the performance of Islamic banks at various 
stages. Some of them are related to their internal structure, which has grown 
unplanned and instantaneous to the demand of the community. Some ol" the 
inherent theoretical contradictions still haunt the business of Islamic banks. 
Early models of Islamic banks, which were supposed for financial 
intermediations only, has taken precedence by the Islamic banks engaging 
themselves in the actual business about which Professor Siddiqi has rightly 
mentioned, "All this {Islamic banking trading practices) keeps Islamic banks 
focused on doing what they are not equipped to do-real industrial or 
agricultural production, trade, commerce, etc. It also keeps them away from 
what they would be able to do as financial institutions".®'^ 
Since Islamic banks have largely concentrated on actual business they 
have not yet been successful in devising an interest-free mechanism to place 
their funds on a short-term basis. Because of the same they are facing problem 
Siddiqi. M.N.. ' I s lamic Bantcs; Conccpt . Percept and Prospects". Review of Islamic l-xonomics. 
Islamic Foundation, U.K.. No. 9. 2000. p. 30. 
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in llnancing consumer loans and government dclicits. Sccond, (he risk involved 
in profit sharing seems to be so high that ahnost all of the Islamic banks have 
resorted to those techniques of financing which bring them a fixed assured 
return. As a result, there is a lot of genuine criticism that these banks have not 
abolished interest but they have, in fact, only changed the nomenclature of their 
transactions. Third, the Islamic banks do not have the legal support of the 
Central Banks, which seldom have the necessary expertise and trained 
manpower to appraise, monitor, evaluate and audit the projects that arc 
required to finance. Various issues are yet to be resolved before Islamic banks 
could really expand their arms outside their small religious clientele. To 
penetrate the masses Islamic banks need to be more professional and service 
oriented besides maintaining their religious identity, which at present is diluted 
because of their certain dubious practices under the guise of Shariah. Islamic 
banks also need to devise Shariah compatible instruments, which would help 
them, finance consumption and the government that has not been possible in 
the past without indulging in wary practices. 
Islamic banks in different countries are working under different formal 
in some countries they are registered as investment companies while in other 
they are working as non-banks, still in some other countries they are working 
as cooperatives, merchant banks, special purpose banks etc. This has rendered 
the supervisor confused about the actual nature of Islamic banks. This is not a 
healthy sign for Islamic banks; in whatever country they operate it is the 
responsibility of Islamic banks to convey their supervisor (Central Bank or any 
other supervisory authority) about the actual nature of their business practices. 
This will enhance the trust of the supervisor, bring transparency in their 
operations and thus lead to increase the acceptance and confidence of Islamic 
banks among the general public. 
While summing up, the problems faced by Islamic banks, it would be 
worth to quote one of the senior most Islamic economists who stressed to 
express that "the climates under which Islamic banks are operating (domestic 
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and external) is anything but congenial. The moral fabric of the society is 
weak. The legal framework is antagonistic. The tax system is partial towards 
the interest system and almost inimical to a profit sharing system. The state oi' 
competition between the Islamic and traditional banking system is such that 
most of the odds are against the Islamic system".^' 
To help the cause of Islamic banking a country should have a developed 
financial market where innovations can be taken off without nuicli 
susceptibility to the system. The country must not be corrupt which is the basic 
qualification of becoming Islamic and people of the country must be educated 
enough along with commitment towards the cause. If one analyzes the above 
prerequisite for developing a case for Islamic banking unfortunately none ol' 
the Muslim country would qualify. In some countries people are highly 
committed but they lack the requisite expertise and their leaders are highly 
corrupt. In many of the Middle Eastern countries people are educated, not as 
corrupt but they lack commitment, moreover, they have not been successful in 
developing their own financial market beyond a certain level as they mostly 
have carried their financial businesses in the Western countries. 
One should not ignore that expectations from Islamic banking were very 
high in the beginning which could not be materialized fully, nevertheless, if 
one compares the first thirty years of Islamic banking experiences which arc 
not as discouraging as the T' hundred years of conventional banking when 
banking failures was a not an uncommon feature. Even today the number of 
bank failures in United States alone in a single year is more than the total 
88 failures of Islamic banking combined together for many years. 
" A h m a d , Khursid, ' I s lamic Finance and Banking: The Challenges and Pro.spect.s". Review of Islamic 
Economics, Islamic Foundation, U.K., No. 9, 2000, p. 78. 
l-'ollowing the Great Depression and stock market crash of 1929, over 9,000 banks failed in the 
United States. At the end of 1990, there were approximately 900 out of 41,000 thrifts which collapsed 
cost ing the insurer US $ 300 billion and the taxpayer US $150 billion [Benston and Kaufman (1997) | . 
Bank failures which averaged six (mostly small banks) per year f rom 1946 to 1980. also exponential!}. 
averaging 104 per year during 1980s [Gorton and Rosen (1995)]. All quoted bv D. AJit. ".I Case for 
Risk Based Deposil Insurance System in India', http://rbi.org.in. September 30. 1998. The cost of 
Savings and Loan crisis alone in United States in the 1980s and early 1990s are estimated to the tune of 
the size of the Islamic banking industry as a whole i.e. around US $150 billion. 
CHAPTER-7 
THE FUTURE OF ISLAMIC BANKING 
The Overview 
While discussing the theoretical and practical aspects of Islamic 
banking, we have observed that the Islamic finance is based on participatory 
system. The proponents of Islamic PLS financing find that the contemporary 
Western system is unjust, inefficient and always prone to collapse. On the other 
hand, the participatory system, as they claim, is just and best in efficiency, 
stability, and growth. 
We have also observed the Islamic resurgence during first half of the 
twentieth century. This resurgence got impetus by the financial theories during 
the second half of the twentieth century, especially the one put forth by Lloyd 
Metzler during 1950s. He proposed an alternative system in which financial 
contracts were based on equity rather than debt, and in which there was no 
guarantee of nominal values of the liability as these were tied to the nominal 
values of the assets. Metzler, in his model, showed that such a system did not 
have the instability characteristics of the conventional banking system. 
During 1970s and early 1980s, when Islamic countries were in receipt of 
large sums of oil money, another theory by Minsky, proved that the present 
conventional banking system was inherently prone to instability because there 
would always be maturity mismatch between liabilities (short-term deposits) 
and assets (long-term investment). In this system the nominal values of 
liabilities are guaranteed, but not the nominal values of the assets. Such a 
system, therefore, needs a lender of last resort and bankruptcy procedures, 
restructuring processes, and debt workout procedures to mitigate the contagion. 
It was established that in the debt based conventional system risk and rewards 
are shared asymmetrically, with the debtor carrying the greatest part of the risk. 
('luipler Seven \ 21?i 
Such a system has buill-in incentive structure that promoted moral hazard and 
asymmetric information.' 
Recent banking crises in several countries heightened the fear that 
drastic measures, if not adopted, would jeopardize the international financial 
system. Simultaneous tidy growth of Islamic banking and finance during 1990s 
had not only proved its theoretical viability but also projected itself as a viable 
alternative. 
After initial hiccups of trial and error, the Islamic financial institutions 
during 1990s, have become increasingly innovative, developing more complcx 
instruments and structures to meet the demands of the modern day business. At 
present. Islamic banking is managing funds around $ 300 billion with an 
average annual growth rate of around 15 percent. Over 100 Islamic equity 
funds have been launched since 1995 with assets under management in excess 
of $7 billion. More than 2/3rd of Islamic finance business is currently based in 
the Middle East where Bahrain is regarded as the hub of Islamic finance. Other 
major non-GCC markets for Islamic finance include Egypt, Malaysia. Turkey, 
Indonesia, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In fact, world's second largest Muslim 
populated country, India too cannot be ignored, as far the future prospects 
Islamic finance are concerned. 
It can safely be concluded that the Islamic banking is not a negligible or 
a temporary phenomenon; rather it is here to stay and there are strong signals 
that it will continue to grow and expand at the present pace. Even for those who 
do not subscribe to the prohibition of interest, Islamic banking has become an 
attractive and innovative idea. There are large number of western scholars and 
practitioners who are attracted towards the idea. They see the Islamic finance 
as an addition to the existing variety of financial network. 
Professor M.N. Siddiqui, an eminent Islamic economist, shares the 
notion that the Islamic banks are here to stay. Emphasizing the viability and 
Mirakhor Abbas, 'Hopes For Tlie Future of Islamic Finance ' , New Horizon. , luly-August. 2002. 
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success of the system, he recalls that the growing number ol" Islamic llnancial 
institutions and the opening of Islamic banking counters by major conventional 
banks are proof of its attraction. According to him the entry of the conventional 
players into Islamic finance and the rapid growth of mutual funds have 
provided a new source of strength to the Islamic finance in the private sccloi". 
He further states that "a search for ethical investment and cleaner, greener 
finance is not confined to any one community and now the quest for socially 
responsible financial management, that yields a fairer distribution of benefits, 
tends to become a universal human endeavor".-
Mohsin Khan, of the IMF wrote in his famous paper that at a time when 
growth of the world economy is being shifted by the apparent inequalities of its 
financial system, the experience of Islamic banking movement may even 
valuable lesson for the debt ridden third world economies.^ 
The Fault Line 
Let us ponder over the following equation before going through the 
views of some prominent scholars, cited here to assess the justification of 
Islamic banking. An amount lent at 15% yearly compound interest doubles in 
less than 5 years, it multiplies 10 fold every 16 and '/2 years and it multiplies 
1000 fold every 49 and 'A years; on the other hand, the average productivity of 
the resources does not multiply even 10 folds in 50 years. Therefore, even if 
capital worth 15% of the total resources of the world could be invested at 15% 
interest compounded yearly, the overall growth of the economy will not be 
enough even for clearing the interest. 
" Kcxnote Address at the 8''' Annual international Conference Lariba Islamic Bankine Los Anuclcs . 
16'" 
.lunc 2001. 
' Khan. S. Mohsin, i s l a m i c Interest Free Banking: A Theoretical Analysis". Staff Papers. Inlernalioiuil 
Manelaiy Fund (IMF), Washington D.C.. Vol. 33, No, 1, 1986, pp. 1-27. 
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Stefan Ingves, an expeit in banking crises, while speaking on the Noidic 
Banking Crisis declares, "The Argentina crisis is not going to be solved until 
the government is piepared to make some hard decisions about loss shaiing 
He goes on to announce, "At present, the thorniest issue on the agenda oi the 
international community, including the Financial Stability Foium (FSF)'* and 
the IMF, are issues related to private sector involvement in debt restiuctunng 
(PSI) and international bankruptcy procedures for countries oi soveieigns 
ma)oi issues with direct implications for how to manage banking ciises 
Several IMF studies put the costs of bank restructuring between 15 and 
45 percent of the GDP^ of the South Asian crises that erupted in 1997 ^ In then 
earlier writings Lindgren et al (1996) noted "since 1980, ovei 130 countiies, 
compiising almost three-fourths of the International Monetaiy Fund's mcmbei 
countries have experienced significant banking sector p ioblems" Systemic 
banking crises have incieasingly been experienced, which because oi Ihc 
implicit deposit insuiance that the government is ioiced to piovide. impose a 
huge burden on the economy In 1995, Japan was estimated to have non 
peifoiming loans to the tune of 10-25 percent of the GDP, Aigentina duiing the 
eaily eighties, suffeied loss ot about 20-55 percent of GDP, and Chile in 1982 
suffeied a loss of about 13-42 peicent of GDP (Capno and Klingebiel,1996) 
Abbas Mirakhoi, one of the leading economics at the IMF Hnds that the 
piesent international system is deficient m many ways of which the two most 
important ones are A debt based system needs an effective lendei ol the last 
^ I h c I inancial Stabili ty I oiiim (I S f ) was c ieatcd in ea i ly 1999 as a consu l la l iv t bo(J\ to cIcM-lop 
IUILS and p iocedures foi p i e \ e n t i n g financial p iob lems and cns i s and c i lcc t ixc l ) d t a l m g with IHOSL 
thai mav occui 
IngNCS Stefan , ''The Noidic Banking Cinn fiom an International Penpectne S p t c t h Di i t c lo i 
Mone ta iy and Exchange At t a i i s Depa i tmcnt Seminai on Financial Ci i ses k i t d i l l i l s M K l Ihc 
Bank ing Insurance and Secui i t ies Commiss ion ol N o i w a ) Os lo Septembci II 2002 
' I his does not inc lude the hidden eost bo ine by the publ ic in the toim ol depii-ciation ctc 
' 1 indgien et a l ) , 'F inancia l Sectoi Ci is is and R e s t i u c t u n n g Lessons t iom Asia l\ll OcLdsional 
Papei^\U IMF Washington D C 1999 p 7 
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resort, the present international financial system does not have one and 
according to him, it is not likely that the one will emerge soon, secondly, a debt 
based system needs bankruptcy proceedings, debt restructuiing, and woikout 
mechanism and processes which the present international financial system 
lacks (Please see, Section, interest and debt of chapter 3). 
The Need 
Islamic economists have given various reasons for the Islamic banking 
as an alternative to the modern commercial banks According to Mannan, '^ve 
need Islamic banking for all by all Informal and voluntary sectoi banking can 
help the mobilization and capitalization of social savings and investments, 
leinfoices the basic values and ethics of a society, and stimulates civil 
society'. ..It is therefore, felt that Islamic banking in the 21'' century will face 
considerable challenges but can create great opportunities as well Ibi both 
Muslim and non-Muslim countries if and only if it works to develop a 
paiticipatory economy beyond the market. It needs to arrest the present tiend 
towards the globalization of poverty coupled with rising corporate powei, 
pervasive corruption, secularization and the concentration of ownership and 
beneficiaries of Islamic banking and finance".'" 
In this regard Professor Siddiqi's arguments are also woith mentioning, 
as to him there are three contemporary phenomena which provide clues to what 
Islamic economists are looking for Firstly, the widespread dissatisfaction with 
the performance and consequences of the monetary and financial sector all ovei 
the world especially since the 1970s. Secondly, the fact that Islamic financial 
"" All quoted by Haque, Nadeem U l . (IMT Senioi Resident Repiesentat ive in Sii I anka). •De\c'/(>ping 
of rinancial Markets in Developing Economief, Addiess Given at the Pmanoial Rcto im C o n l c i e n t c 
h a n s Asia Hotel . Colombo, Sii Lanka, Maicli 18. 2002 
' M i i a k h o i A b b a s , ' H o p e s 1 01 I h e F u t u i c o l Islamic I inanee ' , op cit p 7 
Manna . M A , ' N e w Fiont ieis ot islamic Banking in the 21" Centuiy with Special i c l c i c n t t to 
In lo ima! and Voluntaiy Sector Banking", Second Haivaid Univeisity r o i u m on Islamic I inancc 
hIamiL Finance into the 2r' Cenhny pp 275-289 
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movement appeared on the scene as an offshoot of a much broader resurgence 
among the Muslims, And thu'dly the resilience and hope invoked by the Islamic 
approach to money, banking and finance accompanying strong moral 
overtones." 
The Market 
According to a recent estimate the global size of the Islamic economy is 
around 2.5 percent of the total global economy and 12 percent of the 
developing economy,'- this projection consists of Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) regions only. A large number of Muslims also live in many secular 
countries like India, U K " USA, and other Asian, European, South African 
countries. Besides one of the fastest growing economy of recent past i.e. 'Asian 
Tigers' too have good number of Muslims. World Muslim population is 
estimated between 1.4 - 1.6 billion. They comprise approximately % of the 
world population. Keeping a safe side if it is assumed that Muslims on the 
average have half resources as compared to their non-Muslim brethrens, still 
1/8"' of the world resources are with Muslims. Of them even fifty percent 
Muslims are interested in any kind of Islamic economy then 1/16"' part of the 
world economy is too big to be ignored. 
Apart from the population, the world's 70 percent of oil reserves, 49 
percent of Natural Gas reserves, 21 percent of Uranium production are in the 
Islamic countries. Saudi Arabian Crude Oil and Petroleum products alone 
generated $43.2 billion revenue in 1999. One obvious fact remains that many 
" Siddiqi, M. Nejatul lah, Comparat ive Advantages of Islamic Banking and Finance, i 'rcsentcd at the 
Fifth Harvard University Forum on islamic Finance, 'Islamic Finance Dynamics and Developmenl'. 6 
April 2002. 
Moore . Philip, 'Islamic Finance A parmershipjorgrowlh\ Euromoney Publications. London. 1997. 
p. 142. 
" Musl im population in UK. is around 2% and therefore responsible for 2%of the GDP of UK. Sec 
Moore . Philip, Op. Cit. p. 146. 
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of the Islamic countries are still under-banked due to their inhibition o fdeahng 
with interest based banking. 
Abdullah Al-Rajhi, General Manager of one of the. topmost Islamic 
financial institution says, "There are great opportunities for Islamic banks to 
play an important role in financing development projects in private and public 
sectors in the developing countries in cooperation with the development 
organizations such as the World Bank, Islamic Development Bank, IMF and 
the IFC etc., especially in situations where these organizations need to develop 
specific Islamic financial instruments for selected development projects. A 
good example is the IPC's experience with Islamic funds and leasing 
instruments in project financing through Mudarabah for private sector projects 
in Pakistan and the Middle East. The IPC's successful experience illustrates the 
fact that there is great potential for the accessibility and employment of Islamic 
instruments by International organizations to finance private and public 
projects. The participation of IFC and other international organizations (WB, 
IDE, and IMP) will also serve to boost confidence in Islamic products".'"^ 
A study conducted by Merrill Lynch in 1996 estimates that Middle East 
private investors are worth US$ 800 billion, of which about half is from the 
Saudi Arabian individuals.'^ According to one western observer, this market is 
not growing as a result of the growing awareness of Islam. It is primarily 
driven by the fact that Muslims during the last 15 to 20 years have built 
significant wealth that necessitates banking services, compounded with the fact 
that usury is a very serious sin in Islam. Further in the views of many leading 
Al-Rajhi . Abdullah Sulaiman. ' i s lamic Banks: Technology and Global Challenges and opportunilics" 
in Proceedings of the Third Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance: Local Challent^es. (ilahal 
Opporliinilies, Harvard University. Cambridge, October. 1999, p . l78 . 
' ' M E E D , 16, January, 1998 as quoted in Rifai, ai-Tan'q, 'The realities and Chal lenges f a c i n g Islamic 
Equity Funds; Islamic Bankers are missing the Point ' , Second Harvard University l-orum on Islamic 
Finance: Islamic Finance into the 21" Century. Harvard University, Cambridiie. Massachuset ts . 
October 1998, p. 255. 
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authorities, this market will be responsible for managing at least 50 to 60 
percent of the total saving of Muslims worldwide in 8 to 10 years time".'" 
Besides, a number of western banks are wooing the Islamic investors. 
For example, ANZ Grindlays, Chase, Citicorp, HSBC and Morgan Stanley 
have introduced Shariah-compliant products and services. The importance oi~ 
Islamic banking is also evident by the decision of major stock exchanges such 
as the Dow Jones and FTSE to offer Islamic indices. V Sundararajan. a senior 
executive at the IMF, notes that the Dow Jones Islamic Market USA index iiad 
an annual return of 27 per cent from 1996 to 1999, compared with 24 per ccnl 
for S&P in the same period. "While current industry data are unavailable, 
evidence from the International Association of Islamic Banks suggests that 
assets managed by those banks have tripled in four years." And, despite the 
recent short-term setbacks, the Islamic banking industry is expected to emerge 
stronger than ever. 
According to the Chief Executive Officer HSBC managed Amanah 
Finance, "At the end of the day. Islamic banking is a market-driven 
phenomenon, it is educated, middle-class Muslims with a corporate 
responsibility who are demanding it. The biggest challenge has been the legal 
and regulatory framework around which we have to build Islamic fmancial 
products. The laws are so onerous that it makes it expensive for banks to 
launch a variety of products." 
Professor Rodney Wilson, a prominent Western Economists at the 
University of Durham, observes about the Islamic banks in these words, "These 
early institutions have now matured and have achieved a considerable degree 
of success in terms of market penetrations. This all is more remarkable given 
that the markets in which they were established already had well developed 
Gainor, Thomas , 'Islamic Pnrale Banking - A'oii' and in the Future'. Papci' picscnlcd al AiC 
Wor ldwide Limited Conference . Islamic Investment "99 17"' September 1999. Author can be contaclcd 
at. Tomf«)gainorla\v.com 
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commercial banks; indeed some markets especially in the Gulf, were viewed as 
over-banked". 
The Future 
Islamic scholars feel that in order to develop Islamic banking further, in 
its true sense, it is essential to concentrate on finding new products and 
instruments, to organize training programmes and to spread the Islamic spirit 
among Islamic bankers. It is essential that Islamic banking institutions devote a 
large proportion of their revenues towards research, development and training 
programmes. As there is no dearth of talented people in the Muslim world who 
could be employed for the purpose. It is concluded that in the near future the 
Islamic banks will be able to meet the needs of the financial world. 
The chief of HSBC run Amanah Finance, in his address at the Second 
Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance pointed out. 'The future oi" 
Islamic finance depends on how it works toward achieving mainstream 
relevance by increasing the embedded capital of the Islamic world, by 
participating in more infrastructure and merchant banking activities, and by 
servicing the need of its customers in the rest of the world. The future is not 
some place where we are going, but one that we all are creating with our 
clients, with our Shariah scholars, with our shareholders, with our regulators, 
and with our team members. The future will be built on our heritage and 
traditions. The task of giving mainstream relevance to Islamic financc will 
bless both the makers and its destination.'"" 
" Wilson, Rodney (ed.), -Islamic Financial Markels" Routledge, London, 1990, p. 7 
Ali Muazzam, ' U S President Tries to Ratify tiie Etiiicai Values of the Countr)"". A'eir Horizon. 
London, .luly-August, 2002, p. 3-4. 
' ' Khan. Iqbal, Ahmad, ' Is lamic Finance: Evolution and Challenges", in the proceedings of the Second 
Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance: Islamic Finance into the 2F' Centmy. Harvard 
Universi ty, Cambridge, Massachusetts . October 1998. pp. 225-228. 
ChaplL'i Sc'vc';(|2'!l 
The public slalemenl of the hitcrnational Association oi" Islamic Banks 
(lAIB) in its expressions of the duty notes, "The Islamic banking system 
involves a social implication which is necessarily connected with the Islamic 
order itself and represents a special characteristic that distinguishes Islamic 
banks from other banks based on other philosophies. In exercising all its 
banking or developmental activities, the Islamic banks take into prime 
consideration the social implication that may be brought about by any decision 
or action taken by the bank. Profitability - despite its importance and priority -
is not therefore the sole criterion or the prime element in evaluating the 
performance of Islamic banks, since they have to match both between the 
material and the social objectives that would serve the interest of the 
community as a whole and help achieve their role in the sphere of social mutual 
guarantee. Social goals are understood to form an inseparable element of the 
Islamic banking system that cannot be dispensed with or neglected".-" 
In the words of IMF Managing Director Horst Khler, "there will not be a 
good future for the rich if there is no prospect of a better future for the poor." 
Besides being a moral question, poverty reduction is now recognized as a 
necessity for peace and security of the 1.2 billion people who still live on less 
than $1 aday".^ ' 
Professor Khursid mentions that some recent trends in the world capital 
movement show a clear shift towards equity investment and venture capital. 
Net private capital flows (direct investment, net portfolio investment and other 
longer and short term net investment flows) to developing countries 
represented $ 10.1 billion on average during 1973-77, increased to $ 27.4 
billion during 1978-82, and to $ 117.8 billion during 1989-95. The actual figure 
for 1998 is $ 155 billion. If these trends provide some clue to the future, they 
International Association of" Islamic Banks ( lAIB), Direcloiy of the Islamic Banks and linancia/ 
In.uiiiiiions, Members of the Association. 1990. 
Eduardo. Aninat , 'Surmount ing the Challenges of Globalization", Finance and Dcxclopmcnt . A 
quarlcrly magaz ine of IMF. March 2002. Volume 39, Number i). 
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suggest greater scope for equity investment in the coming decades ^^  The tabic 
7 1 illustrates the growth of equity market m some select countries during 
1986-1995. 
Table 7.1 
Growth of Equity Market in Select Countries 
(Values in US $ millions) 
Country 
Capitalization Annual % 
Rate of 
Growth 
1986-1990 
Annual % 
Rate of 
Growth 
1990-1995 
1986 1990 1995 
Bangladesh 186 321 1323 14 62 32 74 
Egypt 1716 1765 8088 0 71 35 59 
India 13588 38567 127199 29 80 26 96 
Indonesia 81 8081 66585 216 04 52 47 
Korea 13924 120594 181955 71 55 8 57 
Malaysia 15 65 48611 222729 34 03 35 58 
Morocco 279 966 5951 36 41 43 85 
Pakistan 1710 2850 9286 13 62 26 65 
Turkey 935 19065 20772 112 50 1 73 
France 149500 314384 522053 20 42 10 68 
Germany 257677 355073 577365 8 35 10 21 
Japan 1841785 2917679 3667292 12 19 4 68 
UK 439500 848866 1407737 17 89 1065 
US 2636598 3059434 6857622 3 79 17 52 
World Total 6514399 9393545 17787883 9 58 13 62 
Soiiue International Finance Coipoiat ion, 'Cmeig ing Stock markets Tact Book. 1996 t i led b) I iiaci 
A al -Omai and Iqbal, Munawai , "Some Sliategic Suggest ions foi Islamic Banking in the 21" Ccntiii \ 
Re\ iCM of Islamic Economics. N o 9, 2000 p 48 
"" A h m a d . Khuishid , i s l a m i c Finance and Banking The Chal lenges and Piospects . ReMeu of Islamic 
Lcononucs. Islamic Foundation, U K.. No 9. 2000, p 81 
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Islamic Financial markets have to take note of the recent developments 
in the international financial markets. There is now a worldwide trend Ibr 
establishing equity institutions such as private pension funds, mutual funds, etc. 
Equity market during recent years has grown smartly, not only in 
advanced countries but also the low developed countries have succeeded in 
raising resources from their own market as well as from the developed market. 
Globalization in this regard has played a positive role not only providing 
opportunity for rich countries to employ their resources in the most profitable 
ways but has also encouraged less developed countries to raise financial 
resources from the world market at lower cost than earlier would not have been 
possible without globalization. 
Conclusion 
There is hardly any disagreement that despite so much progress in the 
Islamic finance there is much to be achieved in the area of stability, efficiency 
and on the mobilization of resources. Islamic banking, as one western author 
points out, "still resembles that of the climber of a high mountain. The climber 
looks down and realizes that he has come a long way, then looks up and knows 
that a long ascent beckons. It is an exciting time and place for those in this 
growing industry as it moves towards the next stage of its evolution". ' ' 
Siddiqi in the same fervor declares that a return to ethics and morality is 
on the cards as "disillusionment with an amoral approach to economics and 
exasperation at the excesses of secular-materialistic-hegemonic policies of 
politicians has created a new environment. People, including the intellectuals, 
are willing to listen. Is a moral approach to economic activity possible? Is it 
possible to define distributive justice in terms, which take into account not only 
the immediate and the actual, which is often affected by things transient and 
insignificant, but also in terms of things essential and durable which relate to 
Green, S.K., 'Chal lenges Facing the Islamic Financc Industry", in proceedings of the l - ' o u r l h l l a r \ a r d 
University Forum on Islamic Finance, /s /am/c Finance- The Task Ahead. Cambridge. October 2002. p 
154, 
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the core of the human situation? Is it desirable to manage money, banking and 
finance in total indifference to such problems as poverty, unemployment and 
increasing levels of anxiety"^" 
Some western scholars, while conceding the reality of Islamic finance, 
caution Islamic economists not to forget that conventional finance will 
maintain its dominance over the world finance affairs in the foreseeable future 
and therefore, it is necessary that both the systems coexist with some stability. 
In the words of Hayes, "I want to re-emphasize the point that we live in a Vv'orld 
in which the western financial model is and will continue to be dominant for 
the foreseeable future. Islam cannot realistically develop an economic society 
that is sufficiently self-contained to run it strictly according to Islamic 
principles, without reference to the conventional Western financial model. 
Islamic finance will always have to live side by side with the conventional 
Western model".=' 
And finally, as Samuel Hayes cautions, "in a world in which the 
Western conventional model is the dominant player, it is important that Islamic 
finance, a niche player, understand what is happening in that broader world, 
and plan its own developments in ways that do not run head-on into the 
behemoths that dominate the conventional marketplace".^'' 
Whether conventional or Islamic Banking, it is hoped that banking in (he 
21" century must be Humane Banking with least exploitation and maxinnim 
possible care of the people. The two most attractive features of Islamic banking 
are ethics and equity. Islamic Banking armed with these strong points has 
entered the 21^' century. 
Siddiqi, M o h a m m a d Nejatul lah, -Comparat ive Advantages of Islamic Banicing and i ' inancc". i^ipcr 
Prc.sented at the Fifth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, 'Islamic Finance Dynamics and 
Devulopmenr, 6 April 2002. 
Hayes III, L. Samuel , 'Foreword ' , in proceedings of the Second Harvard University Forum on 
Islamic Finance: Islamic Finance into thelf Cenlury, Harvard University. Cambridge. Massachuset ts . 
October 1998. p. XV. 
Hayes 111, L. Samuel , ' Fo reword ' , in proceedings of the Fourth Harvard University l-Drum on Islamic 
Finance. Islamic Finance: The Task Ahead. Cambridge, October 2002, p. xvi, 
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